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STRANDED STRANGERS: ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES AND THE QUEST 
FOR URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN NAIROBI, KENYA 
Derese G Kassa 
May 10, 2013 
There is a burgeoning literature on Right to the City much of which is inspired by the 
pioneering works of Henry Lefebvre who wrote about urban citizenship for all 
inhabitants of the city, access to rights and resources in the city, and political 
participation in the management of urban affairs. This study explores whether the Right 
to the City approach can help explain the dynamics of state- refugee relations in the urban 
centers of Africa. Hence, I took the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (the capital city 
of Kenya) to answer the following research questions: a) How do Ethiopian urban 
refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in Nairobi?, b) How adequate is the “right 
to the city” approach to explain the everyday struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for 
rights and resources?, and c) What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take 
to manage conflict driven urbanization?  
vii 
 
The research is a qualitative case study where a total of 30 urban refugees and a total of 
20 community leaders and representatives of local and international civil society 
organizations working on refugee matters were interviewed. The interviews captured, 
described and discussed the respondents’ own ideas, opinions and experiences. I also 
reviewed international, national as well as urban level policy and strategic documents of 
Kenya when it comes to documenting and regulating international urban refugees.  
After the introduction, the second chapter dwells on a thorough discussion of the 
literature on citizenship and social justice, in general, and urban citizenship in particular. 
Following the third chapter on methodology, I embark on discussing the major findings.  
In a nutshell, I found out that urban refugees exist and interact on two different social 
spaces. On the one hand, they are actively involved in the production of urban space by 
employing their skills, money, time and social networks. On the other hand, refugees 
operate under very restrictive and discriminatory state policies that often deprive them 
basic liberties and freedoms. They, therefore, meet two of the criteria of Lefebvre’s 
concept of urban citizenship i.e. inhabitance and the production of urban spaces. 
However, they fail to meet the third criterion i.e. political rights to participate in the 
governance of the city. In short, they are stranded strangers who produce complex social, 
economic and political practices difficult to qualify in such conventional terms like 
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                                                     CHAPTER I 
       INTRODUCTION 
   Overview  
In today’s era of globalization, cities have become arenas where the notion of citizenship 
is re-scaled. Many are revisiting Henry Lefebvre’s writings on the Right to the City. 
However much of this scholarship ignores African cities and their particular experience 
with the influx of refugees from conflict ridden neighboring countries. In most African 
cities, urban refugees operate on a difficult terrain of multiple identities ranging from a 
‘refugee’, an ‘illegal’ immigrant, an ‘immigrant’ and/ or a city inhabitant.  In so doing, 
urban refugees contest and disrupt the conventional definitions of citizenship. Exploring 
these practices will contribute to the ongoing discussion and scholarship about urban 
citizenship. It will also have policy relevance to those who work on the issue of urban 
refugees in Africa. 
 
This dissertation is a case study of Ethiopian urban refugees in three (3) selected 
neighborhoods of Nairobi (the capital city of Kenya) that addresses the following specific 
research questions. First, “How do Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban 
citizenship in the city of Nairobi?” Second, “How adequate is the “right to the city” 
approach to explain the everyday struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and 
resources in the city of Nairobi?” And finally, “What kind of urban policy measures can 
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African cities take to manage conflict driven urbanization and use it as a positive force 
for social change?”  
 
Accordingly, a total of thirty (30) in-depth interviews with Ethiopian refugees and twenty 
(20) key informant interviews were conducted with  Kenyan officials, representatives of 
international organizations, NGO and community leaders. The study also reviewed 
relevant national policy documents and legislations of Kenya in relation to urban and 
refugee matters. In empirical terms, the main objective of this study is to shed light on 
how refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the host city. Theoretically 
speaking, however, the study aims to abstract whether Lefebvrian arguments for right to 
the city are useful heuristics in the case of African cities where the alien other is the 
refugee. 
 
This introductory chapter fleshes out the overall picture of the study. It begins by 
discussing the process of urbanization in Africa, the link between urbanization and forced 
displacement, and state-refugee relations in African cities. Subsequently, the chapter 
pivots to discuss the fundamentals of the “urban citizenship” literature and the rationale 
to re-appraise it in the African context. It then stipulates the major research questions and 
objectives of the study. Finally, the chapter ends by describing the significance of the 







The world is urbanizing in a rapid pace. Currently, “half the world’s population lives in 
urban areas and by the middle of this century all regions will be predominantly urban”. 
(UNHABITAT, 2008:11) The rate of urbanization is even higher in the global South 
much of which is attributed to exorbitant population growth rates and the rural urban 
migration of people. The same report indicated that Africa’s total population hit the one 
billion mark in 2009, almost 40 per cent of which now live in urban areas. In the future, 
Africa will witness “a total population increase of about 60 per cent between 2010 and 
2050, with the urban population tripling to 1.23 billion during this period.” 
(UNHABITAT, 2010:11) But there is more to urbanization than just the demographic 
concentration of people in cities. 
 
In fact, modern day urbanization occurred in much of Europe, North America and Asia 
following a shift from predominantly agrarian economies into industrial and service 
economies. But many of Africa’s cities emerged either as colonial outposts of 
administration or port cities where surplus is extracted and shipped over to the colonial 
metropolis. Post-independence,  
The Africanization of the public service and the expansion of para-statal agencies 
led to a high rate of new employment creation in urban centers, particularly in the 
capital cities. (Mabogunjie, 2005:6)  
 
Nevertheless, the decline of African cities soon begun following the oil crisis in 1973 and 
many African governments could no more sustain their nascent urban bases. The debt 
crisis set in and many African countries embarked on the infamous Structural Adjustment 
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Programs of the IMF and World Bank. The 1980s are dubbed as the lost years of Africa. 
According to Mabogunjie (2005:6),  
Everywhere, it was a period of harsh economic realities in which an increasing 
proportion of the population was compelled to operate within the informal sector 
economy and many were pushed below the poverty line. 
 
Today, rampant poverty is a major feature of cities in Africa. African cities are known for 
their sprawling slums and shanty settlements. What makes urban poverty very visible is 
that it sits right next to relative wealth and affluence. There are some quarters of the 
African city which are very well kept, with standard housing and public amenities in 
contrast to slum areas where housing is substandard, and basic amenities like electricity 
and clean water are not readily available. 
 
While African urbanization is predominantly explained through natural population 
growth and rural-urban migration, the impact of conflicts and conflict driven 
displacement on African cities is seldom explored. This is more so in the case of refugees 
who are not citizens of the host country or the city in question but whose settlement and 
‘stay’ impacts the host city in a number of ways. Consider east Africa where countries 
have been unstable and caught up in long and grinding civil wars. Up until 1991, 
Ethiopia’s 30 year old civil war unleashed thousands of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees 
in neighboring Sudan and Kenya.  Very recently (1999-2000), Eritrea and Ethiopia were 
engaged in full scale border war leading to a second round of refugee outflow. Somalia 
has long descended into a complete state collapse since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime 
in 1991 making it the foremost contributor of refugees in the Horn of Africa. The Sudan 
got a brief hiatus from the North-South civil war following the Naivasha Comprehensive 
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Peace agreement (2005), which led to the South Sudan referendum in January 2011. 
Otherwise, the civil war in South Sudan and the recent Darfur crisis contributed to the 
refugee bulge in east Africa and the massive flight of refugees into cities like Addis 
Ababa, and Nairobi.  
There are a number of reasons why refugees prefer to migrate to towns, sometimes on a 
second leg journey from a refugee camp to the capital city of a host country. Some of the 
reasons include, “security threats, lack of adequate education and medical services, 
limited livelihood opportunities and harsh climatic conditions.” (Pavanello et al, 2010:12) 
Upon arrival in cities, many of these refugees do not stay put but rather rent rooms, try to 
find job opportunities, open up businesses or go to school. In so doing, they try to support 
themselves, their immediate family members and kinfolk while processing their 
resettlement or immigration in Europe and America. They also contribute to urban 
economies even though most are involved in the informal sector of the economy.  
 
The case of urban refugees, in general, and the transformation they bring about in host 
cities are, to say the least, uncalled for by host countries. This is because the very notion 
of a ‘refugee’ is premised on a spatial and political category that we often refer to as the 
‘nation-state’. Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention defines a refugee as,  
A person who owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.  
 
The definition makes it clear that a refugee is defined by his country of origin and his/her 
inability to go back to that country of origin, instead of rights or privileges that a host 
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country would be willing to offer him or her. Hence, most refugee hosting countries in 
the South keep refugees in refugee camps.  
 
According to Kibreab (2003:60), some of the reasons for encampment by host nations 
include,  
(1) precluding refugee integration into host societies by minimizing or preventing 
economic, social, and cultural interaction with nationals; (2) avoiding or 
minimizing perceived risks to national and societal security by controlling refugee 
movements and activities; and (3) avoiding or minimizing competition over 
scarce resources such as land, pasture, water, forest produce, housing, schools, 
transportation, and employment opportunities in both the formal and informal 
sectors. 
 
Obviously, urban refugees bear the brunt of such hostile policies from national 
governments. According to Kibreab, urban refugees are “the most neglected and abused 
group throughout the developing countries” whose “basic fundamental human rights are 
often flagrantly violated by the security forces of the countries concerned.” (Kibreab, 
2003:60)  Beating these odds, however, they succeed to penetrate into capital cities and 
venture in a number of economic activities. A number of studies ((Sienkiewicz, 2007), 
(Campbell, 2006), (Kibreab, 2003), (Jacobsen, 2002)) have now been conducted among 
urban refugees where the contributions of urban refugees to the host city’s economy are 
duly recognized.  
 
For instance, Sienkiewicz (2007:7) argues that, “If states altered their existing policies 
and enabled displaced persons to work, then governments would benefit.” Campbell 
(2006:407) did a thorough study of Somali refugees in Eastleigh Nairobi concluding,  
As such, these urban refugees, like other migrants and traders, now have vested 
economic interests in Eastleigh. While war may have brought many refugees to 
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Eastleigh in the first place, peace negotiations alone will not necessarily take them 
all back home. 
 
Jacobsen (2002:594) also argues, “A policy that sought to incorporate long-standing 
refugees into the host society would increase the human security of everyone living 
there.”  
 
Clearly, these arguments try to persuade host city governments and countries to embrace 
urban refugees, benefit from their skills and resources and promote an “integrationist” 
policy than segregating and prohibiting them into remote camps. But integration is easier 
said than done. Embarking on such a project requires more than issuing identification 
documents, business or driving licenses or enrolling the children of urban refugees to 
public schools. Rather it requires: a) grappling with the notion of ‘citizenship’ both at the 
national and urban level, b) assessing the social capital of urban refugees and its 
economic relevance in the host cities, and c) studying host-refugee relations while 
studying the potential impact of an integrationist approach to urban refugees.  
 
Accordingly, this study takes the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (the capital city of 
Kenya) to inquire, research and arrive at conclusion on the following issues. 
 
1. The study looks at the concept of “citizenship”, its normative and theoretical 
origins as well as the changes and alternations it underwent in time. It also 
explores in greater depth on how the concept of “citizenship” is re-scaled and re-
qualified at the “urban” level. It does so by paying discriminate emphasis on the 
“urban citizenship” or “right to the city” literature which begun with the 
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pioneering works of Henry Lefebvre (1967/8) and is now gaining more traction 
and currency. 
 
2. The study looks at the case of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi to consider 
whether the debate about “urban citizenship” speaks to the African experience of 
cities or not. It looks at the strength and weaknesses of the “right to the city” 
approach when applied to the case of refugees in African cities. It also narrates 
about the anomalies and the exceptional dynamics of urban processes in Africa. In 
so doing, the study challenges some of the premises of the “urban citizenship” 
literature espoused by scholars many of whom base their analysis on the 
experience of western cities.  
 
3. The study brings up practical policy recommendations to better state-refugee 
relations and urban governance. These recommendations were made by urban 
refugees themselves, local and national level government officials, and civil 
society activists who work on urban refugee issues in Nairobi. 
 
The following two sections (1.2 and 1.3) preview the theoretical discussion about urban 
citizenship and the need to re-appraise it in the context of Africa. The bulk of this 
analysis is done in chapter 2 of the study. However, it is important to summarize it as a 
precursor or a foreground to the discussion about the research questions and objectives of 





1.2 Right to the City/Urban Citizenship: The Fundamentals   
Through the thickness of daily life and local, mostly informal politics, cities can 
accommodate and enable the unbundling of the tight articulation of the citizen 
and formal state politics. Saskia Sassen
1
  
There is a lot of theoretical debate about what the term ‘citizen’ entails. According to 
Varasnyi (2006:231) “the etymology of the word ‘citizenship’ reveals its urban origins: 
there is a clear connection between the word citizen and the word that we now translate in 
English as city-state.” Nevertheless, the term citizenship “has been hegemonically 
associated with membership in a national political community.” (Purcell, 2003:571) But 
even within the confines of the nation-state, defining citizenship has always been a 
controversial issue.  
 The oldest version of citizenship comes from a liberal social contract reading. Here a 
citizen is defined in terms of rights and privileges the individual claims from his/her state, 
vis-à-vis the duties and responsibilities he or she has to that respective state. For Holsten 
and Appadurai (1996:190) a liberal rendition of citizenship is dependent “only on 
membership in the nation-state” and an “array of civil, political, socio-economic, and 
cultural rights people possess and exercise.”  Obviously such a basic, formal and rights 
based definition of citizenship has come under fire from others who harp on 
communitarian and ethical belongingness to the nation.  
Civic republicans uphold that the citizen is more than a voter or a tax payer; he or she 
“would have to devote the better part of his or her time and energy to public concerns.” 
                                                     
1
 Saskia Sassen((2006), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, 




(Dagger, 1981:718) For civic-republicans, therefore, citizenship is public vocation to be 
pursued and mastered by individual members in a given cultural and political community. 
Here, the city is implied as a community whose cultural and political boundaries are co-
terminus. In fact some like Dagger (1981) argue that the city in its diversity and multi-
culturalism is eroding the civic and communitarian bases of citizenship at the national 
scale. The city, for most civic republicans, is now not “more than a bewildering 
agglomeration of streets and buildings and nameless faces.” (Dagger, 1981:718) 
Still others defy the primacy of the nation-state to construe a political community; 
arguing that we are all human beings who belong to one global community with certain 
universal, basic and human rights. Hence, they argue for cosmopolitan citizenship. 
According to Baubock (2009:475), cosmopolitan citizenship refers to “duties of solidarity 
that human beings have towards others across state borders and national identities 
(Nussbaum 2000, Appiah 2006).”  While many are skeptical about the notion of 
cosmopolitan (some even talk of global) citizenship, civic republicans are very cynical 
about a cosmopolitan project. For the latter, cosmopolitan citizenship “fails to specify the 
concrete rights and duties which bind citizens in relations of close cooperation within 
bounded communities.” (Linklater, 1998:27) Hence, cosmopolitan citizenship “fails to 
engage those (people) in any effective form of shared rule.” (Linklater, 1998:27) 
Each of these strands of thought has their fair share of criticisms. Liberalism is charged 
for ignoring the fact that in many cases the nation-state trumps the rights of various racial 
or cultural minority groups, castes, women or classes within its confines. Civic-
republicanism fosters a homogenous political community with shared values and 
commitments which is not practically the case for many nation-states. Cosmopolitanism 
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rides roughshod over the reality that communities should share histories, resources, and 
institutions within the bounds of a given geographic territory to conceive each other as 
fellow citizens.  Also, many argue that someone has to be excluded as an ‘alien’ or a 
‘foreigner’ for the citizen to exist. Hence the idea of global citizenship is oxymoronic. 
The task of defining citizenship has become even more complicated owing to 
globalization, where countries and cities have become arenas for: a) global migration of 
skilled and unskilled labor, b) the global articulation of capital and investment, c) the 
global production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, and d) heightened 
exchange of information and technologies. These processes have reduced the power of 
the nation-state by displacing it upwards (to global and supranational entities like the 
EU), downwards (to sub-national entities regions and cities) and outwards (retrenchment 
of the public sector due to privatization). (Purcell, 2003)  The urban scale has now 
become one prominent site where citizenship is re-scaled and re-qualified.   
The attempt to comprehend such new relations between cities and citizenship has now led 
to the ‘discovery’ of Henry Lefebvre’s prominent theoretical works under the rubric of 
the ‘right to the city’ literature. A philosopher and urban sociologist, Lefebvre first 
coined the term ‘the right to the city’ in 1968 in his book “Le droit a’ la ville”. The book 
“describes the negative impact that the capitalist economy has on cities, converting the 
city into a commodity serving only the interests of capital accumulation.” (Mathivet, 
2010:21) As an antidote, Lefebvre proposes that “that inhabitants demand control over 




Lefebvre’s right to the city book points out the need to reconfigure citizenship at the 
urban level. Three important points stand out in Lefebvre’s work about urban citizenship.  
First, his approach is revolutionary in that he “rests urban citizenship on inhabitance as 
opposed to the nation-state scale.” (Purcell, 2002:106) As Purcell and Baubock clearly 
put it, Lefebvre’s notion of urban citizenship does not depend on ius soli (being born in 
the territory) or ius sanguinis (descent from citizen parents) but rather ius domicile 
(inhabitance in the city). This is remarkable for Lefebvre nullifies the Kantian rendition 
of the stranger –the ‘alien’, the ‘immigrant’, or the ‘refugee’ -by giving any or every 
dweller equal political rights. Similarly, Harvey and Potter (2009:42) define urban 
citizenship as “the rights of immigrants, transients, and strangers to participate in local 
politics”.    
Secondly, the Lefevbrian notion of urban citizenship emphasized the right of people to 
appropriate space which, in the words of Purcell, is the “full and complete usage of the 
city”. It means inhabitants can “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and 
occupy urban space.” (Purcell, 2002:106) To borrow one of Edward Soja’s article titles, 
Lefebvre’s bundle of rights were all meant to negate Margin/Alia – the exclusion of 
alleged aliens. Thirdly, the right to the city implies the right to directly participate in the 
democratic management of the urban space. Here again, Lefebvre makes a radical 
departure from the liberal democratic version of representative democracy. He posits 
representation alienates the citizen.  Instead, Lefebvre underscores that urban citizens 
should exercise their right to difference  meaning the right to claim rights, to struggle and 
conflict with the powers that be while managing one’s own city. Hence urban citizenship 
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“does not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to a political 
identity.” (Dikec, 2009:76) 
1.3 Urban Citizenship in Africa: Rationales for Re-appraisal  
It is clear that the right to the city literature is very much focused on the experiences of 
western cities. (Lefevbre, 1968; Dagger, 1981; Baubock, 2003, 2009; Dikec, 2009; 
Fainstein, 2009; Harvey, 2003, 2009; Holston and Appadurai, 1996; Isin, 2002) Almost 
all authors assume that ‘national citizenship’ is unraveling in western cities for the 
following reasons. First of all, western cities are increasingly connected and globalized. 
Secondly, there are scores of diverse, legal as well as ‘illegal’ immigrants in these global 
cities that challenge (or as Purcell argues ‘destabilize’) the Liberal Democratic 
Westphalian (LDW) definition of citizenship.  But the right to the city literature does not 
take into account the experience of non-western nations, in general, and non western 
cities, in particular. Richard Falk (2000:6) captured how narrow the debate about 
changing forms of citizenship is by stating:  
It needs to be appreciated more than is generally the case that this discourse 
on citizenship, and its changing character, remains an essentially Western 
experience that has not taken existential hold in non-Western societies nearly to 
the extent as have such other quintessential Western conceptions as territorial 
sovereignty, international diplomacy, the rule of law, and even human rights. 
This particular study departs from the experience of western cities. It explores whether 
the right to the city approach could help explain urban dynamics in a non-western city 
context.  True, African countries are increasingly urbanizing. African states are also 
increasingly affected and influenced by global flows of capital, technology, information 
and people. Cities like Johannesburg, Nairobi, Cairo and Addis Ababa are increasingly 
networked with regional and global systems of commerce and diplomacy.  
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Nevertheless, African cities and countries have certain particularities. Most cities in 
Africa are still surrounded by a large swathe of rural or agrarian populations, and are the 
targets of massive rural-urban migration. African states, in many instances, have 
problems of political representation, participation and coercion. (Clapham C, 1985; 
Bayart, 1989; Ake, 1986; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Diamond, 1999)  Also civil 
society is limited in scope; its autonomy is undercut either by the state or foreign donors. 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Gibbon et al 1992; Chole and Jibrin 1995; Mkandawire 
and Olukoshi 1995) 
Studying the right to the city and its applicability to urban spaces in Africa will be useful 
for a number of reasons. First of all, urban theories have always been Eurocentric 
epistemic projects. Most of them were fetched from social practices and processes that 
unfolded in the western world. Hence they are more adept to explain, analyze or put in 
perspective western urban processes. Yielding their heuristic and analytical value to the 
African context means we need to compare the commonalities and anomalies between 
African cities and their Euro-American counterparts.  Robinson (2004:571) is right to 
point out that one way of disrupting this “western” and “non-western” divide in urban 
theorizing would be “to parochialize those accounts of cities which pose as universal.” 
For instance, she mentions that, “Louis Wirth’s account of ‘the’ urban way of life was 
profoundly dependent on experiences of European and American cities – if not simply on 
Chicago” (Robinson, 2004:571) Exploring processes of urbanism in Africa can be one 
way of making the western experience stand “as just another region in the world, neither 




By the same token, the right to the city literature was developed and widely written about 
mostly from the perspective of western cities. The theory can spare itself from a 
universalist impulse and sloganeering (which is already happening in urban social 
movement circles) by anchoring itself in particular contexts like African cities.  A caveat 
is important here. This would not stifle the attempt to develop ‘grand’ or ‘meta’ theories 
on urbanism or cities in general. To the contrary, it should lead to better theorizing.  In 
the words of Robinson, “If efforts to develop understandings of city life could track 
across different contexts”, then “the resources for understanding cities everywhere would 
be enlivened.” (Robinson, 2004:575) 
 
Secondly, the right to the city literature offers a background where the modern city is 
reduced to become a city of capital, and not of citizens. Its repeated call for urban 
citizenship is targeted at reducing the power of global capital and the neo-liberal state that 
use cities as their respective ‘command centers’. (Lefebvre, 1968; Dikec, 2009; Fainstein, 
2009; Harvey, 2003, 2009) Africa, on the other hand, offers a different scenario of urban 
(and by extension global) integration. One feature of Africa’s urbanization is the massive 
migration of displaced refugees-the common folk- from one country to another. Most 
African cities are swelling in size due to the influx of refugees from war torn neighboring 
countries, rather than capitalists.  Nairobi, for instance, has been hosting a large number 
of urban refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, the DRC, Rwanda and 
Uganda over the last four decades. Looking at urban refugees in African cities will 
therefore help us understand how people struggle for rights and resources in urban Africa 




Thirdly, the liberal, democratic and Westphalian versions of the ‘state’ and the ‘citizen’ 
are seldom applicable in the context of African cities.  Discussing the case of South 
African and Botswanan cities, Nyamnjoh (2007:74) frames this unique context stating; 
“Even when legal rights are extended to migrants, racial and ethnic minorities; they have 
not always been able to claim them”. In fact, “disaffected nationals, in conjunction with 
the state, direct their resentment against immigrants and ethnic minorities.” (Nyamnjoh, 
2007:74) While many western cities speak of illegal immigrants, rising sentiments of 
xenophobia and racism against these ‘aliens’; African cities now speak of urban refugees. 
 
Incidents of harassment, violence and xenophobia by the public are common news items 
from countries like South Africa, Kenya, and most of the Maghreb countries in North 
Africa. (Simone A, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007.2006; Nyaoro, 2010) Authorities, especially 
the police, are known for harassing refugees; asking for bribes and presents from 
refugees; and detaining refugees arbitrarily and under false pretence. (Nyaoro, 2010; 
Nyamnjoh, 2006) In short, urban refugees are the alien inhabitants of the African city. 
Hence we should ask: What does right to the African city then mean? And, how do 
refugees struggle to access rights and resources amidst such hostility?  To answer these 
questions, one should look at “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and 
exclusion informed by race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography that determine 
accessibility to citizenship in real (my emphasis) terms.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:79)  
 
Last but not least, any discussion about urban citizenship in Africa would bring new 
concepts such as “liminality” and “transience” into the literature on the right to the city. 
Urban refugees often use African host cities as transit corridors for international 
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migration, as opposed to legal or illegal immigrants who land in western cities to settle in 
permanently.  This ‘suspended’ nature of their stay in host cities renders them to a 
situation of ‘liminality’. They consider themselves as sojourners (waiting to emigrate out 
of host cities) but also demand rights and resources as legal inhabitants of the host city. 
Kihato (2007:8) summarized the case of refugees from Ivory Coast living in 
Johannesburg stating: 
The social space that is occupied by immigrants in Johannesburg is one that defies 
clear definition. Indeed it is a liminal space in which a population is caught 
between and betwixt an often idealised past and an imagined future. This liminal 
condition is articulated not only by their own perceptions of their dislocation in 
South African society, but by their imagining of a future ‘back home’ or outside 
of the continent. This has a profound impact on questions of belonging, and 
citizenship. Migrant narratives, the nature of their associational life, and their 
relationships to home and host country, constantly reconfirm their unrootedness 
and transience in their everyday lives in Johannesburg. 
 
Given all these, we can safely argue that the right to the city theory would gain a lot by 
taking the African case into account.   
 
On the other hand, employing the right to the city approach using the case of urban 
refugees will contribute a lot to the study of forced displacement and urban refugees in 
Africa. The first contribution will be in reorienting the scholarship about refugees in 
Africa from an “encampment centered” approach to an “urban centered” approach.  
There is a dearth of information about ‘urban refugees’ in Africa who cross international 
borders and land in   host cities. In contrast, refugees who cross border zones and settle in 
refugee camps receive a lot of research and policy attention. According to Weaver, these 
camp refugees “enjoy a level of technical and socioeconomic assistance and 
infrastructure superior to urban refugees who have self settled in cities of the host 
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country.” (Weaver, 1988:459) Accordingly, Kibreab (1996:131) dubbed ‘urban refugees’ 
as people that “the eye refuses to see”. Anita Fabos (2003:1) built on this notion of 
invisibility stating,  
Indeed, the association of African refugees with camps is so overwhelming that it 
is often the first image that comes to mind for perhaps the majority of people who 
are not refugees.   
In its own modest way, this study aims to bring to light the struggles of urban refugees 
and give them some visibility. 
 
Secondly, the current approach to the treatment of refugees in Africa focuses on 
providing basic services in camps until such time comes that refugees get permanently 
relocated in a third (usually western) country. Such a temporary and service providing 
approach to refugees departs significantly from international declarations and policy 
instruments that bestow various rights on refugees.  Some of these rights include: a) the 
right to possess property (UN, Article 13,1951), b) protection of the “industrial, artistic, 
literary and scientific works of a refugee” (UN, Article 14, 1951), c) the right to gainful 
employment in the host country, d) right to public education and housing (UN, Articles 
21 and 22, 1951).  The right to the city approach will therefore be useful since it 
reintroduces a rights centered discourse to study urban refugees.   
 
Thirdly, a rights centered discourse would help us consider whether we can speak of 
urban citizenship regimes in Africa. And if so, it will help us contemplate what the remits 
or parameters of urban citizenship for African refugees ought to be like. It could be the 
case that urban refugees value and prefer to have certain rights to the city as opposed to 
others. For instance, Kihato (2007) found out that Ivorian refugees in Johannesburg only 
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focused on economic rights as opposed to political rights. She stated, “Many do not 
necessarily want political rights, but they do want rights to economic opportunities”. 
(Kihato, 2007:10) This study would trace if there are similar patterns amongst Ethiopian 
urban refugees in Nairobi or not. Exploring these processes would help discover whether 
we can speak of right to the city in generic terms, or as specifically outlined or 
contextualized portfolios of rights.  
 
Last but not least, the policy and political implications of the right to the African city has 
already become a topic of research and discussion among African scholars.  Parnell and 
Pieterse (2010) pioneered this project of appropriating the right to the city literature. They 
state, “Curiously, the notions of urban citizenship, with its assumptions of universality, 
have been little applied to the fundamental development questions of how cities of the 
South might be imagined or governed.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148) This lacuna, 
they argue, is “apparent by the absence of an articulated rights-based agenda for cities of 
the South.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148) For them, “the concept of the rights based 
city offers innovative ways of advancing debate about the developmental state” as 
opposed to “neoliberal governmentality.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148) 
 
Pieterse and Parnell’s model lays out a “generation of rights”. The first generation of 
rights focuses on individual rights for voting, health, education. The second generation of 
rights focuses on household services like housing, water, energy and waste management. 
They then speak of rights to the city, as the third generation of rights, which include 
things like public safety, social amenities, and public transport.  Parnell and Pieterse 
share Lefebvre’s suspicion and skepticism about representative democracy and the neo-
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liberal state. But their call to “build state capacities and deliver economic opportunities to 
the poor or to redistribute from the rich” does not tally up with Lefebvre’s deep seated 
suspicion about any state project. (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010: 150) Here again, one 
should be able to ask whether a developmental state is better placed to cater to groups 
like urban refugees than the neoliberal state. And if so, its potential implications for city 
planners and policy makers in African cities ought to be studied.  To sum up, the Right to 
the City approach could break fresh ground: by making the case of urban refugees more 
visible, by reorienting the focus of refugee studies on rights and power relations, and 
articulating new trends of thought on rights to the city in Africa.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives  
This far I have established how rapidly Africa is urbanizing partly due to the inflow of 
refugees from neighboring countries in conflict. I also discussed about the unique set of 
circumstances that urban refugees find themselves in while interacting with the policies 
of the host state (on the one hand) and regular citizens of the host country (on the other). 
This was followed by a discussion about citizenship, in general, and urban citizenship, in 
particular. The “urban citizenship” literature begins by discussing how the process of 
globalization forced the nation state to relinquish its power both to supra and sub national 
levels. Cities have now become arenas where citizenship is redefined. Hence there is an 
increased interest in Henry Lefebvre’s discussions of urban citizenship as the rights of all 
inhabitants to appropriate and use urban spaces; and to directly participate in the 
management of these urban spaces.  
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However, the right to the city approach pays a discriminate emphasis to the experiences 
of western cities ignoring non-western cities and how citizenship and rights are being 
defined in those areas.  African cities are urbanizing rapidly due to the influx of refugees 
from civil wars in neighboring countries. Both individually (as active human agents) and 
collectively (as urban enclaves of ethnic refugees): these urban refugees have managed to 
be involved in economic activities, to access public goods like education and health 
services, and transform urban neighborhoods. Urban refugees negotiate a difficult terrain 
of multiple identities ranging from a ‘refugee’, an ‘illegal’ immigrant, an immigrant and/ 
or a city inhabitant. But very little is researched about the conditions of urban refugees, in 
general, and how urban refugees are contesting formal definitions of citizenship, in 
particular. To borrow from Harvey and Potter (2009:42): can we speak of urban 
citizenship in Africa as “the rights of immigrants, transients, and strangers to participate 
in local politics?” There is a lot of merit in asking this question but some deserve 
mentioning. 
First of all, the right to the city theory could spare itself from universalist impulses and 
sloganeering by anchoring itself in contexts like African cities
2
.  For instance, looking at 
urban refugees will help us understand and explain how people at the margins struggle 
for rights and resources in African cities as opposed to the global elite. It would bring 
new concepts such as “liminality” and “transience” into the literature on the right to the 
city.  It would also illuminate “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and 
exclusion” that “determine accessibility to citizenship in real terms.” (Nyamnjoh, 
                                                     
2
 This is already happening amongst international outfits who work on urban development 
issues in the South. For instance UNHABITAT organized a World Urban Form in Rio 




2007:79) On the other hand, the right to the city theory would help inform and enrich the 
scholarship on forced displacement, in general, and urban refugees, in particular. To sum 
up, the right to the city theory could break fresh ground: by making the case of urban 
refugees more visible, by reorienting the focus of refugee studies on rights and power 
relations, and articulating new trends of thought on right to the city in Africa.  
 
Hence, this particular study aims to answer the following three major research questions 
by taking the case of Ethiopian refugees in selected neighborhoods of the capital city of 
Kenya, Nairobi
3
.  The first research question reads, “How do Ethiopian urban refugees 
negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of Nairobi?” The second research 
question reads, “How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday 
struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi? The 
third major research question reads, “What kind of urban policy measures can African 
cities take to manage conflict driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social 
change?”  Table one (1) illustrates these three major research questions. 
Table 1. Major Research Questions 
 
1. How do Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of 
Nairobi? 
2. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday struggle of 
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi? 
 
3. What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take to manage displacement 
driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social change? 
 
 
                                                     
3
 The reasons why the city of Nairobi and Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi are 
selected for this study will be discussed in greater depth in the methodology chapter 
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These research questions could be translated into five research objectives.  Accordingly,  
1) This study aims to explore the adequacy of the right to the city literature in a non-
western urban context.  
 
2) The study also investigates refugee-host city relations taking the particular case of 
Ethiopian refugees in the city of Nairobi. 
 
3)  The study looks at the educational, religious and social institutions of the 
Ethiopian refugee community and explored how refugees bank on these and other 
social networks to survive and thrive in Nairobi. The study also inquires whether 
refugees use their social capital to negotiate and secure other economic and 
political rights in the host city. 
 
4) The study focuses on the enterprises and business establishments owned by 
Ethiopian refugees, looking at how these enterprises benefit from both the refugee 
community and Kenyan citizens of Nairobi.  It also attempts to shed light on 
whether the participation of refugees in economic activities translates into 
bargaining power to access other rights to the city.  
 
5) Last but not the least, this study provides a brief historical analysis of Kenya’s 
national policy on the issue of refugees. It attempts to trace how the refugee 
inflow started in the country, in general, and in Nairobi, in particular. It also tries 
to capture the dynamics around the initiation, development and ratification of 
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Kenyan policy regimes regarding urban refugees, both at the national and local 
level.   
For summary purpose, however, one can reduce these specific objectives into two major 
objectives. Empirically speaking, the main objective of this study is to shed light on how 
refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the host city. It explores how urban 
refugees employ their knowledge, resources and networks to appropriate and manage the 
urban space. This process entailed negotiating and accessing rights, resources and power 
within the host city. Theoretically speaking, however, the study reflects on whether 
Lefebvrian arguments for right to the city are useful heuristics in the case of African 
cities where the alien other is mostly the refugee, instead of the immigrant. 
1.5 Significance of the Study  
I have already stated under section 1.3 that much of the literature on cities, globalization 
and its footloose circulation of labor, capital, technology and goods in cities is derived 
from the experiences of Western Europe and North America. In contrast, we have the 
African continent which is rapidly urbanizing but is least studied. Even more, the 
potential link between conflicts, urbanization and inhabitants’ right to the city has not 
been adequately studied. This study therefore has some theoretical contribution by way 
of qualifying the process of urbanization in Nairobi, charting refugee-host community 
relations, and looking at how refugees use their human, financial and social capital to 
negotiate more ‘rights to the city’.  
Secondly, the study aims to reflect on how the city of Nairobi is coming to grips with the 
issue of urban refugees by looking into international, national and city wide policies and 
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legal instruments. In addition, it captures the actual praxis (lived experience) of state-
refugee relations on the ground. Particularly, interviews with refugees and their 
community leaders, as well as Nairobi’s legislators and officials yielded useful 
information on which policies worked and which ones did not. Eventually, the study does 
present a set of policy recommendations that would help facilitate the relationship 
between the city of Nairobi and urban refugees.    
Methodologically speaking, there were many advantages to conducting a case study. First 
of all, case studies provide a deep understanding of how a certain social process has 
influenced or affected a given group, community, nation, etc. According to Schutt 
(2009:428) “What distinguishes case study research is the emphasis on understanding the 
case as a ‘whole’”. The researcher may “focus on different parts of the case during 
analysis, but the researcher’s primary concern is fitting the parts together-understanding 
the interrelations among the elements that make up the whole case.” (Schutt, 2009:428) 
Secondly, case studies “are friendly to employ a wide range of interconnected 
interpretive practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject matter at 
hand.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:5)  
1.6 Organization of the Study  
Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the literature on citizenship and the emerging 
debate on urban citizenship. It also draws a distinction between the relatively new 
discussion about “right to the city” and the older theoretical debate about social justice in 
the city indicating that the debate about urban citizenship frames the notions of inclusion, 
participation and decision making not within the frameworks of a liberal-democratic 
state. To the contrary, Lefebvre’s works stand out as critique of liberal democracies. 
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Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the study. It sets out with a summary of the 
general and specific research questions already discussed in this introductory chapter. In 
this chapter, I have also argued why I consider a qualitative case study is ideal to address 
the research questions I raised. The chapter then delves into a discussion of the data 
collection methods, the sampling procedures and analysis of the data gathered from the 
field.  
Chapter 4 is the first part of the data analysis. It begins by providing a more detailed 
analysis about the profile of urban refugees, and their reasons for migration. It then 
discusses about the challenges and opportunities the city of Nairobi offered to them upon 
arrival. It then delves into a discussion about the different livelihood schemes of urban 
refugees outlining how refugees use their skill set, their capital, and their community 
networks to engage in gainful employment.  The chapter ends by looking at the various 
religious, cultural and educational institutions established by Ethiopian refugees and 
inquires the role and relevance of these institutions to refugee life. 
Chapter 5 zooms into the more crucial issue of state-refugee relations first by looking at 
the generation of international, continental and national protocols and laws that the 
Kenyan state subscribed to officially. The chapter looks into the pros and cons of these 
protocols and legislations followed by refugees’ own reflections about the Kenyan State, 
the Nairobi city council and their relationship with the law enforcement agencies of the 
State.  
Chapter 6 is a critical summary of how urban refugees are “governed” in Kenya. It begins 
be revising the major findings of the study both in chapter 4 and 5. It then utilizes the 
arguments of the “right to the city” approach itself to consider whether the “urban 
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citizenship” literature speaks to the experience of urban refugees in Nairobi. These 
discussions lead to the final section of the chapter which underscores the need to have a 
critical look at  power and governance at the “nation-state” level in Africa since it is 
directly, if not more influentially, involved in the urban governance of refugees. In other 
words, section 6.4 stands out as a critique of the emphasis that “the right to the city” 
literature proffers at the “urban” level.  
Chapter 7 deals with specific policy recommendations that urban refugees, government 
officials and civil society leaders working on urban refuge matters forwarded as useful 
entry points for better policy and governance of urban refugees. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research by recapturing the original research questions,  
providing a synopsis of the major theoretical debates on urban citizenship, and comparing 
the empirical findings of the study alongside the theoretical premises of “right to the city” 









REVIEW OF LITERATURE   
Overview 
This chapter engages the literature on citizenship in more detail. The first section starts 
out by reviewing the origin of the term “citizen” and the major strands of thought in 
explaining what it means. Accordingly, it outlines the liberal social contract, civic 
republican and cosmopolitan citizenship theories. It then elaborates Henry Lefebvre’s 
work on “right to the city” followed by recent works on “urban citizenship” many of 
which were inspired by Lefebvre’s work. It then draws a distinction between the 
contemporary works on urban citizenship and the older theoretical debate about social 
justice in the city. It ends by pointing out how the debate about urban citizenship frames 
the notions of inclusion, participation and decision making beyond the frameworks of the 
liberal-democratic nation-state.  
2.1    Cities and Citizenship  
2.1.1 Citizenship and the State: Brief Background  
The term citizen emerged in “the course of the constitutional upheavals of the 
seventeenth century” when the opponents of the Stuart monarchy in England began to 
“seriously question the powers of the Crown” describing themselves “as free born 
citizens than as subjects to their king.” (Skinner, 2003:11) A citizen is hence a free entity, 
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as opposed to a slave or a subject whose freedoms are curtailed and confined by a 
sovereign other i.e. a slave master or a monarch. Skinner calls this Westphalian notion of 
citizenship as neo-Roman where, “To be free as a citizen requires that the actions of the 
state should reflect the will of all its citizens.” (Skinner, 2003:15)  
This narrative about freedom, and the free citizen was soon critiqued by the anti-
republican and pro-monarchical writings of Thomas Hobbes (1649-1651). For Hobbes, 
liberty has nothing to do with dependence on others or independence from others. 
Freedom, he argues, is taken away from people “only by identifiable acts of interference 
on the part of external agents.” (Skinner, 2003:15) So when the law coerces us to do 
something by “arousing fears about the evil consequences of disobedience”, we are not 
acting “unfreely in obeying it.” (Skinner, 2003:16) We are not becoming slaves of the 
sovereign law. Rather, we are like “the man who throws his goods into the Sea for fear 
that the ship would sink.” (Skinner, 2003:16) Arguing so, Hobbes strongly criticizes the 
belief that “subjects in a popular common wealth enjoy liberty.” (Skinner, 2003:16)  
Obviously, Hobbesian calls for Leviathan were met with furious repudiations. Skinner 
quotes the incisive work of Algernon Sidney (1694), who responded back to Hobbesian 
affirmations of coercion by a sovereign (usually a monarch) and its consistency with 
liberty as totally illogical. He argued that one cannot accept, “those men or nations are 
not slaves, who have no other title to what they enjoy, than the grace of the prince, which 
he may revoke whensoever he pleaseath.” (Skinner, 2003:16) Sidney continued, “if it be 




These arguments about freedom, citizenship and slavery circled on two major points. 
First, there has always been controversy on the degree of coercion that the state should be 
allowed to exercise on its members. How do we strike the balance between sufficient 
coercion to ensure public safety, law and order (on the one hand) without  stifling on the 
human and civil liberties of individual citizens( on the other hand)? Secondly, beginning 
from the 17
th
 century experiments of republicanism, liberty and citizenship are defined in 
negative terms i.e. freedom from the coercive and stifling powers of the state. The 
philosophy of liberalism, Skinner argues, is rooted in this negative undercurrent of 
liberty. Protagonists (Skinner, 2003:20) argue,  
If liberty is the ideal to be cherished, and if law is the principal means by which it 
is undermined, and then we have a powerful reason for controlling the state in the 
name of maximizing our freedom as citizens.  
Only recently, liberalism has turned into a positive rendition of liberty where the state is 
redefined as the institution which can improve people’s lives, redress inequalities and 
render equity and some sort of social justice.  TH Green and Bernard Bosanquet 
pioneered this project. Green, for instance, argues that “to speak of the freedom of a man 
is thus to speak of the state in which he shall have realized his ideal of himself.” (Skinner, 
2003:21) Hence, the state assumed the role of ‘hindering hindrances’ such as “free and 
compulsory education (because ignorance is hindrance), health care (because disease is 
hindrance) and state pensions and welfare (because poverty is hindrance)”. (Skinner, 
2003:23) Interestingly, liberalism (in its broad philosophical stroke) oscillates between a 
minimalist (negative) rendition of the state and a maximalist (positive) rendition of the 
state.  If we are to look at these two signposts and deduce their narrative about 
citizenship, the minimalist approach borders a libertarian narrative of a citizen (low taxes, 
less regulation, a watchman state). Whereas, the maximalist narrative borders the 
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progressive/liberal rendition of a citizen (high taxes for equity, more regulation, an 
enabling state). 
2.1.2 Theories of Citizenship 
Contemporary debates about citizenship do spring from the classic debate about the 
powers of the state vis-a- vis the rights and duties of citizens. Obviously, the oldest 
renditions of citizenship are the liberal social contract theories. These approaches argue 
that citizens primarily are rights holders.  TH Marshall, in his seminal work Citizenship 
and Social Class suggests that “the citizen/state relationship is an inter-subjective one” 
where both the state and the citizen are entities “possessing interests, resources, and 
capacities” of their own. (Poggi, 2003:42) But such a formal, legalistic approach to 
citizenship has been quite problematic. Holsten and Appadurai (1996:190) give us a 
critical summary of why the liberal definition of citizenship lacks rigor and salience. 
They state,   
Although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that 
which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal 
status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship. That it is 
not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who have formal membership in 
the state but who are excluded in fact or law from enjoying the rights of 
citizenship and participating effectively in its organization. This condition also 
applies to citizens of all classes who find that their preferences for a desirable or 
proper form of life-for example, with regard to sexual or religious practices-are 
not adequately embodied in the national-public sphere of rights even though the 
communities in which they live may overwhelmingly approve them.  
The first critique of the formal and legalistic definitions of citizenship comes from civic-
republicans who argue that legal status is “the basis of citizenship, but it was not the 
whole of the matter.” (Dagger, 1981:720) For civic republicans, the citizen is more than a 
voter or a tax payer; he or she “would have to devote the better part of his or her time and 
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energy to public concerns.” (Dagger, 1981:718) Hence citizenship is a “public vocation” 
that “carries with it a responsibility to act with the interests of the community in mind.” 
(Dagger, 1981:718) Such communitarian renditions of citizenship which emphasize 
ethical membership, active participation and the pursuit of a ‘common good’ (or the 
“national interest”) by individual citizens usually lament the loss of this ‘pristine’ form of 
citizenship. The culprit, many uphold, is liberalism. Dagger (1981:720), for instance 
argues,  
Liberals have tended to regard political participation principally as a means of 
protecting and furthering one's private interests, and as something, therefore, that 
is neither worthwhile in itself nor part of the citizen's responsibility.  
A more recent approach towards citizenship which actually attempts to defy the territorial 
and political confines of the nation state is the literature on ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’. 
According to Baubock (2009:475), cosmopolitan citizenship refers to “duties of solidarity 
that human beings have towards others across state borders and national identities 
(Nussbaum 2000, Appiah 2006)”. The debate about global or cosmopolitan citizenship 
echoes Roman teachings of Stoicism where “every person was thought of as born into 
and hence a citizen of two republicae: a particular city-state and the greater cosmopolis.” 
(Bowden, 2003:353) If these two loyalties conflict, Bowden states, “citizens’ duties to the 
cosmopolis would always prevail” (Bowden, 2003:353).” Many questioned this loyalty to 
the human race (as a global community) as impractical due to such simple factors as 
distance. Hill (2000:66) quotes Henry Shue’s analogy to make this point,   
I am the pebble and the world is the pond I have been dropped into. I am at the 
centre of a system of concentric circles that become fainter as they spread .My 
duties are exactly like the concentric ripples around the pebble; strongest at the 
centre and rapidly diminishing toward the periphery .Any duties to those on the 
far periphery are going to diminish to nothing, and given the limited resources 
available to any ordinary person, her positive duties will barely reach beyond a 
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second or third circle. We generally imagine our primary, secondary and tertiary 
duties to others as ranked geographically. 
 
In short, critics argue that distance regulates our reaction to fellow other human beings. 
But enthusiasts like Nussbaum responded stating, “‘our task as citizens of the world will 
then be to “draw the circles somehow toward the center”, making all human beings more 
like our fellow city-dwellers’.” (Bowden, 2003:355). The literature on cosmopolitan 
citizenship faced stiff resistance from the traditional schools of thought on citizenship 
which posit that “the modern conceptions of citizenship are anchored in the world of the 
bounded community.” (Linklater, 1998:23) Hence, “it loses its precise meaning when 
divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality.” (Linklater, 1998:23) 
 
For civic republicans, cosmopolitan citizenship, 
Not only fails to specify the concrete rights and duties which bind citizens in 
relations of close cooperation within bounded communities, but at a deeper level, 
it fails to engage them in any effective form of shared rule. (Linklater, 1998:27) 
 
 From their ethical vantage point, therefore, cosmopolitan citizenship is an oxymoron. In 
a similar vein, Nyamnjoh (2007:74) comments that cosmopolitanism seems “confined to 
rhetoric, making it difficult in reality to feel at home away from home.” He continued,  
No amount of questioning by scholars, human rights advocates and immigrants 
immersed in the reality of flexible mobility seems adequate to de-essentialize the 
growing global fixation with an “authentic” place called home.” 
 
Baubock (2009) has recently developed his ‘stakeholder theory’ on citizenship. He begins 
by recognizing merits in the liberal social contract tradition stating,  
In a world separated into distinct political communities, a recognized status of 
membership in at least one of these communities is a general precondition for 




He quotes Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase that citizenship is ‘the right to have rights’ 
(Arendt 1967, p. 269).But there is more to citizenship by way of “active participation or 
representation in the making of laws.” (Baubock, 2009:479)  He then recommends what 
the two criteria of qualifying individuals for citizenship. Individuals eligible for 
citizenship should be those “who (a) depend on that community for long-term protection 
of their basic rights.(dependency criterion) or (b) are or have been subjected to that 
community’s political authorities for a significant period.” (Baubock, 2009:479) It is not 
clear how Baubock’s definition of a stakeholder is far from the liberal narrative of 
granting citizenship to people born in the country or to those who can be “naturalized” 
over the course of time.  
 
2.1.3 Re-scaling Citizenship: Cities and Globalization 
According to Varasnyi (2006:231) “the etymology of the word ‘citizenship’ reveals its 
urban origins: there is a clear connection, for instance, between the word citizen and the 
word that we now translate in English as city-state.” Nevertheless, “throughout the 
twentieth century the term ‘citizenship’ has been hegemonically associated with 
membership in a national political community”. (Purcell, 2003:571) For Purcell, this 
Liberal Democratic and Westphalian (LDW) version of citizenship is now being 
‘destabilized’ owing to global transformations. He discusses  ‘global economic 
restructuring’ of the modern world where: a) finance and capital mobilization is 
articulated on a supra-national level, b) the production of goods and services is globally 
articulated, and c) the massive migration of both skilled and unskilled labor is taking 
place at a global level.  
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Politics is also being rescaled at both supra-national and sub-national levels. The famous 
European Union experiment and the devolution of authority and resources to the local 
tiers of political administration, Purcell argues, indicate that there is significant reduction 
in the power of the nation-state. All of these processes affect the way citizenship is 
defined. He argues, “state power is being displaced upward, downward and outward, and 
the national scale state is losing its status as the dominant centre of political authority and 
political sovereignty.” (Purcell, 2003:571) This means, “A citizenship regime in which all 
citizenships flow from legal membership in a national-state scale is more open to 
configuration.” (Purcell, 2003:571) This notion is widely shared by other authors like 
Engin Isin (1997), Saskia Sassen(1996, 1998), Holsten and Appadurai(1996).  
For Holsten and Appadurai(1996:189), globalization is driving “a deeper wedge between 
national space and its urban centers”. They continue, “There are a growing number of 
societies in which cities have a different relationship to global processes than the visions 
and policies of their nation-states may admit or endorse (Holsten and Appadurai, 
1996:189).” They argue the politics of London, Los Angeles, or Mogadishu is oddly 
placed in the politics of the United Kingdom, America or of Somalia. Another way of 
looking at how cities have become centers for new forms of citizenship is the disjuncture 
between formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to “membership in 
the nation-state and the substantive to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and 
cultural rights people possess and exercise.” (Holsten and Appadurai,1996:190). They 
boldly state that “formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a 




Faced with its diverse and global city constituents, the nation-state has vacillated between 
policies that make “citizenship more exclusive” and others that make “citizenship more 
inclusive.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:190,191) Both approaches are not without 
misgivings. In the first case, Holsten and Appadurai hold, “localism can generate 
xenophobic violence.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:191) But “the elimination of local 
community as the ground of citizenship” also “tends to preclude active participation in 
the business of rule” and replace the “civic ideal with a more passive sense of entitlement 
to benefits.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:191) Cities therefore represent the spatial and 
political scale, where the “tired identity of formal, national citizenship” is unraveling. 
(Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:195) Some like Isin(2002),  are optimistic about this 
process while many others are weary(Dagger, 1981). Isin(2002:312), for instance, argues,  
The modern project of the nation state emphasized unity and sameness over 
difference and diversity. The rise of multiculturalism as a political force is a sign 
of the failure of that modernist project. The cities and regions of the future must 
nurture difference and diversity through cultural pluralism.  
 
Dagger (1981:721), on the other hand, laments that “the greater size of cities, their 
political fragmentation, and the mobility of their citizens” have all contributed to the 
“loss of civic memory” and active citizenship in today’s American cities. In its present 
shape, Dagger argues, the city has not come “to be something more than a bewildering 
agglomeration of streets and buildings and nameless faces”. These contestations on 
identity, citizenship, and cities have often led to violence.  Holsten and 
Appadurai(1996:200) concluded, “ If the city is a special site for such formations and 
reformations of citizens, it can also be a special war zone, a space in which these 
processes find expression in collective violence”. These may take forms of “urban 
terrorism from the extreme right and left, racist attacks, Islamic bombings, gang 
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shootings, death squads, riots, vandalism etc.”(Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:200) In 
short, the global urbanization of violence shows that cities have now become the major 
sites where forms of identity and citizenship are coming to close contacts and clashes. 
 
2.2 The Right to the City   
2.2.1 The Right to the City: A Cry and a Demand  
The drive to comprehend such new relations between cities, identities and citizenship 
have now led to the ‘discovery’ of Henry Lefebvre’s prominent theoretical works under 
the rubric of the ‘right to the city’ literature. A French sociologist, Lefebvre first coined 
the term ‘the right to the city’ in 1967 in his book “Le droit a’ la ville”. As he defines it: 
The right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to 
information, should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of  
the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple services. It would  
affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space 
 and time of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the 
 use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into 
 ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’). 
(translated in Kofman and Lebas 1996: 34) 
 
Le droit a’ la ville “describes the negative impact that the capitalist economy has on 
cities, converting the city into a commodity serving only the interests of capital 
accumulation.” (Mathivet, 2010:21) Gilbert and Phillips (2003:316) note that Lefebvre 
was calling for a radical “re-appropriation of everyday life by social and political actions” 
against forces of capital and state power in 1968 France. However Lefebvre’s 
formulation of the right to the city has relevance to contemporary realities where 
“processes of economic globalization increase, the same capitalist logic of development 
persists and exacerbates the struggle for social and environmental justice in the city.” 
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(Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:316) For Lefebvre, the right to the city is to be claimed 
through the right to difference, which is “the right to claim, to struggle and to redefine the 
relation between domination and appropriation.” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:317) In 
short, Lefebvre proposes that “that inhabitants demand control over the construction of 
urban spaces.” (Mathivet, 2010:21)  
 
In his other book The Production of Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three main ways 
of understanding space i.e. “perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Elden and Brenner 
elaborated on this schema of Lefebvre stating that it unites “physical, mental and social 
space”.  Perceived spaces, that Lefebvre also calls ‘territorial practices’ and ‘territorial 
representations’ include : “the physical, material spaces of state territory, from the 
borders, fences, walls and barriers erected to mark its external limits.”(Brenner and Eden, 
2009:365) Conceived spaces , whom he also calls ‘representations of territory’ refer to, 
“a range of imagined senses of the body of a nation translated into political practice, 
including maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory cartography, and 
otherwise diagrammatically.”(Brenner and Eden, 2009:365) Thirdly, lived spaces refer to 
the individual and social experience of living through the physical and mental world of 
spaces. For Purcell, lived space represents “the complex amalgamation of perceived and 
conceived space. It is the everyday life of the city dweller.” (Purcell, 2003:577) Brenner 
and Elden (2009:367) conclude,  
The power of Lefebvre’s analysis is that he offers a way to think state, space, and 
territory together; to conceptualize them through the relations between practices, 
representations, and lived experience; to see them as historically interrelated 
rather than determined; and to enable a powerful set of conceptual categories to 





For Lefebvre, such political activism and struggle to re-appropriate and fashion the urban 
space can only happen when a new form of city-zenship develops. He is quick to point 
out that “the traditional and formal meanings of citizenship as the source of obligation (to 
pay taxes, declare goods, and military service etc) offer a little more than the right to 
vote.” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:319) However, he continues the activities of the 
representative “will unlikely be controlled by the voters.” (Gilbert and Phillips, 
2003:319)  Hence, an implicit charge that the Liberal Democratic and Westphalian model 
of democracy has actually marginalized and excluded most of the urban folks. In lieu, 
Lefebvre recommends a new bundle of citizenship rights including “rights that have been 
vulnerable to state and market domination: right to information, to expression, to culture, 
to identity in difference (and equality), to self management (autogestion), and to the city.” 
(Gilbert and Phillips .2003:319)  Fernandez (2007:207) summarizes this disjuncture 
between the liberal contract narrative of rights and Lefebvre’s formulation stating, 
If Rousseau distinguished between politics and the social pact, considering 
politics to be a mere circumstantial effect of the ‘general will’ underlying the 
social pact, Lefebvre proposed a contemporary formula for social citizenship, 
expressing a ‘social project’ which requires a new political contract between the 
state and citizens in order to reduce the gap between state and government, and 
between the institutional power and the power of civil society. 
 
2.2.2 Urban Citizenship: Re-qualified and Re-scaled 
We have already discussed that Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city is a critique 
of liberal democracy and its mechanisms of electoral representation. Mark Purcell makes 
an interesting link between the ‘right to the city’ literature and the normative theories 
about cities and citizenship.  Purcell (2003:577) argues, “Lefebvre’s right to the city 
model rests urban citizenship on inhabitance, instead of loyalty to the national-state 
40 
 
scale.”  For Purcell (2003:577), Lefebvre imagined that these inhabitants have “two 
major rights: 1) the right to appropriate urban space, and 2) the right to participate 
centrally in the production of urban space”.  
The first bundle of rights are actually about the “the full and complete usage of the city- 
the right to live in, play in , work in , represent, characterize, and occupy urban space in a 
particular city.”(Purcell, 2003:578) They are more about the “use value” of cities than 
their “exchange value”.  Purcell links this to Lefebvre expose of the city as an oeuvre i.e. 
a human vocation, a piece of art fashioned and refashioned by its inhabitants.  Secondly, 
Purcell (2003:578) argues, the right to participate “implies the right to play a central role 
in the decision making process in the production of the urban space”.  Such an 
arrangement gives people the right to global cities where for instance an “Angeleno 
dweller could be a formal citizen of Mexico, a citadin (citizen-denizen) of Los Angeles 
and, not a formal citizen of the United States.” (Purcell, 2003:580) In short, Lefebvre re-
qualifies citizenship (what it should substantively entail) and re-scales it as well (making 
the urban as the most important scale of political practice.) 
Baubock elaborates how Purcell’s notion of urban citizenship is different from formal 
citizenship. Nation-states, he argues, “have three basic mechanisms for allocating 
citizenship: ius soli (birth in the territory), ius sanguinis (descent from citizen parents) 
and naturalization.” (Baubock, 2003:149) By contrast, Purcell’s formulation of a citadin 
is automatically based on “ius domicili as the basic rule for allocating membership in the 
city.” (Babcock, 2003:149) Such practices, Baubock argues, existed in the past where, for 
instance, “In 1975 Sweden introduced the vote for all non-citizens after three years of 
legal residence in local and regional elections and in referenda.” (Baubock, 2003:151) 
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According to Baubock, all the Nordic countries have followed Sweden’s footsteps since 
then. In Germany, Baubock adds, “the text of the Basic Law does not explicitly tie the 
local franchise to citizenship.” But the German Constitutional Court (1990) “repealed 
legislation in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein that would have introduced voting rights 
for non-citizens at the level of district election.” (Babcock, 2003:151) 
While Purcell embraces the notion of ‘urban citizenship’-or rather citadinship-, he also 
criticizes Lefebvre’s concept of an ‘inhabitant”. He argues, “To my mind, the key 
weakness in Lefebvre’s concept is that he conflates his idea of ‘inhabitant’ with the 
category ‘working class.’” (Purcell, 2002:106) Such formulation, for Purcell, narrows 
down the political agenda of the ‘inhabitant’ within the confines of class struggle. For 
Purcell, the “inhabitant” should be able to challenge “the racist city, the patriarchal city, 
or the hetero-normative city, all of which confront inhabitants in their daily lives.” 
(Purcell, 2002:106) But he is convinced that “the analytical and political power of the 
idea of inhabitance” helps us understand “better how politics of identity and difference 
will articulate with an urban politics of the inhabitant.” (Purcell, 2002:106)  
Not everyone is enthusiastic about Purcell formulation of the right to the global city. For 
instance, Varasanyi (2006:233) points out that much of the urban citizenship literature is 
inspired by “changes taking place in the European Union”. The question is how 
applicable would this literature be in the case of other regions of the world where a supra-
national integration project like the European Union is not underway? Secondly, she 
points out that the practical application of the ‘urban citizenship’ literature is not looked 
at. She (2006:234) posits, “In an extremely literal sense, where should boundaries be 
drawn around the city?”, and “who belongs within (and is a citizen) and who is excluded 
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of the city?” Baubock (2003:156) iterates the same issues stating, “There are reasons to 
be skeptical towards the idea that urban citizenship could simply bypass the national level 
and become a basis for building institutions of global democracy.”  
 
Baubock(2003:156) also criticizes the ‘global city’ literature of nodes and international 
networks between cities stating, “A network is not a polity; it is not a community sharing 
its own institutions of government and common interests in a broad range of public 
goods.” Even more, he stated, “The populations of New York, London and Tokyo may 
have similar interests, but they do not have many common interests that would call for 
bringing them together under a single government”.(Baubock,2003:156) 
Plyushetva(2009:93) takes a different take on ‘the right to the city’ approach that its strict 
adherence to the criteria of inhabitance could be counterproductive because, “there is 
nothing to prevent those with political power and financial means to also shape the urban 
space according to their needs.” Hence she recommends that the ‘right to the city’ 
approach can yield just outcomes when “only those claiming their core citizenship 
rights.” (Plyushetva, 2009:93)   
 
2.2.3 The Right to the City: Alterations and Confusions  
The ‘right to the city’ literature is now a rallying point of grassroots organizations, 
international coalitions and urban activists who struggle for social justice, inclusion and 
equity in the city. For instance UNHABITAT organized a World Urban Forum on “Right 
to the City” in 2010. Also, Habitat International Coalition (HIC) was a forerunner in 
introducing the World Charter on the Right to the City. The Charter, Mathivet states, is 
based on three fundamental axes. First comes, “The exercise of full citizenship, namely 
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the realization of all human rights to ensure the collective well-being of inhabitants.” 
(Mathivet, 2010:25) The second premise is “The democratic management of the city 
through the direct participation of society in planning and governance.” (Mathivet, 
2010:25) Thirdly, the Charter invokes “The social function of the city and of urban 
property, with the collective good prevailing over individual property rights.” (Mathivet, 
2010:25)  
 
Recognizing that there are now “cities without citizens”, ‘right to the city’ now represents 
“the struggle of invisible city dwellers that have been robbed of a space where they can 
develop and live with dignity.” (Mathivet, 2010:25) Much of this struggle is against “the 
ways that neo-liberalism and the privatization of land use have turned our cities over to 
developers.” (Marcuse, 2010:87) Or in David Harvey’s (2003:941) words,  
A few hedge funds, exercising their inalienable right to make a profit by 
whatever means, rage around the world speculatively destroying whole 
economies. They destroy our cities with their speculations, reanimate 
them with their donations to the opera and the ballet while, like Kenneth 
Lay of Enron fame, their CEOs strut the global stage and accumulate 
massive wealth at the expense of millions.  
 
For Harvey and others, this is clearly wrong and he concludes stating,  
The creation of a new urban commons, a public sphere of active democratic 
participation, requires that we roll back that huge wave of privatization that has 
been the mantra of a destructive neo-liberalism. (Harvey, 2003:941)   
 
Recently, however, there is a lot of excitement on the part of global policy makers ( such 
as UNESCO, UNHABITAT etc) and  international  financiers( e.g. the World Bank); 
narrating their own version of what they meant by right to the city. For Fawaz (2009:831) 
these contemporary formulations dwell on a “normative framework of redistributive 
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justice” significantly departing from “the way ‘the right to the city’ has been used by 
theorists.” For instance, a recent UNESCO/UNHABITAT report adopted a very 
minimalist definition of the right to the city. Interestingly, the document 
(UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:16) starts by defining what the right to the city is not, 
instead of what it is. It continues arguing,  
Claiming the right to the city does not confer specific rights (such as ‘city rights’ 
of the Middle Ages—to hold and receive income from the markets, tolls, and 
taxes, or modern rights to specific urban services). Nor does it translate into 
national claims to the urban level so that urban citizenship replaces or negates 
national citizenship. 
 
Instead, the report defines the right to the city as one that “enables all inhabitants and 
communities—whether women or men, established residents or incomers—to access in 
liberty and freedom the benefits of city life.” (UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:36) It also 
“confers responsibilities on city inhabitants to support (emphasis mine) governments in 
facilitating those rights.” (UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:36) One can easily tell that the 
radical, participatory and empowering aspects of Lefebvre’s writings and his critical look 
on the liberal democratic state are being watered down here. The right to the city is 
applied only as a convenient lexicon (a buzz word for that matter) to mean having rights 
in the city and considering the state as the guarantor of these rights.  
 
Even more, the experiences of developing country cities are studied under the rubric of 
the right to the city literature, “especially in Colombia and Brazil where more inclusive 
and participatory processes of planning are invoking the ‘right to the city’ in their 
formulation.” (Fawaz, 2009:832) Most of these studies are however “directed towards 
reforming existing state models of governance thinking of strategies and legal 
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frameworks that can render them more inclusive.” (Fawaz, 2009:832) According to 
Earle(2010:8), “the diffusion of the term( right to the city) has led to a wide arrange of 
definitions” and confusions too. At its most minimal, Earl continues, “The idea is 
‘reduced to the right to be maintained in the city – that is, to be housed and serviced’”. 
But “the original idea was far more transformative, calling for ‘a radical restructuring of 
social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond.” (Earle, 2010:8)  
 
But still, there are many who approach the notion of rights and the city from a critical 
angle. Carasco(2010) for instance writes that government control needs to be abated if 
public spaces in the city are to be truly public. She (2010:3) argues,  
It is naïve to believe that the government will cease their arbitrary prohibition of 
speech as long as it continues to own physical public forums, for it has 
persistently refused its management and use as communal space, and shows no 
signs of intending to do so. ..If the right to the city is truly to become a right rather 
than a privilege, if no one is to have the right to exclude –not even the 
government-, then traditional public spaces must become communal space where 
every individual conserves the right not [to] be excluded from the uses or benefits 
of resources.  
 
To conclude, Lefebvre’s work is undergoing a lot of mutation and transformation as it is 
used to qualify different processes, policy actions and narratives by different actors in the 
city. The following section, however, draws a clear conceptual distinction between the 
right to the city literature and the older and much wider discussion about social justice in 
the city. It shows that right to the city approach offers an alternative and a critique of the 







2.3 Justice and the Right to the City   
The limits of just and unjust are very difficult to set down; like the middle state 
between health and illness, between the appropriateness and inappropriateness of 
things, between the false and the true, is difficult to mark. 
    Voltaire  
 2.3.1 Liberalism and the Just City  
There are many words that we leisurely use but are difficult to pin down or define. 
Justice is one such term. A casual use of the word may entail positive connotations such 
as ‘doing right’, ‘providing for the needy or the underdog’, ‘redressing inequality’, 
‘punishing wrong doers’, and/or ‘ensuring public safety’. The issue of social justice 
gained some traction in urban studies in the works of David Harvey, Manuel Castells, 
Richard Senett, and lately, Susan Fainstein. Otherwise, much is not written about justice 
per se. However, almost all theoretical perspectives about urban problems imply one or 
another model of justice. So do their respective policy recommendations.  
The oldest argument on urban injustices comes from the liberal tradition. Dreier, 
Mollenkopf and Swanstrom’s Place Matters provides an epic summary of this tradition. 
The liberal thesis begins by asserting that place (where we live in the city) “affects our 
access to jobs and public services (especially education).” (Dreier et al, 2001:2)  Hence 
those who live in poor and dilapidated neighborhoods of the city get low quality 
education and training opportunities; find it difficult to find decent jobs; to earn and save 
adequate income for a living. For liberals, therefore, “rising inequality is the major 
problem” of modern cities.” (Dreier et al, 2001:17) By way of remedies, most liberals 
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posit a bundle of policy recommendations which can be grouped into three major themes: 
a) reversing the suburban bias in urban development, b) ensuring human capital 
development in the inner city, and c) attacking income poverty in a regional/metropolitan 
fashion.  In short, the liberal tradition considers the state as the major actor in alleviating 
poverty and inequality, mainly through political, redistributive and remunerative 
interventions organized at metropolitan levels.   
One of the most elaborate liberal renditions on the just city comes from Susan Fainstein 
(2010).  In her book, Fainstein (2010:23) speaks of three major concepts underpinning 
social justice in the city. These are “1) democratic processes and just outcomes, 2) the 
criterion of equity, and 3) the criterion of recognition”.  That democracy comes at the 
forefront of the discussion about justice is not surprising. We assume that one major form 
of addressing issues of representation, participation and decision making in cities is via 
democracy. In fact, the quest for urban justice often comes as a quest for democracy. 
According to Fainstein (2010:24),  
Demands for transparency, inclusion, and negotiation in public decisions were a 
reaction to the top-down, technocratic approach underlying governmental 
programs such as urban renewal, exclusionary zoning, and placement of toxic-
producing facilities.   
In short, the place and role of democratic governance is one major issue around which the 
concept of the just city model revolves. 
 Nevertheless, assuming that democratic participation would in itself redress injustice 
would be so simplistic and wrong. In fact, some of the world’s most unequal societies 
are democracies (e.g. India, Brazil, USA, South Africa etc.). So are their cities (e.g. New 
Delhi, Rio di Janiero, New York, Johannesburg etc.). Hence, the theory of deliberative 
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democracy or its planning derivative, communicative planning theory, have  profound 
weakness in assuming that “reasoned discussion will produce just outcomes.” 
(Fainstein,2010:29) Unless the social and economic roots of inequality are tackled, as 
Fainstein(2010:30) argues, “democracy and justice are frequently at odds in unequal 
society.” Secondly, there are instances where just economic outcomes resulted from 
democracies which were not very deliberative. Fainstein(2010:34)mentions of instances 
“like the European welfare states and the New Deal where major reforms were 
introduced without the direct participation of the public”.  In short, democratic processes 
should yield equitable outcomes. Otherwise they become nominal exercises i.e. matters 
of form than substance. 
Equity, for Fainstein(2010: 36), entails “the distribution of both material and  non-
material benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already 
better off at the beginning.”  She continues (2010: 36) to point out that pro-equity 
regimes look at urban development programs and “ask: a) who benefits from them, b) 
and to what extent?” So equity does not only imply distribution of benefits but doing so 
on a vertical axis (from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have nots’).  Here Fainstein(2010:37) draws a 
line between her liberal version of justice to the utilitarian view of “the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number.” She criticized utilitarianism for “it does not ask how the sum of 
satisfactions is distributed among individuals” (2010:37).  
Thirdly, the notion of justice in the city would have to deal with diversity. Fainstein (a la 
Nancy Fraser) points out that much of urban politics is about ‘recognition’ as much as it 
is about ‘distribution’. In fact, the liberal tradition of urban justice comes under fire from 
post-structuralists for its ‘liberal atomism’ and ‘economism’. The critiques of liberalism 
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uphold that “recollections of persecution of one group by another based on race, 
nationality, gender will not simply go away because of economic equality.” (Fainstein, 
2010:45) While the post-structural emphasis on ‘other’ forms of injustice rather than 
economic inequality is noteworthy; its recommendations for a just city are not clearly 
pronounced. In fact in some of its versions, post-structuralism may lead to “essentialism, 
unproductive conflict, and new forms of oppression rather than to mutual respect.” 
(Fainstein, 2010:47)  
To sum up, Fainstein holds that a just city has to deal with issues of democratic 
participation and decision making; economic empowerment and distribution; cultural 
tolerance and cosmopolitanism.  It is quite difficult to arrive at an optimal mix of all these 
orientations and map out what a just city would like, mainly because of the 
interrelatedness of the concepts themselves. Democracies may bestow greater liberties on 
citizens without addressing inequality. Or we may have undemocratic regimes generating 
growth and tackling poverty without recognizing citizens’ basic human, political or civil 
rights (e.g. a Chinese city would be an ideal example here).  
2.3.2 Neo Liberalism and Urban Justice  
Beginning from the late 1970s, the idea of alleviating poverty and inequality through 
government interventions began to lose luster. The critique of that argument developed 
within the rubric of neo-liberalism. Boudreau et al state that “Historically, neo-liberalism 
was a reaction to both the widely experienced authoritarian practices of the mid 20
th
 
century and the Keynesian-fordist regime of accumulation.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:24) 
The authors continue that the person who “most visibly symbolized these policies was 
NYC mayor Rudy Guliani.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:23) Fred Siegel’s The Prince is a 
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narrative of Giuliani’s neo-liberal reforms in the city of New York. For Siegel, New York 
City’s problem was not its concentrated poverty, and staggering inequality. Instead it was 
the city government itself.  
Siegel argues, “Between a unionized work force, rapidly expanding social services and 
the need for public work projects, the city was forced repeatedly to raise taxes and 
borrow.” (Siegel, 2005:7) Giuliani’s reforms, therefore, aimed at downsizing 
government. Among other things, he decided, 1) to cut the size of government, 2) to cut 
taxes to attract jobs, 3) to consolidate or eliminate city departments and introduce 
competition with the delivery of services, and 4) to work with the State Legislature that 
the city gets a fair share of state revenue. (Siegel, 2005:24). And on social issues like 
crime, work and education, Giuliani’s neo-liberal reforms departed from the older liberal 
efforts.  
About education, Giuiliani said,   “Let us be honest. Money has become the biggest 
dodge for explaining the failure of our school system. It is almost a mantra: If we only 
had more money.” (Siegel, 2005:116) He also cut welfare spending stating, “Welfare 
drained the city of not only money but also social capital. It robbed people of dignity and 
hope all of which can be found in a job.” (Siegel, 2005:153) On crime, Giuliani argued 
that, “Government couldn’t serve the substitute for the family in instilling the values of 
citizenship.” (Siegel, 2005:142) However, he increased policing expenses and adopted 
stringent “broken windows” policing “which took seriously neighborhood complaints 
about the disorder created by the so called victimless crimes.” (Siegel, 2005:143)  
Were neo-liberal reforms antidotes to the economic and social crisis of cities? Many 
would reply with an emphatic no! Boudreau et al argue (2009:25),  
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The process of neo-liberalization has entailed much creative destruction not only 
of prior institutional frameworks and powers but also of division of labor, social 
relations, welfare provisions, and technological mixes, ways of life and thought, 
reproductive activities, attachments to the land, and habits of the heart.  
They narrate Toronto’s experiments under “an uncompromising neoliberal PC premier of 
Ontario, Mike Harris.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:54) Harris’s government introduced 
stringent neo-liberal reforms under the motto, “common sense revolution”. The 
‘revolution’ (Boudreau et al, 2009:59) introduced reforms which:  
1)resulted drastic welfare cuts, 2)targeted  squeegee kids and panhandlers, 3) 
eliminated public housing programs, 4) attacked public work unions, 5) 
dismantled and underfunded the education system and civil society 
organizations, 6)reduced and redesigned  local governments, 7) amalgamated 
hundreds of local governments, and 8) loosened planning restrictions.  
True to their Canadian inklings, the authors concluded, “Welfare cuts, no public housing, 
and lower labor standards all mean Canada is being Americanized.”(Boudreau et al, 
2009:63)  
Going back to Fainstein’s just city model, it seems neo-liberalism was a disaster in all the 
three criteria she listed i.e. democracy, equity and diversity. The elimination and 
amalgamation of local governments, as well as the lay off and restructuring of thousands 
of government workers implies that representation, participation and local decision 
making powers were under assault. Power was relinquished to the upper most echelons of 
power and class. Hence, these neo-liberal reforms undermined democratic ideals. 
Welfare, housing and education cuts all mean that neo-liberal reforms have actually 
increased inequality within cities. In the name of generating growth and self-reliance, the 




Diversity has not been directly undermined but it now has ‘perverse’ market logic to it. 
Boudreau et al (2009:91) write, “In the context of neoliberal market regulated everyday 
life, cultural differences are being commodified. Multiculturalism is reduced to the 
celebration of ethnic foods.” It cannot however continue as a “as a good-weather motto 
for a multiethnic metropolis” in cities like Toronto which are now sharply 
“geographically and socioeconomically divided along class and racialized lines.” 
(Boudreau et al, 2009:98) Boudreau et al are right in pointing to us that the problem is not 
ethnicity or color per se, but the problem is definitely colored.  
2.3.3 Urban Justice and Progressive Alternatives  
Just as the old liberal tradition of direct and increased government action to welfare and 
redistribution was challenged by the neo-liberals, the neo-liberals now come under fire 
from progressives who challenge the normative, political and policy orientation of neo-
liberalism. Imbroscio(2010:1), for instance, states,  
Over the past two decades two related but distinct orthodoxies have taken hold 
within the academic study or urban America. Both are grounded in elements of 
philosophical liberalism. And both are deeply misguided. 
 First comes, urban regime theory, which holds that “the local state is left too weak to 
accomplish the complex policy tasks required to govern the city effectively. Therefore 
local public officials need to form governing coalitions with private capital”. (Imbroscio, 
2010:3) It is these coalitions that Stone calls regimes. Imbroscio calls the next tradition 
liberal expansionism i.e. the argument that “the social and economic problems of the 
inner cities can only be solved by “crossing the city line” or playing the outside game”. 
(Imbroscio, 2010:5) Imbroscio criticizes Stone’s taxonomy of regimes as limited and 
based only on the assumption of a public-private divide of political and policy spheres.  
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In lieu, he recommends alternative regimes where: a) local states can be accumulators, b) 
communities can be accumulators, and c) small scale entrepreneurs can be accumulators. 
Liberal expansionism did not escape his piercing criticisms either. (Imbroscio, 2010:23-
33) Among others, Imbroscio argues neo-liberal reforms rarely explain why inner city 
and community focused development interventions ‘failed’; rather they conclude failure. 
Secondly,  arguing that there is nothing to build in the inner cities and poor minority 
neighborhoods smacks of elitism( that Imbroscio calls liberal condescension) and 
reminds one of Oscar Lewis’s infamous “ culture of poverty” thesis. Neither did suburbs 
and edge cities effectively solve problems of poverty and inequality. Hence the liberal 
rush towards regionalism and the urge to disperse poor people from inner nods of 
concentrated poverty, for Imbroscio, is misguided.    
Imbroscio(2010:43-47) recommends Local Economic Alternative Development 
Strategies (LEADS) which, he states, should have the following “building blocks”. First 
is “community economic stability”- a condition where localities possess job 
opportunities. Second is “public balance sheets” that tally the social costs and benefits of 
private sector development and disinvestment decisions. Third, comes “asset 
specificities” i.e. the need to emphasize the “importance of capital immobility for vibrant 
local economic development.”  Last but not least is what Imbroscio dubs “economic 
localism”. In short, Imbroscio’s alternative development strategies encourage generating 
capital which is immobile enough to sustain and benefit local communities.  
Here again, one would question how organic, egalitarian and united communities are to 
advance economies of scale and to survive and thrive in highly competitive, corporate 
capitalist economy. It also remains to be seen whether such endeavors will be democratic 
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and inclusive or institutions of patronage, corruption and nepotism by the powerful few. 
Last but not the least, one would wonder how ‘local’ is local in todays global and 
interconnected financial and real economy. While the normative and political appeals of 
these alternatives are tempting; their feasibility falls under a big question mark. Wouldn’t 
such pragmatism be a reason why all liberals have now become Petersonians?  
2.4 Beyond the Just City: Right to the City 
We have moved into an era where we are called upon to raise certain basic  
questions about the whole society. We are still called upon to give aid to the 
beggar who finds himself in misery and agony on life’s highway. But one day,  
we must ask the question of whether an edifice which produces beggars must  
not be restructured and refurbished. That is where are now.  
 Martin L King (1968)  
Where would Lefebvre’s right to the city approach be placed given the previous 
discussions about urban in/justice and its liberal, neo-liberal and progressive readings? 
Lefebvre’s tradition is a critique of the liberal outline of urban justice very much in the 
line of political economists such as David Harvey. Critiquing Fainstein’s outline of just 
city (comprising tenets of democracy, equity, and diversity); Harvey and Potter (2009:40) 
state that “ideals of justice and practices of political power have marched along very 
much hand in hand!” So this project of developing ideal types of a just city ignores the 
economic and socio-political context within which injustice itself emerges, develops and 
is instrumentalized.  
For example, what qualifies for injustice in a slave owning or feudal society is very much 
different from injustice in a modern industrial capitalist society. So shall vary the types of 
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justice that the oppressed, marginalized or exploited in each of these societies seek from 
the establishment. Harvey and Potter (2009:41) underscore, “the difficulty with all 
idealist specifications of rights and justice, including Fainstein’s Just City, is that they 
hide this connection.”  This is more so for John Rawl’s famous theory of justice where he 
“constructs a “veil of ignorance” concerning the position we might occupy in the social 
order and asks how we would specify a just distribution in the light of that 
ignorance.”(Harvey and Potter, 2009:41) In reality, however, no individual or group in 
society wears a veil of ignorance when experiencing injustice and when it demands 
redress. And it is that demand for redress; that uprising against the legal, economic as 
well as political scaffoldings of the neo-liberal state that Lefebvre defines the right to the 
city.  According to Mustafa Dikec(2009:74) 
The right to the city “does not imply a ‘clean’ and quaint city where the “good 
citizens” mingle on its streets, crowding its beautiful parks, and living there 
happily ever after. As Lefebvre (1996:195) argues, it does not abolish 
confrontations and struggles. On the contrary! 
Furthermore, Lefebvre states, “The right to the city cannot be considered a simple 
visiting right or a return to the traditional city.” (Dikec, 2009:75)  Dikec(2009:75) brings 
our attention to Kant’s formulation of the stranger in Perpetual Peace, where Kant 
argues, “ There is no room for the stranger to claim a right, but simply to enjoy a right to 
visit or pass through.” Lefebvre is arguing exactly the opposite! He is arguing that both 
residents and strangers in the city should have active political rights to access and 
appropriate urban space; participate in the decision making process about its 
management; and make or remake it after their hearts’ desire! The right to the city 
approach, therefore, goes beyond calls for a just city. According to Dikec (2009:76),  
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The right to the city, therefore, is not simply a participatory right but, more 
importantly, an enabling right, to be defined and refined through political 
struggle. It is not only a right to urban space, but to a political space as well, 
constituting the city as a space of politics. Urban citizenship, in this sense, does 
not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to a political 
identity.  
In the words of Peter Marcuse(2009:246), the  Just City approach “is an important 
concept that leads in new and much needed directions for thinking and acting on urban 
problems”, but it should  “be expanded to develop and achieve what the Right to the City 
calls for: the right to full, free, creative life for all.”  
On her part, Fainstein fires back at the Marxist critique of justice as “the ideologized, 
glorified expression of the existing economic relations.” (2010:40) She quotes Geras to 
assert that “First, Marx’s characterization of capitalism as robbery is itself about justice. 
His critique of capitalism is in the name of justice. His concern is for distributive justice.” 
(Fainstein, 2010:41) She adds that the discomfort of Marxist positivists for a normative 
perspective of justice in capitalist society is obvious. For them, justice can only be 
realized when private property ownership is totally abolished and when the ‘exploitation’ 
of one human being by another stops. This very argument, Fainstein responds, is itself 
highly normative and value laden. It could be a ‘desirable’ state of affair, but not 
‘feasible’ in the present order of things. Harvey and Potter (2009:46) interject here 
arguing, “This is precisely the point at which Fainstein’s conception of the Just City 
falters. From the start it delimits its scope to acting within the existing capitalist regime of 




       METHODOLOGY   
    Overview 
This chapter discusses the rationale behind a qualitative case study. It begins by 
explaining the reasons why the city of Nairobi is selected to study the case of Ethiopian 
urban refugees. It then revises the major research questions of the research followed by 
specific research questions posed during the data collection process. The third section 
provides an overview of qualitative research methodology justifying why I found it more 
suitable to answer the above mentioned research questions. The following sections offer 
brief discussions about the case study design; the data collection instruments, as well as 
the sampling techniques and procedures that were used in the field. 
In a nut shell, I took the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (Kenya) mainly because 
Nairobi boasts the highest concentration of urban refugees in Africa from neighboring 
countries like Ethiopia. It therefore offered an ideal context to explore state-refugee 
relations in greater detail. I also chose qualitative methodology since it allows capturing 
processes of state-refugee relations in ways which elicit the meanings that respondents 
(informants of the study) attach with these processes. It also provided a range of data 
collection techniques which complement each other such as, a) observation, b) analyzing 
texts and documents, c) interviews, and d) recording and transcribing. 
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I decided to conduct case study for the design is favorable to conduct empirical inquiry 
on “a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context.” (Yin, 1984:23) As far as 
sampling is concerned I used the urban refugees list of Kenya’s prominent nonprofit 
organization, Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK), to screen, select and approach thirty 
(30) refugee respondents. This total sample size was apportioned evenly between three 
different neighborhoods (“wards” in technical parlance) that have the highest 
concentration of urban refugees in Nairobi. Accordingly, five men and women were 
interviewed from each ward. Their informed consent was solicited and their personal 
details are completely anonymized to maintain confidentiality. When it comes to Kenyan 
government officials and civil society leaders, I used snowball sampling where my 
contacts recommended a group of stakeholders or key informants I should reach out and 
interview on the field.  Accordingly a total of twenty (20) respondents were interviewed 
from line government bureaus, local and international organizations that work on urban 
refugee issues.  
Interviews proved to be very useful and exciting data collection instruments for the 
following reasons. First, they aptly captured, described and discussed the respondent’s 
own ideas, opinions and experiences.  Second, they offered flexibility where I was able to 
rearrange the order of questions or issues to be discussed impromptu while interviewing 
an informant and probe for more information. Last but not least, the interviews generated 
more valid accounts since I could observe the gestures, tones and reactions of informants 





3.1 Site Selection: Why Nairobi? Why Ethiopian Refugees? 
I have already indicated that internal conflicts in African countries result a massive flight 
of civilians from war torn countries into neighboring countries and cities.   East Africa 
has seen its share of violence and instability. For almost 30 years civil war was raging in 
Ethiopia where hundreds and thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Kenya until 1991. 
Later in 1999, Ethiopia and Eritrea started a border war which lasted until 2000 and saw 
the massive flight and eviction of both Eritreans and Ethiopians from the respective 
countries. A significant number of these refugees fled to Nairobi too.  Somalia’s state 
collapse since 1991 made it the highest most contributor of refugees in the region. Also 
the civil war between North and South Sudan produced thousands of refugees some of 
whom fled south to Kenya. The situation is so dire that a recent report on the refugee 
crisis in the Horn of Africa indicated that “there are a total of 824,000 refugees and some 
3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the East and Horn of Africa.” (UNHCR, 
2010:7) 
It is important to note that the only stable country in East Africa has been Kenya which 
hosted refugees from the region. Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, has also become one 
major recipient of refugees from neighboring countries.  Today the city of Nairobi boasts 
one of the biggest (if not the biggest) number of urban refugees in East Africa. According 
to Pavanelo et al(2010:7), “official figures suggest there are around 46,000 refugees in 
Nairobi (UNHCR 2010), however unofficial estimates are nearer 100,000.” Not only the 
sheer size but also the diversity of Nairobi’s urban refugees is striking.  The same authors 
report that “Official and anecdotal information indicates that the Somali population is the 
largest followed by Ethiopians, Congolese, Sudanese, Ugandan and Rwandese, while 
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smaller refugee groups residing in Nairobi include those from Eritrea and Burundi.” 
(UNHCR, 2010:7) 
 
Ethiopians comprise the second largest nationality of urban refugees in Nairobi following 
Somalis. According to UNHCR, “12,257 refugees and asylum seekers of Ethiopian origin 
have taken up residence in Nairobi.” (UNHCR, 2009b) Despite the magnitude of urban 
refugee inflow and the socio-economic and political dynamics they create in African 
cities, very little research is conducted about them. (Sienkiewicz, 2007, Campbell, 2006, 
Kibreab, 2003, Jacobsen, 2002, Pavanello et al, 2010) Even more, no study has thus far 
been conducted on Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi. This study aims to close that gap. 
 
3.2 Major and Specific Research Questions  
I have already discussed the major research questions of this study under section 1.3. 
However it is imperative to reiterate them here and flesh out the more specific research 
questions. These specific research questions were very useful starting points to develop 
the data collection instruments i.e. the in-depth and key informant interview formats. 
Table 2 illustrates them in more detail. 
Table 2 List of Specific Research Questions  
 
I. How do refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of Nairobi? 
a. How do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi relate to the Kenyan state, and its law 
enforcement agencies and departments? 
b. How do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi and their Kenyan counterparts understand, 
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qualify and explain their status of inhabitance in Nairobi? 
c. Are Ethiopian refugees engaged in economic activities and the mobilization of 
capital? What are these businesses? How are they established? What do they 
make and sell? 
d. How do these enterprises marshal the capital, skilled labor and networks from the 
Ethiopian refugee community? And how do these institutions impact both 
refugees and the host community? 
e. What type of religious, educational and other cultural institutions are initiated and 
organized by Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? How do these institutions impact 
both refugees and the host community? 
II. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday struggle 
of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi? 
a. What are the bundles of political rights that urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy? 
And   how do these differ from the rights of citizens and legal immigrants? 
b. What are the bundles of economic rights that urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy? 
And how do these differ from the rights of citizens and legal immigrants? 
c. Do urban refugees have the right to live in and use urban public spaces in 
Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not? 
d. Do urban refugees have the right to participate centrally in the production of 
urban space? If so, how? If not, why not? 
e. How far can the urban citizenship literature on western cities (aiming at the 
inclusion and participation of immigrants and strangers) explain the situation of 
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urban refugees in nonwestern cities? 
III. What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take to manage 
displacement driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social change? 
a. What are the laws and policies of the Government of Kenya (GoK) as well as 
the city of Nairobi regarding urban refugees? What are the pros and cons of these 
national and local policy instruments? 
b. What kinds of policy recommendations could be made to improve the 
provisions as well as the implementation of these policies? 
 
 
3.3 Qualitative Research Methodology: Overview  
Silverman (2001:11) provides a good summary of what qualitative research methods 
include. They involve: “1) observation, 2) analyzing texts and documents, 3) interviews, 
and 4) recording and transcribing.” These methods can be combined or used in different 
contexts. For instance, while in-depth interviews entail an individual informant, focus 
group discussions involve multiple participants being interviewed and discussing an issue 
determined by the researcher. There are two major reasons why a qualitative case study 
became appropriate for this research. These are: a) the epistemological assumptions 
underlying qualitative studies and b) the relative strength (instrumental validity) of 
qualitative research methods to answer the research questions better than quantitative 
methods. (See section 3.4) 
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The dominant epistemological stance that underpins the use of rigorous quantitative 
methods (like surveys) is positivism; an assertion that reality has an independent, 
objective existence outside the observer and is ready to be discovered, aggregated and 
studied.  The qualitative research tradition, on the other hand, is founded on 
interpretivism; an assertion that “reality and meaning are constructed from the actions 
and reactions of society’s constituent members, the individuals.” (Bryman, 2004:17)  
Positivists assume that “a) the world is independent of and unaffected by the researcher, 
b) facts and values are distinct, and c) observations are the final arbiter in theoretical 
disputes.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:16) Interpretivists, on the other hand, argue that “a) 
the researcher and the social world impact each other, b) facts and values are not distinct, 
and c) the methods of natural sciences are not appropriate because the social world is not 
governed by law-like regularities.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:17) It is this interpretivist 
tradition of qualitative methods that makes them more amenable for this particular study.  
Creswell (1994) provides some basic assumptions of a qualitative research design. As 
was stated above, qualitative research is concerned primarily with “process-rather than 
outcomes or products.” (Creswell, 1994:145) Similarly, I intend to capture how Ethiopian 
urban refugees are negotiating urban places and urban spaces in the case of Nairobi, the 
city with largest number of refugees in east Africa. Secondly, Creswell points out that 
qualitative research is usually interested in “meaning-how people make sense of their 
lives, experiences and their structures of the world.” (Creswell, 1994:145) In a similar 
vein, this study does not hypothesize about the experiences of urban refugees in Africa 
per se. Rather it aims to explore the urban refugees’ own reflection of their experience.  
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Thirdly, qualitative research involves “fieldwork where the researcher physically goes to 
people, setting, site or institution to observe or record behavior in its natural setting.” 
(Creswell, 1994:145)  Accordingly, I travelled to Nairobi and conducted fieldwork from 
the 14
th
 of July 2012 to the 11
th
 of October, 2012. Last but not least, qualitative research 
is “inductive where the researcher builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, and theories 
from details” (Creswell, 1994:145). Glaser and Strauss (1967) named this process 
analytical induction where concepts and theoretical categories emerge from the data 
itself. 
3.4 The Case Study Design  
Yin (1984:13) argues that our choice of a research design is very much dependent on 
three important factors, namely “1) the type of research question posed, 2) the extent of 
control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and 3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events.” For instance, experiments are amenable to 
“how” and “why” kind of questions; but they require control over behavioral events; and 
also focus on contemporary events. On the other hand, case studies are amenable to 
“how” and “why” research questions; they do not require control over behavioral events; 
and usually focus on contemporary issues or events. Yin (1984:23) defines the case study 
design as follows, 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between the context 
and the phenomenon are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used. 
The case study design involves “systematically gathering enough information about a 
particular person, social setting, event or a group to permit the researcher to effectively 
65 
 
understand how it operates or functions.” (Berg, 2001:225) There is therefore ample 
latitude as to what counts for a “case” in a case study design. For this study, I gathered 
information on a particular group of people i.e. Ethiopian urban refugees in the city of 
Nairobi.   
 
 Case studies can also be broader or narrower in terms of their scope of analysis. For 
example, the researcher “may confine his or her examination to a single aspect of an 
individual’s life (say medical records)” or “assess the social life of an individual and 
their entire background, experiences, roles and motivations.” (Berg, 2001:225)  In this 
case, the study has a much broader scope exploring such matters as 1) state-refugee 
relations, 2) the social networks of Ethiopian urban refugees, 3) business and economic 
activities of the refugees in Nairobi and, 4) the various policy regimes on state-refugee 
relations in Kenya.  A caveat is important here. Case study is “not actually a data-
gathering technique, but a methodological approach that incorporates a number of data 
gathering techniques.” (Berg, 2001:225) 
 
According to Berg (2001:229), case studies can be classified into three different types 
namely “intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies.” Intrinsic case studies are 
undertaken when the “researcher wants to better understand a particular case.” (Berg, 
2001:229) It is conducted when the unit of analysis portrays some “particular trait, 
characteristic or problem” which was not explored before. Instrumental case studies, on 
the other hand, are conducted “to provide insights into an issue or refine a theoretical 
explanation.” (Berg, 2001:229) In situations like this, a case study is only considered as 
supporting evidence, or “a background against which the actual research interests will 
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play out.” (Berg, 2001:229)  The third type is collective case studies where several 
instrumental cases are selected “to allow better understanding or perhaps enhance the 
ability to theorize about a broader context.” (Berg, 2001:229)  
 
Looking at this classification of case studies, this particular study is an instrumental case 
study which aims to contribute to a better theorizing of the right to the city approach. It 
aims to do so by investigating the particular conditions of urban refugees, who are 
neither in camps nor living as legal immigrants of an African city. It is trying to illustrate 
whether the right to the city literature can be expanded or developed to incorporate the 
case of non-western urban experiences. The study is not intrinsic since I am not looking 
at the case of urban refugees for its own purpose but as a case to think about theory. 
Neither am I conducting multiple case studies to better explain a theoretical argument. 
Hence it is not a collective case study. 
 
Case studies have their own limitations. Silverman (2001) points out one major 
shortcoming of qualitative methods including the case study approach. Researchers 
“seldom provide the criteria or grounds for including certain instances and not others. As 
a result, it is difficult to determine the typicality or representativeness of instances and 
findings.” (Silverman, 2001:222) Secondly, there is “the common concern about case 
studies that they provide little basis for scientific generalization.” (Yin, 1984:21) Thirdly, 
many argue that case studies “take too long and result in massive, unreadable 
documents.” (Yin, 1984:21) But each of these limitations or concerns about case study 
methods can be addressed in ways that boost the internal validity of the case study 




As far as sampling is concerned, section 3.5 stipulates the sampling techniques, frames 
and procedures of the study.  It elaborates on how respondents are selected in ways 
commensurate with the research objectives and questions.  This can help address the risk 
of “anecdotalism” or “cherry picking” that skeptics of qualitative research techniques are 
quick to point out. Secondly, I stress that “case studies, like experiments, are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions than to populations or the universe.” (Yin, 
1984:21) In other words, the researcher’s goal in a case study design is “to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization).” (Yin, 1984:21)   
 
Thirdly, the qualitative data could be organized into a coherently descriptive and tightly 
analytical frame if the analysis does not lose sight and track of the basic research 
questions the study set out to answer. As such, the major research questions are the 
overarching thematic umbrellas under which the bulk of the interviews are coded, 
discussed and analyzed. Such thematic analysis is complemented by a comparative 
analysis of patterns tracing and matching across groups (e.g. Kenyans versus Ethiopians, 
female versus male urban refugees, officials versus refugees, NGO representatives 








3.5 Data Collection Techniques  
3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews  
I interviewed a total of thirty (30) urban refugees in Nairobi. Creswell (1994:151) 
defines interviews as “face-to-face or one-on-one interaction” between an informant and 
an interviewer. Interviews are very useful “ a) when informants cannot be directly 
observed; b) when the information collected can provide historical information and c) 
when the researcher wants greater ‘control’ over the line of questioning”. (Cresswell, 
1994:151) Usually the interviewer would have a checklist of interview topics or a 
structured outline of questions that help him or her conduct the interview. Semi 
Structured interviews refer to those interview formats which use such guidelines. 
Despite their advantages, interviews can also be limiting because they usually provide, 
“a) “indirect” information filtered through the views of the interviewees, and b) 
information in a designated ‘place’, rather than the natural field setting.” (Creswell, 
1994:151) The researcher’s presence in the field setting may also bias responses. 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, there are three major reasons why semi 
structured interviews were useful for this data collection purpose. First, semi structured 
interviews capture, describe and discuss the respondent’s own ideas, opinions and 
experiences.  They provide a “deeper understanding of social phenomena than what 
would be obtained from purely quantitative data.” (Silverman, 2000:89) 
Bryman(2004:320) states that the emphasis in interviews is on  “how the interviewee 
frames and understands issues and events-that is what the interviewee views as 
important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of behavior.” This 
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merit makes interviews more useful to understand city-refugee interactions in Nairobi 
compared to structured surveys where response categories are strictly coded. 
Secondly, the interview process is flexible. It is possible to rearrange the order of 
questions or issues to be discussed impromptu while interviewing an informant. The 
researcher can probe for more information or ask clarifications from the respondent. 
There also is the chance to observe people’s facial expressions and gestures while 
conducting the interview. This flexibility enables the interviewer to have “greater 
control over the environment.” (Sarantakos, 1998:266) This applies to almost all 
qualitative data collection techniques where, “the researcher is the primary instrument of 
data collection.” (Creswell, 1994:145) Data is “mediated through this human instrument, 
rather than through inventories, questionnaires, or machines.” (Creswell, 1994:145) 
 
Thirdly, conducting semi structured interviews is instrumental since it reflects the 
theoretical position of this study. It involves looking at “actual patterns of social 
interaction not just verbalized reports or post hoc traces of interaction.”(Bulmer, 
1984:210) Interviews are verbalized reports but the researcher can  observe and study  
patterns of social interaction in situ through a face to face interaction with refugees. 
Hence interviews are “subtle and negotiable social encounters” between the researcher 
and respondents, which offer much more insights than, for instance, questionnaires. 
(Bulmer, 1984: 211) 
 
One challenge in conducting interviews, or any qualitative research, is the insider-
outsider dichotomy between the researcher and the ‘researched’, which is characterized 
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by unequal power relations between the two. Often communities view the researcher as 
an outsider and more powerful individual. Accordingly, people sanction their actions, 
opinions, and feelings while interacting with this inquisitive outsider. Sideaway 
(1992:403) argues in this line stating, “So often in journeys to the Third World, we move 
towards the top of a social hierarchy in a society that we often do not well understand, 
and the results can be problematic”. This outsider-insider divide can only be bridged if 
the researcher takes time to stay in the community, takes part in their daily activities, and 
manages to establish good rapport.  To this end, the researcher spent a total of 12 weeks 
in Nairobi. 
 
However, it is difficult to completely do away with this unequal relation between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (or between the ‘researchers’ and the ‘researched’) despite 
efforts to break the barriers. In my opinion, it is impossible to realize what is called ‘total 
immersion’ in any research context. What a researcher can do is to be ‘reflexive’ and 
admit that his or her knowledge and analysis of the research process cannot be complete 
and objective but “partial” and “situated.” (Mauthner and Doucet 2003) Linda McDowell 
(in Rose, 1997:1) argues in this line stating that “we must recognize and take account of 









3.5.2Key informant interviews  
In addition to in-depth interviews with refugees, the researcher also conducted key 
informant interviews with representatives of three major groups. First were Kenyan 
government officials in: a) the Province and City Hall of Nairobi, and b) the Ward 
managers of Kilimani, Eastleigh North and Eastleigh South regions. The total number of 
Kenyan officials interviewed was seven (7). 
Secondly, the researcher conducted key informant interviews with representatives of both 
local (Kenyan) and international NGOs who work on the issue of urban refugees in 
general and Ethiopian refugees, in particular. The third group of key informant 
interviewees was officers in the UNHCR and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). Both of these organizations are actively involved in processing the 
documentation, support, immigration and naturalization process of urban refugees in 
Nairobi.  I conducted a total of 7 key informant interviews among these two groups.  
Finally, the researcher conducted six (6) key informant interviews with Ethiopian 
community leaders who are active in religious, civic or community associations. This 
brought the total number of key informant interviews conducted to twenty (20) 
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3.5.3Document Reviews  
Prior (2008:111) states that documents in social research “always enter into social affairs 
in two modes: 1) as receptacles of content, and 2) as agents in networks of action.” 
Traditionally, however, social scientists focused more on the collection and analysis of 
documents per se than using them as agents or actors of action. By documents, I am 
referring to “books, reports, letters, texts, photographs, biographies and autobiographies, 
as well as documents including statistical data which are typically regarded as a resource 
for the social science researcher.”(Prior, 208:112) Accordingly, this study reviewed 
international, national as well as the urban level policy and strategic documents of Kenya 
when it comes to hosting, documenting and regulating international urban refugees. The 
review gives a background about the policy regimes, actors and institutions involved in 
refugee affairs in Kenya. 
Table 4 Themes and Sources of Document Review 
Policy Theme  Sources  
National and Urban Policies on  
Refugees and International 
Migration  
1.United Nations Protocols and Conventions on 
Refugees  
2.Kenyan Ministry of Provincial Administration 
and Internal Security 
3.Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs 





3.6 Sampling Techniques 
 3.6.1 Sampling in Qualitative Research  
Sampling is required in both qualitative and quantitative studies, simply because the 
“researcher cannot observe or record everything that occurs.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003:77) We often speak of probability and non-probability samples in social science 
research. Probability sampling is considered as the most rigorous approach to sampling 
since “every element in the study population is chosen at random and have a known 
probability of selection.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:78) Qualitative research methods, 
however, rely on purposive sampling where the “sample units are chosen because they 
have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and 
understanding.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:78)  Purposive sampling has two major 
advantages. First, it helps us “ensure that all the key constituencies of relevance to the 
subject matter are covered.” Secondly, “some diversity is included (within each of the 
key criteria)” so that the impact is properly understood. (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:80) 
Probability sampling, on the other hand, usually measures the incidence and prevalence 
of a given social phenomenon. It does not lend itself to qualitative research which is more 
concerned about theoretical or analytical generalizations than statistical generalizations.  
One key feature of purposive sampling in qualitative research is its flexibility. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) coined the term theoretical sampling to qualify this process. Here, 
researchers “sample incidents, people, or units on the basis of their potential contribution 
to the development and testing of a theoretical construct.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79) 
This process can continue until the researcher reaches “data saturation” or a “point when 
no new insights would be obtained.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79)  Others (Maxwell, 
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1996; Patton, 2002) speak of theoretical sampling as opportunistic sampling where the 
researcher takes advantage of unforeseen opportunities as they arise during the course of 
fieldwork. Another important feature of purposive samples is heterogeneity or what 
Patton (2002) calls maximum variation sampling where “there is a deliberate strategy to 
include phenomena which vary widely from each other.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79) 
Accordingly, this case study purposively sampled three different groups of people. These 
are: 1) Ethiopian refugees and community leaders in Nairobi, 2) Kenyan government 
officials at the national, city, and ward levels, and 3) leaders of international 
organizations as well as civil society organizations. Gender, age, administrative location 
and official positions were considered while selecting key informants to ensure some 
heterogeneity or diversity in the sample pool. On the other hand, I was flexible to identify 
and sample individuals or groups which prove to be useful on field work. For instance, 
NGO representatives and some officials were sampled using snowball sampling.  
Table 5 Major Sample Categories in the Study Design 
No. Sample Categories 
1. Ethiopian refugees and community leaders in Nairobi 
2. Kenyan Government Officials at national, city, division, and location levels  







3.6.2 The Sample Matrix of Interviews  
Nairobi is a chartered urban province which has 8 administrative divisions (also known 
as Constituencies) and 50 wards. The wards are the lowest tiers of administration for the 
city. Previous research (Pavanello, 2010) indicates that Ethiopian refugees are 
concentrated in the Kamukunji and Westlands divisions of Nairobi. Furthermore, two 
wards in Kamukunji (namely, Eastleigh North, and Eastleigh South) and one location in 
Westlands (namely, Kilimani) are where the majority of Ethiopian refugees have settled 
in. Given this settlement pattern of Ethiopian urban refugees, I purposively sampled and 
interviewed a total of 30 Ethiopian respondents (both female and male) from these 3 
administrative wards (10 respondents in each location). Table 6 illustrates the breakdown 
of our refugee informants by gender, age and administrative location. 
Table 6 Sample Matrix of In-depth Interview Informants by Wards, Gender and 
Age 
 Eastleigh 




Age  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
18-29 2 2 2 2 2 2 
30-44 2 2 2 2 2 2 
45- 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total                              10                                 10                                            
10 




3.6.3 Sampling Frames and Procedures  
Usually, the sample frames for qualitative research develop in two major ways: 1) 
through existing sources like administrative records and published lists, and 2) in 
specifically generated schemes (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:90). A good example of 
specifically generated schemes could be households screen where door to door short 
interviews are conducted “to check if the household has an individual who belongs to the 
group or not.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:91) Or we could develop our sampling frame 
“through an organization” which “provides services to or represent particular 
populations.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:93)  A third technique of generating a sample 
frame is what is commonly known as “snowball sampling” where “people who have 
already been interviewed are asked to identify other people they know who fit the 
selection criteria.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:94)  
I used two of these purposive sampling techniques for different sampling categories. In 
the case of Ethiopian refugees, the sampling frame was derived through the 
organizational list of a local NGO known as Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK), which 
provides various services for urban refugees in Nairobi. Secondly, snowball sampling 
was used to contact key informants from a) Kenyan officials, b) local NGO 
representatives, and c) representatives of international organizations.  I asked my key 
informants to lead me to other bureaus and organizations which they thought would 
provide more information and insight.  Also, I directly contacted religious and 




3.7 Ethical Issues and Considerations  
A number of ethical issues come to the fore when planning to conduct research that 
involves human subjects. First of all, I sought informed consent from all the participants 
in the study and read out the content of the consent form to the informants. Participants 
were given information about “the purpose of the study, who the research team is, how 
the data will be used, and what the participation will require of them.” (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003:67) Secondly, I granted anonymity and total confidentiality meaning “the 
identity and the opinions of those taking part would not be known outside the research 
team” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:67) All of the names and personal details of my 
informants are therefore not mentioned to protect participants’ anonymity. I also altered 
certain aspects of the data in order to protect refugees who yielded sensitive information 
to avoid their being identified by a third party once this study becomes available for the 
general public. In addition, the data generated from this study was not archived or 
passed on to a third party- an individual, institution or a data bank-to ensure 
confidentiality. Thirdly, I was careful not to raise and ask questions which “might 
uncover painful personal experiences” and may cause harm to the informant (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003:68).  The questions in both the in-depth interview guideline and the key 
informant schedules (See the Appendices) were coined in a broad and exploratory 
fashion. This helped me avoid asking pointed questions that dwell on sensitive or 





3.8 Data Analysis  
There are a number of ways to analyze qualitative data. Yin (1994:103) outlines some of 
these methods, namely: “putting information into different arrays, making a matrix of 
categories and placing evidence within such categories, creating data displays (e.g. 
flowcharts) or putting information in chronological order”. This study attempted to 
decipher emerging patterns and concepts from the data by analyzing the interviews, 
discussions and documents into different thematic arrays. Here, the specific research 
questions are the overarching arrays or thematic umbrellas under which the bulk of the 
interview data was coded, discussed and analyzed.  
 
This type of analysis -developing themes, patterns and concepts from a mix of 
categories,- should not be construed similar to what is commonly known as “open 
coding” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Open coding is an integral part of the “grounded 
theory” methodology that sets out to build categories from qualitative data and 
culminates at developing a theoretical assumption from the data. This study is different 
since it uses the right to the city approach as a theoretical framework and explores 
whether some of its premises apply to the case of African (or non-western) cities or not. 
Hence, the pattern of data analysis in this study could be named as “structured coding” 








 BEYOND THE POLITICAL: THE MAKINGS OF AN URBAN REFUGEE  
          Overview 
 
This chapter is the first part of the data presentation and analysis. It begins by providing a 
detailed analysis about the profile of urban refugees, and their reasons for migration. It 
then discusses the challenges and opportunities the city of Nairobi offered to them upon 
arrival. Subsequently, it delves into a discussion about the different livelihood schemes of 
urban refugees outlining how refugees use their skill set, their capital, and their 
community networks to engage in gainful employment. It also reviews the major 
challenges of urban refugees while doing business or trying to eke out their subsistence 
through various income generating economic activities. It then looks at the various 
religious, cultural and educational institutions established by Ethiopian refugees inquiring 
about the role and relevance of these institutions to refugee life. The chapter ends with a 
synthesis that casts the major findings in light of the major arguments put forward by the 
urban citizenship literature. 
4.1. “Urban” Refugees: What is in the name? 
They all came from different parts of Ethiopia and for so many different reasons. Their 
reasons for leaving their country of origin and seeking a “refugee” status in Nairobi make 
us interrogate the term “refugee” itself. That is why this chapter begins by boldly stating 
that the definition of a “refugee” goes well beyond the political. I first asked 
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refugees when they arrived in Nairobi and also inquired about their reasons for fleeing 
from Ethiopia. The range of responses was wide.  
Out of the 30 interview informants I purposively sampled, eleven of them stated that they 
lived in Nairobi from 1 to 5 years. We can call these refugees recent sojourners. While 10 
of them indicated that they have stayed in Nairobi for more than 10 years. We can refer to 
these refugees as pioneer refugees. There is some significant variation in terms of the 
years the veterans spent in Nairobi. Two of my respondents mentioned that they have 
lived in Nairobi for 20 years while 4 of them indicated that they have spent 11 years in 
Nairobi. The number of people who stayed from 6 to 10 years is not very far from the rest 
either. Around nine (9) people indicated that they have lived in Nairobi from 6 to 10 
years.   
It is commonplace to assume that urban refugees are predominantly political refugees 
who fled their country for fear of political persecution. But the findings from the 
interviews rebutted that assumption from the outset. I have therefore created three 
categories of response to aggregate the predominant reasons behind the refugees’ flight 
into Nairobi.  
 
4.1.1 Economic Refugees  
The most recurrent theme or reason why refugees left to Kenya is for economic reasons. 
These economic reasons have three different aspects. There are some who left to Nairobi 
to further migrate into West European and North American countries as economic 
immigrants. This subgroup is the most predominant among the remaining two other 
subgroups of economic refugees. One of my informants stated his reason as follows:  
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The main reason I moved from Addis Ababa to Nairobi was my desire to 
relocate to Canada. My aunt who lived in Nairobi told me that there is a better 
chance of migrating to Canada since the Canadian High Commission in east 
Africa is only located in Nairobi. I accepted her advice and flew over to 
Nairobi.  
 
In addition to Canada, the United States of America is a major country of destination that 
most Ethiopians aspire to get into from Nairobi.  Some of these refugees come to Nairobi 
by themselves. Others come as family to process immigration into the US from Kenya. 
One of my respondents was very concise when asked why he ended up in Nairobi. He 
replied, “I came here to get a visa and migrate into the United States”.  Another 
respondent stated,  
I came here to process immigration into and settle in America. I came with four 
family members and lived with them for three years.  Unfortunately, I was denied 
entry visa to the United States. I settled in Nairobi permanently and began to work 
as a waiter in a local cafeteria.   
Still, there are some refugees who have applied for immigrant visa into these West 
European and North American countries and are hopeful that they would soon leave 
Nairobi. A female informant who came to Nairobi in 2006 stated “I came to live with my 
sister. Later, she left to America and I decided to stay here and apply for a US visa. I am 
still waiting for the outcome of my immigration application into the US.” Another 
respondent also indicated that his mother and sisters have already settled in the States and 
that he is waiting to do so too.  
There is a second sub group of economic refugees who came to Nairobi to migrate 
mainly into South Africa.  The researcher discovered from the interviews that illegal 
human trafficking of people from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa is taking place. 
Respondents indicated that there is a cartel of illegal traffickers located inside Ethiopia 
and their agents are placed in Nairobi, Kampala (Uganda), Dar Es Salam( Tanzania), 
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Maputo( Mozambique) and Johannesburg. This network hosts people in the transit cities 
like Nairobi and traffic them illegally across the borders of these countries en route to 
South Africa. One of my respondents’ narrated his tragic experience as follows: 
The reason why I came to Nairobi was to go to South Africa and find a job. In 
2009, I left Nairobi and travelled to Mombasa
4
. Then we embarked on a small 
boat from Lamu port to sail to Tanzania. We paid 3000 US dollars to illegal 
traffickers who pledged that they will take us all the way down to South Africa. 
The journey begun in the evening and took a whole day and evening before we 
got to Zanzibar. They hid us in Zanzibar for three days and we began to cross 
over to mainland Tanzania. But the Tanzanian Naval Forces captured us on the 
Indian Ocean. They detained us in mainland Tanzania, robbed all the money that 
we had and later handed us over to Tanzanian immigration officials. The 
Tanzanian officers detained us for two days and ordered us to leave the country in 
10 days.  
I had no money and knew no one in Tanzania. I went to an Ethiopian evangelical 
church in Dar Es Salaam and asked for their help. They paid  3 days rent for me to 
stay at a local lounge. But the lounge owner was so considerate and she allowed 
me to stay there and have free food and drinks from the hotel. She finally gave me 
around 30000 Kenyan Shillings (estimated to be 300 USD) and advised me to go 
back to Kenya. I paid 25000 Kenyan Shillings to travel all the way back to the 
Mombasa Kenyan border. I jumped off before the security checkpoint and 
circumvented the line to go into the Kenyan border and hop on the bus again. I 
finally arrived in Mombasa and took another bus to come back to Nairobi again. 
 
The third subgroup of economic refugees in Nairobi is the ones that migrated in search of 
jobs and better living conditions in Kenya itself. One of my respondents responded, “I 
came here to find a job and work”. Most of these refugees keep mentioning about the 
stories they heard about how good life is in Nairobi, that business opportunities are 
available in the city and about the chances of migrating to the West.  A female 
respondent from Addis Ababa put it as follows, “While I was in Addis Ababa, all I used 
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to hear about Nairobi was great news! At one stage, I decided to cross the Kenyan border 
to enjoy a new life”. Another respondent from the eastern part of Ethiopia stated,  
I grew up in one of the eastern provinces in Ethiopia. When I completed high 
school I moved to Hawassa
5
 to live with my aunt. I used to hear good things about 
Moyalle
6
Kenya whenever my aunt’s friends come to our house. One day I took 
the bus and went to Moyalle Kenya without telling anybody. I crossed the border 
and came to Nairobi after a while. 
 
To conclude, I found out that  most of my informants arrived into Nairobi for economic 
reasons. Many wanted to use it as a transit corridor to the West. Others eyed South Africa. 
And still others resorted to settle in Nairobi permanently looking out for employment and 
business opportunities which they presume are easier to access in Kenya than Ethiopia. 
 
4.1.2 Political Refugees  
Ironically, only ten (10) respondents stated that they left the country due to clear and 
eminent political threats to their lives. On the other hand, thirteen (13) respondents 
indicated that they left the country for economic reasons and the remaining seven (7) 
individuals left for personal and family related reasons. Seven of the ten respondents who 
stated political reasons for their departure from Addis Ababa recount their association 
with Ethiopian opposition parties. Some stated that they were members in the Ethiopian 
opposition party, namely the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) that ran against 
the incumbent party in 2005. Following disputes about the election outcome and the 
outbreak of protests, the incumbent regime began to detain and arrest members of the 
                                                     
5
 Hawassa is a city located on the banks of Lake Awassa in the Rift Valley region south 
of the Capital, Addis Ababa. 
6
 “Moyalle Ethiopia” and “Moyalle Kenya” are Ethiopian and Kenyan towns located on 




opposition, in which case, many fled to neighboring Kenya. One of the respondents 
narrated his case as follow:  
I used to work as a police officer in Addis Ababa where I was denied salary 
increment and promotions repeatedly! The main reason for their rejection was that 
I did not sympathize with their party and was not a card carrying party member of 
the incumbent regime.  They tried to cajole me into becoming a member but I 
refused repeatedly. Finally, they detained and released me after the 2005 national 
elections.  This made me leave my country in the same year. 
 
Another respondent who was a student activist during the 2005 national election states 
his reason for departure as follows: 
I was a student of Information Technology at the College of Commerce in Addis 
Ababa in 2005 when the killings happened after the elections. I was active during 
the student riots, and soon realized that I was in risk.  I and four (4) other friends 
of mine decided to flee from the country since the threat from the government 
security people was getting tougher.  After we secured assistance from the Red 
Cross, we managed to cross the Kenyan border.  Finally, we were assisted by the 
UNHCR to reside in Kakuma
7
.   
 
 
4.1.3 Social Refugees  
Surprisingly, I also found refugees who migrated into Nairobi neither for economic nor 
for political reasons. These individuals left their country of origin because of personal 
and/or family related matters. For instance, I met some who came here for reunions with 
their boy or girl friends. One of my informants stated, “I came here to visit my girlfriend, 
and I decided to live with her.” Another male respondent narrated his unique experience 
as follows: 
The main reason that made me leave my country was love.  I was a first year 
student of Addis Ababa University when my girl friend came to Ethiopia from 
Germany. We enjoyed ourselves. I completely abandoned my study and begun to 
spend the whole day with her.  
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After a few months, she proposed the idea of crossing the Kenyan border. I totally 
agreed since I knew that I am not going to pass my college exams anyway. We 
flew into Mombasa
8
 and stayed in a hotel for a month. But in just three weeks, we 
realized that we did not have any money to get by.  Disagreements begun and we 
broke up. Unfortunately, she started dating tourists in Mombasa for money.  I 
advised her to move to Nairobi to start a new life, but she refused.  Finally I 




One of the female respondents also has a unique story of flight into Nairobi. Her primary 
reason for fleeing into Nairobi was the marital crisis she underwent. Here is an excerpt 
from her response   
I gave birth to my first son while I was in high school. We got married with the 
father of my son afterwards. But he abandoned me and our son and left to United 
States. I was frustrated and depressed when this happened. I left my job and 
wanted to leave to Italy. A person promised to facilitate my travel to Italy and 
took 10000 Ethiopian Birr (estimated around 1000 US Dollars) from me and 
disappeared. A Somali friend of mine advised me to go to Nairobi saying it would 
be much easier to travel to South Africa or Europe from here. I then left my son 
with my parents and crossed the border to Kenya.  
 
The researcher stumbled on a similar kind of story but this time from a male respondent. 
This particular individual was a university lecturer in one of Ethiopia’s universities who 
left the country due to stress and frustration from a failed marriage. He narrated his 
condition as follows:  
The reason why l left the country is because of family problem. My wife left me 
for a   British national and left to the UK with my only son. It was such a 
devastating blow to my life. I could not focus on my career and life in Ethiopia. I 
left my job and decided to leave the country. 
Even more, I found social refugees who left for Nairobi because of parental, sibling or 
peer influence. Most of them were told that it is easier to secure immigration visa to 
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 Mombasa is a major port city and tourist destination on the Indian Ocean coastland of 
Kenya. 
9
 “Matatus” are the famous city buses of Nairobi that carry 25 to 40 passengers. They are 
known for their colorful make up and blustering music. 
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western countries from Kenya. Others were told that business opportunities are plenty in 
Nairobi. A female respondent recounted her experience as follows,  
My friend used to nag me to leave the country in order to have better 
opportunities. One day, she told me that she was ready to cross the Kenyan border 
and urged me to accompany her and other two friends. I decided to go with her 
without telling my parents.  
 
  
4.2 Reception and Assistance in Nairobi  
Given the large concentration of refugees from all over East Africa in Kenya’s refugee 
camps (“Dadaab”
10
 and “Kakuma”), I presumed a significant number of informants may 
have landed in these camps. To my surprise only 3 of them indicated that they lived in 
camps before coming to Nairobi. In contrast, 27 of my informants indicated that they 
flew or drove straight into Nairobi crossing the Ethio-Kenyan border. All of the three 
respondents stayed in the “Kakuma” camp bordering Ethiopia in northern Kenya. 
“Kakuma” is located in a very arid and inhospitable area with very few amenities like 
clean water, health and educational facilities. One of the refugees stated why he left 
saying, “I was in “Kakuma” for two months. It is a malaria infested area and I could not 
adjust to its hostile weather condition. So I decided to move to Nairobi”.  
Camp refugees get direct assistance from the UNHCR but they are far more 
disadvantaged than those who live in cities who access better housing, food, health and 
educational services in Nairobi. One of the community leaders who lived in Nairobi for 
more than 20 years summarized the history of refugee camps in Kenya as follows: 
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“Walda” was the first ever refugee camp founded in the North Western border of 
Kenya with Ethiopia post 1991. It was around 60 Kilometers away from Moyale 
Ethiopia, the southernmost town of Ethiopia edging the Kenyan border. Around 
60,000 refugees fled to Walda from Ethiopia. But they were vulnerable to stealth 
attacks (including murder) by agents of the Ethiopian government who crossed 
the border in Ethiopia and infiltrated the camp.  
After repeated outcries from the refugees, the Kenyan government was forced to 
build another refugee camp known as Tikka further inland (25 kms away from 
Nairobi) and relocate the refugees for protection purposes. But here, refugees 
began to run away from the confines of the camps and started to settle in urban 
areas and intermingle with the local Kenyans. The Kenyan government now 
became concerned about security matters and closed the Tikka camp. Finally, 
another large refugee camp was built for Ethiopian refugees in a place called 
Kakuma which is 1000 Kilometers away from Nairobi. 
The respondent described the predicament of encampment by stating,   
Yes, you can get free shelter and monthly food rations from the UNHCR but the 
quality of the houses and the camp is so terrible. There is also the fear that the 
Ethiopian government brings in agents who spy on refugees; or may even attack 
those that they consider are security threats to the regime. So the issue of public 
safety is a big problem in the camps. 
But still, the Kenyan government has the encampment strategy as the centermost piece of 
its refugee policy. An official of the Danish Refugee Council in Kenya, summarized this 
as follows,  
In Kenya, the policy of the Department of Refugee Affairs encourages refugees to 
stay in camps. You can give refugees basic services like food, water, shelter, 
health and education services if they are confined into camps. It is also easier to 
register and provide security for them if they are found in camps. But the camps 
in Kenya are not ideal at all! When Dadaab was formed, for instance, the numbers 
of refugees in the camp were around 90000 people. As we speak today, our 
bureau estimates that there are more than 479000 refugees in the camp! Daddab is 
the biggest refugee camp in the entire continent now. This staggering number of 
people, mothers and vulnerable children in one huge camp makes it very 
complicated to deliver relief and humanitarian assistance to camp refugees.   
The official continued to outline the specific disadvantages of encampment including: a) 
serious congestion, b) inadequate basic services, c) environmental degradation because of 
large population concentration, d) the lack of security and public safety in the camps (for 
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instance, banditry and violence against women are commonplace in the camps), d) 
refugees do not have any voice or influence on camp management affairs, and e) 
discrimination against minorities is prevalent. Asked to elaborate on his last point, he 
brought an example where in Daddab camp where the majority of the refugees are 
Somalis; he met Ethiopian girls who were forced to wear veils to be able to study in a 
primary school. These girls were Christians, not Muslims.  For these and other reasons 
most refugees prefer to migrate into urban areas. But the government of Kenya was not 
ready to welcome them to the cities. A Kenyan researcher on refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) explained the situation by stating,  
Camps have always been the unwritten law of the land. And there have been 
several projects to chase out refugees from urban centers by the Kenyan 
authorities. There were many arrests and arbitrary investigations in Eastleigh, the 
Nairobi neighborhood overpopulated by Ethiopian and Somali refugees. So the 
government has never been in a position to protect urban refugees. The rules did 
not allow you to be here in the first place. Given the bombings in Nairobi and the 
threat from extremist elements in Somalia, the higher echelons in Kenyan 
government are now even pushing Daddab camp to be removed from Kenyan 
territory and be placed inside mainland Somalia. I very much doubt if there has 
been a change of heart towards a more integrative and inclusive approach towards 
urban refugees in Nairobi. I think it is to the contrary. 
Because of the grim living condition in camps and despite official resistance in cities, 
refugees come to the townships of Nairobi. But as I indicated earlier, most of the urban 
refugees I interviewed reported that they flew into or travelled directly to Nairobi. Upon 
arrival, most were welcomed by siblings and family members. This is especially the case 
for those who came here to facilitate their immigration to Western countries. One of my 
respondents, for instance, stated that his whole family was here in Nairobi when he came. 
Seven of our respondents indicated that either their brothers or sisters hosted them when 
they arrived. Another respondent stated, “Yes, my aunt assisted me when I arrived in 
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Nairobi. She provided me with shelter, food and pocket money for some months”.  Some 
of them were also welcomed by their friends or spouses.  
Surprisingly, ten (10) of my respondents indicated that they had no particular person to 
welcome them when they arrived into Nairobi. But once they arrived, all of them went to 
the Eastleigh area where Ethiopian refugees are found and sought help from complete 
strangers who happen to be Ethiopians. They spent a day or two at another refugee’s 
place to look for a job and rent out another room (that they usually share with two or 
more people to defray cost). Refugees usually pick all kinds of daily chores to make their 
daily living. Men become “makangas” (“taxi boys” who call out for passengers on 
“matatus”) or they become “conductors” (those who collect fees from passengers inside 
the “matatus”). One of the respondents recounted his experience as follows, 
When I came here for the first time, my family extended all kinds of support that I 
needed. But they got tired of me asking for money as time goes, and there was no 
one that could assist me. Life forced me to work as a “makanga” in a “matatu”.  
 
Finding support could be much harder for women. One of the female respondents who 
came to Nairobi with her friend narrated how hard it was for them to make a living. She 
stated,   
We did not have a host family who could provide us with shelter and food. For a 
few days, we stayed in a hotel in Eastleigh. But when we realized that we were 
running out of our small money, we decide to earn money as bar girls.  There 
were instances when we were forced to sleep with men for money in order to 
cover our daily expenses and rent. It was so hard. 
 
Uncharacteristically, some people get lucky when it comes to finding support and jobs. 
One of my female respondents recounted her experience as follows,  
I stayed in Nairobi and I was staying in a small Ethiopian hotel known as 
Hawassa.  I heard the owner mentioning that he needs a cook and I approached 
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him to be employed there. He took me in and I started working for him. I was 
hired with a monthly salary of 3000 Kenyan shillings. Later I became a maid for a 
Somali Kenyan family where I used to cook. The family was well off and agreed 
to pay me 100 USD per month. The lady was also kind enough to give me a two 
weeks break and advised me to go to Addis Ababa and bring my son back from 
Ethiopia. I brought my son, and continued to work for the same family. But 
following the 2007 Kenyan election crisis the family moved to Germany.  The 
family gave me 400 USD and I found a cooking job in a restaurant. 
 
4.3 Shocks and Surprises in Kenya  
I also asked refugees about what their first impressions were about Kenyans, in general, 
and if they had experienced any culture shock once they settled in Nairobi. A plethora of 
responses came and refugees were excited to share their anecdotes and encounters.  These 
experiences could be clustered around 3 major areas: dietary habits, social norms, and the 
relation of the police to the citizens. Many confided that they found the way food is 
prepared in Kenya different from that of Ethiopia. One of the respondents was blunt 
saying, “I was shocked to learn that Kenyans cook cattle intestine and eat it! We do not 
do that in Ethiopia, right?” Some find certain social norms very different from Ethiopia. 
For instance, a respondent said, “I’m always surprised at occasions when Kenyans do not 
greet their neighbors very well!” Another respondent mentioned, “I am shocked when I 
see old people standing inside a crowded “matatu” while the youth sit. If it were Ethiopia, 
you should stand and let the old people sit”.  
Most of my respondents described Kenyans as peaceful and sociable people. However, 
they expressed their shock about the rampancy of police corruption in Kenya. One of my 
female respondents described the situation saying, “The only thing that rules in this 
country is money. It is not the law.” Another respondent added, “In Ethiopia, you go to 
the police station to complain if somebody has done something illegal or inappropriate to 
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you. Here it is the reverse. Even the locals, Kenyans, avoid the police by any means 
necessary”.  Another female respondent added,  
In Ethiopia, people tend to feel sympathy for you if you are a refugee or a 
stranger. In Kenya, it is totally different. The police in particular stop you and ask 
you for money. I was working as a waiter in an Ethiopian restaurant when the 
officer came and asked me to show him my work permit. I did not have one and 
he detained me until he was given a bribe to release me. I still work in the same 
Ethiopian restaurant.  
But refugees take a great care to differentiate between the Kenyan law enforcement 
officials and the general public. As mentioned earlier, their impressions about Kenyans 
are overwhelmingly positive. Here is a testimony from one of our female respondents 
whose son grew up in Nairobi and is now going to a Kenyan middle school. She stated, 
I have found Kenyans to be very sociable people. They respect your privacy and 
do not interfere in your family life. Your neighbors do not ask you questions like 
“Who are you? What do you do for a living?” They are very careful when it 
comes to upbringing their children. Unlike Ethiopians they do not pinch or whip 
their children in order to discipline them
11
. The children here are brought up as 
adults. My son will say “I am sorry” if he has done anything wrong. He does not 
understand it if I keep grumbling about his mistake. My son has grown up as a 
Kenyan. He speaks perfect Swahili and English. He does not even like Ethiopian 
food. He once said, “Ethiopia’s brown sauce is too hot and spicy!” (laughter) 
Refugees repeatedly stated that arriving in Nairobi and getting used to Kenyan society 
and culture was difficult for them. Most of them do not speak Swahili (which is the 
national language) and good English (that most Kenyans fluently speak). In many 
instances, they were harassed, asked for money and detained by Kenyan police officers. 
This stands out as the major problem and cultural shock to Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi.   
It did not therefore come as a surprise that eighteen (18) of our urban refugee informants 
replied that they do not feel well integrated into the Kenyan society as opposed to twelve 
(12) others who claimed that they are integrated. Both groups cite interesting anecdotes to 
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 It is common in Ethiopia for parents to pinch, slap, and whip their children. 
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substantiate their claims. A priest of one of the Ethiopian Orthodox Churches in Nairobi, 
for instance argued,  
I know of a lot of marriages that took place in our parish between Kenyan and 
Ethiopian spouses. Kenyans usually say that Ethiopians are trustworthy and 
hardworking. So they hire our people in their homes and businesses. Ethiopians 
also like the fact that ordinary Kenyans do not have xenophobic attitude towards 
us. We conduct our daily life more or less the same way that other Nairobians do. 
Another refugee stated,  
I know of two Ethiopian friends who married Kenyan women. There are also 
many Ethiopian women who married Kenyan men. Just this week the son of the 
Prime Minister of Kenya, Fidel Castro Raila Odinga married an Ethiopian girl! So 
there is some integration underway here. 
But still, there are others are very skeptical about the claim of integration. One of the 
government officials that we interviewed stated,  
I do not think most urban refugees are integrated to the Kenyan population. 
Especially in the case of Somalis, they stick together and do not open up to other 
Nairobians. They only speak their language and very little English. Rarely do they 
interact or say marry Kenyans. In addition, the problem of small arms is tied to 
the smuggling of weapons from Somalia. Some elements are also linked with 
radical Islamists. These developments, I would argue, have made the relations 
between Kenyans and urban refugees very tense. Integration, for me, is something 
non-existent or even unrealistic. 
These skeptical comments about integration were also made by Ethiopian refugees 
themselves. One of my respondents stated, “We Ethiopians are inward looking. We 
cannot live outside the confines our own community. It is not strange to meet someone 
who has been living in Nairobi for more than 20 years but does not have a Kenyan 
friend.” Another refugee added, “In my opinion, there are few who integrated themselves 
with the Kenyan life but the majority of us are not integrated”.  A more nuanced opinion 
came from a Kenyan researcher about this particular issue. He stated, 
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There is a lot of economic integration. Business between refugees and the locals is at 
an all time high. But the social aspect of integration is lagging. A Kenyan still looks 
at an urban refugee as an Ethiopian, Rwandese and Somali. I am not sure if the 
economic integration undermines or further facilitates social integration. Secondly, 
there is a level of integration between refugees and Kenyan nationals which is more 
evident in cities. We mingle and interact in the cities more. For instance, we have six 
(6) Congolese families that go to my church. We visit them and fellowship with them 
like any other Kenyan church member. 
 
Obviously, it is difficult to reach a conclusive point and state whether urban refugees are 
fully integrated to Kenyan society in terms of their economic, political and social 
relationships. But the responses have already made it clear that the mere inhabitance of 
the refugees, their economic relation with Kenyan nationals, and their use of public 
amenities like Kenyan schools and health facilities, are opening the leeway to integration. 
The following sections deal with and discuss these facets of refugee-host relations in 
more detail.   
 
4.4 Refugee Livelihoods: Economic Rights and Activities 
An outstanding feature of urban refugees is that most of them are engaged in income 
generating economic activities both in the informal and formal sectors of Nairobi’s 
economy. People assume that both urban and camp refugees are economically inactive 
populations. The only difference, most commentators outline, is that the former get 
assistance from the UNHCR while urban refugees secure financial assistance from family 
members and relatives abroad. However, remittances comprise only one of the income 
sources of urban refugees. For instance, only five (5) of our refugee informants reported 
that they get direct financial assistance from abroad.  Otherwise, urban refugees are 
engaged in diverse economic activities making it difficult to define them as “refugees”, 
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“illegal immigrants”, or “immigrants” in the Kenyan context. Let us explore these 
economic activities. 
4.4.1 The Self Employed  
Broadly speaking, I found those urban refugees who are self employed and those who 
earn their income by working for others. The “self employed” have a number of small 
businesses that focus mainly on service provision both to the refugee community and 
Kenyans. One of the female respondents for instance has a beauty salon that she bought 
from Somali woman who used to be a refugee herself. She stated, “This salon was owned 
by a Somali woman who left to Europe with her family and I used to work for her as a 
hair dresser. She offered to sell the business to me at a reasonable price and I did.” She 
continued, “I own and run this business legally. We pay an annual fee to the Nairobi City 
Council to renew our business permits.”  
Another female respondent owns a small boutique (a retail shop of women’s clothes and 
shoes) in Nairobi. It has been more than eight years since she opened her own business. 
She added, “We sell modern clothes, shoes and accessories to women. We also bring 
traditional Ethiopian costumes from Moyalle Ethiopia. Usually refugees who are ready to 
travel to Western countries come and buy our traditional costumes.” One of the male 
respondents owns a small music and video retail store where he “rents and sells audio and 
video copies of music productions from Ethiopia and the neighboring countries.”  He also 
repairs electronic equipments like tape recorders, DVD and VCD players for the locals 
and makes a very good living. He stated, “My business is quite profitable. Not only do I 
cover my family’s expenses; but I also pay the studio rent and my assistant’s salary 
always in time.” Another respondent who lived in Nairobi for seven years imports 
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cosmetic products from the Middle East and distributes to the local shops in Nairobi. He 
was also involved in other businesses before establishing his own business and describes 
the process as follows, 
I first started working as a rental broker six months since got here. I was told to 
move out of my apartment and I looked around for many other houses. It dawned 
on me that I can start this job of finding cheap apartments for people. Since then I 
have been making good money off of this. I used some of the profit to import 
cosmetics products and start distributing here in Nairobi. I have also bought two 
taxi cabs from Kenyan owners and sublet them to Ethiopian drivers (refugees).  
They take one third of the daily profit they make and I collect two third of it. I am 
planning to sell both of these cabs and buy a bigger field vehicle that I can rent 
out for safari tours and field travels. 
 
4.4.2 Employed Workers  
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned job that young male Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi 
are engaged is in public transport. More than 8 of my male respondents stated that they 




in the famous “matatus” of Nairobi. 
Here is a story from one of the respondents who remembers his first stint as a “makanga” 
vividly, 
I was very courageous to start as a “makanga” when I knew very little Swahili 
and had no idea of Nairobi’s neighborhoods! But you will do everything to 
survive. A year or so later, I started speaking Swahili very well and was promoted 
to be a conductor. The “matatu” owner was an Ethiopian. Our “matatu” was fast 
and classy. She was called “Born Free”. I worked for more than 7 years as a 
conductor on her. But the job was very precarious. The owner can fire you any 
time he feels like it. And usually, the owners bring one of their relatives from 
Ethiopia and give your position over to them. In such instances, you have to look 
for another “matatu” to work on. We hustled hard during those days just to 
survive.  
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  “Makangas” are ushers to city buses who call out passengers. 
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 “Conductors” are the people who collect fees inside city buses. 
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Another respondent now works as a “makanga” on one of the “matatus” owned by a 
fellow Ethiopian. He stated, “I have now learnt to speak Kiswahili very well and so I do 
not find it hard to communicate with “matatu” passengers.”  
Ethiopian refugees sell both their skilled and unskilled labor to survive and make a living 
in Nairobi. Here are some of the other economic activities they are engaged in. One of 
our female respondents stated, “I work as house maid.” Another one is a cook. She 
described her job as follows, “I know how to prepare most of the Ethiopian traditional 
dishes and I have learnt how to prepare the Kenyan traditional meals. I now work in this 
Kenyan restaurant that also serves Ethiopian dishes”. She added, “I also do catering at 
Ethiopian weddings and other ceremonies to make extra money.” We have barbers who 
are busy catering for both Kenyan and Ethiopian customers in the populated quarters of 
Eastleigh North and South.  
Another major employer of Ethiopian refugees is “Sheba Miles”, a famous high end 
Ethiopian restaurant that hires a number of waiters, waitresses, cooks, janitors and 
guards. One of our respondents works in “Sheba Miles”. He explained the role of “Sheba 
Miles” as follows,  
I used up all my savings in my first two months of stay in Nairobi. I did not have 
a lot when I got the employment opportunity to work at Sheba Miles. Here, I get 
paid and I do not have to worry about rent and food. This is because the restaurant 
covers them both. Moreover, I am going to school. I think I am one of the luckiest 
refugees in Nairobi. The restaurant owner has not only helped me but a number of 







4.4.3 Basic Expenditures  
In addition to exploring revenue sources and economic activities of urban refugees, this 
study looked at the spending pattern of refugees on essentials such as food, shelter and 
clothing. All of my respondents reported that Ethiopian refugees buy food items, spices 
and ingredients from Ethiopian stores. Bachelors frequent Ethiopian restaurants. One of 
the respondents explained the situation as follows, “Ethiopians buy their groceries from 
local stores and cook in their households. Young bachelors go to Ethiopian restaurants to 
eat. Seldom do Ethiopians eat Kenyan food”. When it comes to clothes, people prefer to 
buy used clothes from Europe that are sold in one of the biggest open air markets in 
Nairobi  known as the “Kikomba” market.  
Kenyans import these clothes which are much cheaper and of better quality than the ones 
which are locally produced. But “Kikomba” is not the only market for clothes. One of my 
respondents stated, “There are famous used cloth stalls in markets known as “Adams”, 
“Toya” and “Kwangware””. These markets are named after the neighborhoods they are 
placed in. Most Ethiopians reside in Eastleigh and “Chai Road” areas where there is a 
large concentration of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. Another respondent explained the 
reasons why Eastleigh remains to be a top destination point for urban refugees. He stated, 
“People come here for two reasons. First, these neighborhoods are underdeveloped and 
rent is cheap. Second, Ethiopians have difficulty speaking English (which most Kenyans 
speak fluently) and Swahili. So they prefer to congregate in these areas where they feel 
embraced by their country folks”. 
As far as housing is concerned, all of the refugees that I interviewed indicated that they 
rent houses from Kenyan landlords. There was not a single incident where a refugee 
99 
 
reported that he or she owns the house in which he or she is currently residing. Often, a 
single individual rents a two or three bedroom house from a Kenyan national and sublets 
them to Ethiopian refugees. Refugees also share utility costs such as water, electricity, 
and landline phones among themselves. Most of these houses are brick built with one 
kitchen and bathroom. Crowding and congestion typify the living arrangement of the 
refugees both in their houses and in their neighborhoods i.e. Eastleigh and Chai Road.   
One of the community leaders described the housing condition in many of these buildings 
as follows, 
Refugees do not have enough income to pay for decent accommodation. So, you 
would find grandparents, spouses, children and grandchildren sleeping a single 
room. Imagine the trauma they undergo. The space is very small, congested and 
there is no ventilation.  
The same respondent quoted a recent health study conducted by RCK which showed that 
“around 95% of urban refugees living in Nairobi suffer from Air Transmitted Diseases, 
especially Tuberculosis.”   
Sadly, I also found out that two of our informants do not actually have enough money to 
even rent a room and would have to crash at their friends’ rooms. One of them described 
his condition as follows, “I do not have enough money to cover my rent. I always live by 
sharing my friends’ rooms. I sleep one night at one of my friends’ house, and another 
night at the others.” I asked the two informants if the problem of refugee homelessness is 
a serious problem in Nairobi. They answered it is and added that they know of many 





4.5 Refugee Business Ventures  
It is important to underscore that the interest to invest in the Kenyan economy was 
something recent among Ethiopian refugees. A prominent Ethiopian businessman 
describes it as follows,  
In the 80s and early 90s, there were not many Ethiopian refugees and 
businessmen in Kenya. Instead, there were many Eritrean refugees who used to 
have heavy trucks and long distance buses. They were active in the urban 
transport sector. Later with the influx of the Ethiopian refugees, people started up 
opening small businesses like kiosks, coffee shops, boutiques and restaurants. 
From the mid 90s on however, you find a lot of influential Ethiopian businessmen 
who are active in the transport sector and the hotel and tourism sectors too.  
Refugees, in general, and the business leaders, in particular, underscore that Kenya offers 
a favorable environment with plenty of opportunities for trade and business.  One of my 
respondents compared this to the situation in Ethiopia stating, “The licensing and 
registration of new businesses is so efficient in Nairobi. If you have the capital, then you 
can easily invest or even buy property. In Ethiopia, it is so hard to invest even when you 
are a national.” Because of this, most of the refugees who went abroad via Nairobi come 
back from countries like Canada and the US to open up businesses. Another respondent, 
for instance, stated, “Yes, we have a lot of émigrés who live in Canada, Australia and the 
US and who are now in Nairobi to invest”.  
4.5.1 Licensing and Taxes 
The Nairobi City Council provides a two step clearing process for people seeking 
licenses. First, refugees are asked to show their IDs or alien certificates that attest their 
legal residency in Nairobi. Second, refugees are expected to submit the amount of seed 
capital they are about to invest in the opening of their business venture.   As for the 
licensing process, one of the female respondents stated, “The licensing process is fairly 
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simple. We also pay an annually fixed amount of money to renew our business permits at 
the city council. Otherwise the government does not levy any income or business tax on 
us.”  
 
Yet, I found three business owners who mentioned to me that they operate without a 
license and were not shy to tell the reason. In all the three instances, they were not 
interested to pay for the license and the annual fees. In lieu, they bribe the city officers 
and continue trading. One of them was blunt in his response stating, “I do not have the 
license but I always give 5OO Kenyan shillings to the city council officials when they do 
routine checks”. He continued, “Corruption is endemic in this country and yes that is why 
I prefer working without license”. The cavalier attitude of these particular informants 
about their practice and the way corruption is taken for granted in Nairobi was truly 
disturbing for the interviewer.  
 
4.5.2 Hiring and Management  
One of the most popular Ethiopian businesses in Nairobi is the famous Ethiopian 
restaurant in Nairobi known as “Dire Dawa”. “Dire Dawa” is a high end restaurant that 
occasionally caters for senior government officials like the Vice President of Kenya and 
government ministers. It has thus far collected a number of prizes and trophies. For 
instance, it was ranked as one of Nairobi’s top ten restaurants in 2007. It was the 2011 
winner of the “Best Value for Money” restaurant in Nairobi. It was the restaurant of the 
month in June 2012.  
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The owner was born in Ethiopia in 1962 in a small town called Awassa which roughly is 
a 200 kilometers south of the capital city Addis Ababa. He fled the country following the 
1974 Ethiopian revolution and the subsequent coming to power of the Derg, a military 
junta of officers that usurped the Haile Selassie I’s monarchy.  He started business by 
selling hair products for men and soon made his way into retail business. He later 
mobilized his capital to open “Dire Dawa” restaurant in Nairobi. Currently, the owner is 
also involved in import and export business too.  He is also a shareholder in a 
construction company which won the bid to erect towers and facilities for a cross country 
electricity grid stretching from Western Ethiopia to the North and Eastern parts of Kenya. 
One of the managers of “Dire Dawa” stated that the refugee population in Nairobi has 
exploded and the living condition of most of these refugees is disappointing.  He added, 
“Most of these refugees subsist on financial aid and remittances from relatives and 
kinfolk who live in the West. But, there are also many refugees who pursue their studies, 
engage in business ventures and do something meaningful with their life”. He states that 
this business has been employing fellow Ethiopians to support them financially. He 
mentioned that most people ask him why he does not employ Kenyan nationals as waiters 
and waitresses. He replied, “some of the refugees working for us may not have legal 
papers and hence would not be able to find jobs elsewhere.” The restaurant “has more 
than 30 such employees who live in the residential quarters of the hotel, have fixed salary 
and benefit from service tips and tokens”. 
In short, businesses utilize both the skilled and unskilled labor of Ethiopian refugees and 
provide employment and income for their fellow country folks. This is not to argue that 
Ethiopian businesses do not hire Kenyans. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Given 
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their skills and willingness to work, Kenyans are also employed in Ethiopian businesses. 
Hiring policy is also contingent on the nature of the business itself. One of my female 
respondents who owns a beauty salon reflected on this as follows,  
I have two employees who are hair dressers. One is Kenyan and the other one is a 
Somali. Hiring depends on the kind of business you have. If you for instance have 
a beauty salon, then you sure need Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian workers 
because the styles of hairdressing for women of each ethnic group differ. So you 
need people who cater for that particular group. Or if you have restaurant or 
coffee shop, then you need waiters and waitresses who speak Swahili and Somali 
languages.  
This proved to be true when I interviewed another female respondent who is the owner of 
a famous high end beauty salon located in one of Nairobi’s famous four star hotels. She 
came to Nairobi by the end of 1988 to visit her relatives. In the same year, her relatives 
moved to the Netherlands and she had to go to the UNHCR and register as a refugee. The 
UNHCR also sponsored her education in hairdressing at a famous college in Nairobi. She 
graduated in one year (1989) and started as an assistant in a top beauty salon inside one 
of Nairobi’s four star hotels and worked there until 1993. It was in 1994, that she left her 
former job to open up her own high end beauty salon. She narrates her story as follows.  
On my fourth year in Nairobi, I opened up my own beauty salon but finding a 
spot in the downtown area was very difficult. Fortunately, the spouse of a 
prominent official was one of my clients and she found me two rooms inside 
“Fedha Towers” (one of the tallest buildings in down town Nairobi). I run this 
business from 1994 to 1998. And following the transfer of all UN offices from 
downtown to the outskirts of Nairobi
14
 I felt I should move because most of my 
customers were UN staff.   
I found a new complex in the Westlands Sarit Center area that I refurbished and 
moved all my stuff in. Unfortunately, burglars stormed into the apartment 
complex and looted everything I invested on. It was such a devastating blow since 
I had nothing left. But I found myself another place and started all over again in 
two months which became quite successful. In fact, I hired three other 
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professional hairdressers, Kenyan, Algerian and Lebanese women, who were very 
great professionals. This was very important because our customers were from all 
over the world. I worked in the same spot for 9 years (until 2008) and moved to 
my current beauty salon in 2009. 
 
I also interviewed one of the managers of another high end Ethiopian restaurant. He 
spoke of their hiring policy as follows,  
We do help a lot of these young people who are willing to work in the restaurant. 
This far, around 43 Ethiopians have worked here in my restaurant before they 
moved to the States. One of them stayed for 7 years working for me. Another 
worker only stayed for 3 months and moved abroad. Most of these refugees are 
very grateful that we gave them the opportunity to work and support themselves 
when they needed it badly.  In fact, I was in Atlanta (GA) last year to visit my 
relatives and around 21 of my former workers drove from the neighboring states 
to meet and greet me! It was such an emotional and exciting moment for me. 
Interestingly, a few Ethiopian refugees have in fact succeeded to expand their business 
ventures into Juba (South Sudan) and Kampala (Uganda) from Nairobi. A fitting example 
for this is the story of a prominent Ethiopian business man who fled persecution as a 
young university student from Ethiopia, ended up in Nairobi and started an amazing 
journey of professional and business success in Nairobi. Here is an excerpt from my 
interview with him. 
I was one of the university students who opposed the policies of the current 
regime in Ethiopia while they still were rebel fighters. In 1991, university classes 
were disrupted because of the escalation of the civil war and ultimately Addis 
Ababa fell in the hands of the rebel fighters. In 1992 I rejoined Addis Ababa 
University to finish my studies but deeply opposed the political changes which 
unfolded with the coming of the EPRDF
15
. I fled to Kenya Moyalle and ended up 
in a refugee camp not far from Moyalle.  
The camp was so inhospitable for all of us. There were around 25000 refugees in 
this camp half of which were university and college students who fled Ethiopia. 
There was security problem since secret agents of the Ethiopian government used 
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 EPRDF is an acronym for the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front 
which is a coalition of ethnically organized parties that overcome the former military 
junta in 1991. EPRDF is still in power. 
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to infiltrate into the camp and assassinate some of their political foes. There was 
also conflict between refugees and the local population. But most importantly 
basic supplies like potable water and food did not come in time and we used to 
spend days half starving. There were not enough tents. There were a few incidents 
of rape too. And the United Nations was completely disorganized. 
Three weeks later, I boarded a bus that comes to Nairobi even though I had no 
legal travel documents. The driver used to stop ahead of check points for us to 
jump off the bus and we used to do detours to avoid the police and jump on the 
bus again. When I got to Eastleigh, I had no relative or friend. But I stumbled on 
an Ethiopian who happened to be the uncle of one of my college class mates and 
he took me to his place.  Staying in Eastleigh, I met another university student 
who knew that I was a 3
rd
 year university  student back home and recommended 
that I contact a Canadian outfit which used to provide college assistantships and 
scholarships for refugees. The name of the organization was Wendell Charitable 
Trust. I contacted their office, explained who I am and presented my transcripts 
asking for their assistance. The regional director gave me an exam to check if I 
was indeed a university student and begun to look for universities in Canada to 
take me in. Fortunately, the University of Alberta and Mc Gill University 
expressed their interest to provide me scholarships. I finally decided to go for 
University of Alberta and the UNHCR settlement officer cooperated to finalize 
my refugee status mandate. 
Unfortunately, the Canadian Consular Officer rejected my visa application 
alongside three other Ethiopians. She insisted that the regime in Ethiopia is 
democratic and that we have nothing to fear for back in Ethiopia. That was the 
lowest point of my life. Frustrated and despondent, I almost gave up on my search 
for schools. However, the director of Wendell Trust advised me to continue my 
study here in Kenya. I agreed and was enrolled in Nairobi University to study 
Chemical Engineering in 1993. The trust secured funding from another UK 
foundation. But in the same year, student riots and demonstrations broke out in 
Nairobi against the Moi administration and the University got closed indefinitely. 
This became another setback. But I did not give up hope; I went to the University 
of East Africa in Barraton (outside Nairobi) and asked to be transferred to their 
school. I was accepted and I spent 4 years in that University and earned my 
Bachelor of Arts in Agro-economics. I continued one more year and completed 
my Bachelor of Arts in applied chemistry in 1998. The University was impressed 
by my performance and asked to retain me as a graduate assistant. I worked there 
for 3 months but left to Nairobi once again. My ambition was to work for the UN 
or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Back in Nairobi, I read that the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) 
has vacancy for a chemist with an economics background. I applied and 
fortunately secured my first ever professional job at the UN with a monthly salary 
of 5000 USD. I worked there for a few years and became a Junior Program 
Officer (JPO) at age 24. In 2000, I left for the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and begun to work as a food security advisor of the UNDP to 
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World Food Program (WFP) in South Sudan. I worked in South Sudan until 2006 
and resigned from the UN. 
In 2006, I opened an Ethiopian restaurant in Juba (the new capital of South 
Sudan) which became the busiest restaurant in the city. Following infrastructure 
development works in South Sudan, I imported three Italian made heavy trucks 
and begun to sublet them to the contractors. I began to make around 12000 dollars 
from each truck every month. And in 2010, I began my own construction 
company in South Sudan which became a huge success. Just recently my 
company won the contract to build the state house of the South Sudan 
government. I have also become the major shareholder of the only Toyota car 
dealer company in South Sudan known as Global Lines. 
Here in Nairobi, I am involved in Real Estate development business. South Sudan 
is the place where I took off investment wise, but there are lots of problems in 
terms of law and order. The risk factors are too high. But in Nairobi, we have a 
system which is so friendly to foreign investment. They have a very well 
developed infrastructure (telephone lines, the internet, electricity, water supplies 
etc), probably the best in East Africa. And the country has always been open to 
foreigners, say compared to Ethiopia. There are a number of international 
organizations and headquarters of the UN offices. But most of all there is 
adequate skilled manpower for any business venture that you would want to 
embark on. Hence I am now refocusing my investment into Kenya. But through 
all these years, I have been living permanently in Nairobi. 
4.5.3 The Spite of Corruption 
Though business leaders within the Ethiopian refugee community are very grateful about 
the opportunities they have seized in Nairobi, they do not shy away to point out that 
corruption is one major problem in Kenya. It runs through the government bureaucracy 
ranging from private police officers and their commanders to the clerks, department 
heads, commissioners and ministers of the Kenyan state. In fact, the 2011 Corruption 
Perceptions Index of countries by Transparency International (a German based watchdog) 
ranked Kenya’s public sector to be the 29
th
 most corrupt nation in the world out of 183 
countries
16
. This holds true also for the city council of Nairobi where the bureaucrats are 
accused of using their office prerogatives to ask for bribes and kickbacks. One of my 
respondents described the situation as   follows,  
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There is a lot of corruption when it comes to the routine checks done by the health 
and sanitation department of the city council. Offices are dispatched to monitor 
the sanitation and safety standards of barber shops, beauty parlors, restaurants and 
bars in which case they threaten the owners to write dismissive reports about the 
business unless the latter cooperate to give them money. Corruption is ingrained 
in the workings of the Kenyan public service, especially those who work at the 
lowest tiers of administration like wards, divisions and the city council.  
 
Another respondent who clears some goods via the Ethio- Kenyan border complained of 
the custom officials stating,  
Custom clearance is a major problem on the border. The custom officials levy 
tariffs arbitrarily. For instance, the officials may charge you 2000 Kenyan 
Shillings to clear a stack (approx 25 Kilograms) of traditional costumes that you 
want to bring in. Next time they may raise that exponentially and ask you 14000 
Kenyan Shillings. We know much of what they collect from us does not go to the 
coffers of the government but to the officials themselves. Those who work in the 
hotel services are also subject to harassment by city government officials who ask 
for money complaining that the business is not safe and hygienic enough to treat 
customers. It is an excuse to get money illegally from refugee business owners. 
One of the workers at Sheba Miles restaurant explained this stating, “Sentiments of 
xenophobia and resentment against successful refugees do exist among Kenyan 
officials”.  He remembers of an incident when a certain Kenyan official came to dine at 
the restaurant and insisted on sitting on a reserved table. He gently reminded the official 
that the table is reserved and volunteered to arrange a different table set for the customer. 
But the official angrily interjected saying, “Don’t tell me where to sit in my own 
country!” Incensed, the manager replied “This is your country but not your table!” 
However, the respondent stated that police harassment and corruption have relatively 
declined since the Mwai Kibaki administration came to power (2002) took over. Still, he 




4.6 Forced Displacement and Social Capital  
4.6.1 Religious Institutions   
Another striking feature about the “stay” of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi is the existence 
of numerous churches and mosques where they congregate to worship and network with 
each other. There are two Orthodox Churches that host hundreds of believers at their 
Sunday services. In addition there are a total of seven (7) Ethiopian evangelical churches 
where evangelicals commute to worship both through the weekdays and the weekend. 
Ethiopian Muslim refugees do not have a separate mosque of their own but go to the local 
mosques in Eastleigh. These religious institutions are not only engaged in spiritual 
ministries and services but also provide the social and cultural milieu for refugees. One of 
the priests of the Ethiopian Orthodox churches in Nairobi outlined the services that the 
church provides as follows, 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) is directly and constructively involved in the lives 
of refugees in many ways. I remember that refugees used the church’s land line to 
correspond with UNHCR and other the international agencies during those days when 
there were no cellular phones in Nairobi. The church officiates marriages. We have a 
small collection of books in Amharic
17
 that refugees borrow to read. We also give 
Sunday school Amharic language lessons to children of refugees. Most of these 
children are born and brought up here and do not get Amharic lessons in Kenyan 
schools. We provide prayer and counseling services for the youth. Recently, we are 
planning to open up a private clinic for refugees for nominal fees. We are planning to 
use the revenue from this service to provide various psycho-social services for the 
refugee community. 
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church also founded a charity and care taking association for 
the Ethiopian community known as “Maedot”. I interviewed one of leaders of “Maedot” 
about the objectives and the activities of the association. She started by saying that 
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“Maedot” is a self help association that raises funds from the congregation on a monthly 
basis. People make voluntary contributions. This far, she added,  
“Maedot” has: 1) assisted ten families who could not cover school fees for their 
children, 2) served hot meals to those refugees who did not have enough to eat and 
are in a very desperate condition, 3) visited more than 40 Ethiopian patients in 
hospitals, 4) covered the travel expenses of more than 10 refugees who wanted to 
back to Ethiopia. We are focusing especially on those who were illegally trafficked 
from Ethiopia to head to South Africa but were caught by Kenyan law enforcement 
officials. 
Traditionally, orthodox believers also have a number of religious fraternity and sorority 
associations where men or women meet up every month to commemorate a divine figure 
(angels, saints etc.). These associations are known as “Ye Tsiwa Mahibers”. People 
gather every month for food and drink and the ceremonies start with blessings and prayer 
by the local priest. The Treasurer mentioned of three associations held in remembrance of   
St Gabriel, Virgin Mary and Bishop Gebre Menfes Kidus
18
.  Another female respondent 
also indicated that she is a member of a “Mahiber” with 10 members. She continued, 
“We visit each other on the day of the Saint we commemorate. We also comfort a 
household in case a family member or a relative of our “Mahiber” passes away”. 
I also interviewed one of the pastors of an Ethiopian Evangelical Church in Nairobi. The 
history of this particular church elucidates how refugees have been initiating, developing 
and institutionalizing organizations of faith and mutual support while facing immense 
challenges. It attests to the argument that refugees are involved in creating social 
practices and structures on the move from their country of origin and en route to a third 
country of final settlement.  Their “temporal” and “spatial” suspension in Nairobi did not 
deter them from such “creative” transition.  It is also essential to note that different 
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cohorts of refugees come and go via Nairobi but the institutions that they founded outlast 
the stay of these refugees in Nairobi. The institutions expand, become more formal and 
sophisticated through the passage of time. Here is a brief story of the Church narrated by 
the Pastor, 
Our church was first founded by a prominent Ethiopian evangelist known who 
lived in Nairobi for more than 20 years serving as the East Africa director of the 
International Bible Society (IBS). This particular organization is a global outfit 
working on bible translations and the distribution of Scripture all over the world. 
Here in East Africa, the IBS has succeeded to get the bible translated into 32 local 
languages.   
Dr. Belay was working in Nairobi when in 1991 the Derg
19
 regime fell in 
Ethiopia and thousands of people fled into Kenya. These include university 
students, former government officials and ex- combatants. Dr Belay used to travel 
to the Tikka Refugees Camp to minister to these refugees. Many did not have 
adequate food and shelter and some people died of cholera epidemic.  Most 
people believed in Christ and became born again Christians and members of a 
new congregation. Dr Belay also invited other more senior ministers to 
consolidate the refugee congregation and church membership grew in leaps and 
bounds.   
In 1991, some of the refugees begun moving from Tikka camp to Nairobi and 
founded a cell in Eastleigh area whose membership begun to swell again. So this 
fellowship grew into our Church. The church was first hosted by the Kenyan 
Deliverance Church in Eastleigh.  A year later, the Church rented a big 
convention center in the downtown area. We just celebrated our twentieth 
anniversary here.  
Our membership was in its thousands in the first 5 to8 years since we moved here 
(1992-2000). But it started shrinking as many people started to leave to Europe, 
Canada, USA, and Australia for third country resettlement. Still many of our 
members are waiting for their relocation to these countries and hence our 
membership is currently at 812 people. I would say only 20 percent of these 
members live in Nairobi permanently as legally permanent residents. In short, we 
are a refugee church!! 
The pastor first arrived in Nairobi to do his diploma in Psychology and studied at Daystar 
University in Nairobi from 1997 until 1999. In the year 2000, he enrolled at the Pan 
African Christian University (Nairobi) to study theology and graduated in 2004. 
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Sellasie I of Ethiopia in 1974 and ruled the country until 1991. 
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Meanwhile, he used to minister in this congregation voluntarily as a counselor and a 
preacher in its mid-week services. The former senior pastor of the church asked him to 
work as his assistant pastor in 2005. And he was appointed a senior pastor of the church 
in 2006 following the departure of the former pastor. He argues that his Church is more 
than a spiritual establishment but works to improve the social and economic welfare of its 
members.  He lists some of the social services the church provides as follows,  
Most of the refugees have a serious language problem. They do not speak English 
well. We organized language proficiency classes for refugees where we used our 
senior church members to train them. We also began entrepreneurship and 
business management classes to those who are interested. The latter went for three 
years and stopped two years ago when the person who is in charge left the 
country.  We are also providing Amharic language lessons for children in Sunday 
school programs. They read scripture, play drama, and sing spirituals in Amharic. 
This way they stay rooted in their language and culture. We insist that people 
dress in our traditional costumes on holidays, during weddings and specials 
festivities.  
I probed the pastor to find out how the church raises funds to cater for these social 
services. He responded that “the church raises its fund from the tithes and donations of its 
members”. He added that they do not have any assistance from foreign churches or 
international charity organizations. The church’s budget is very small most of which is 
used to pay for the rent of the conference center and cover the fees of the senior pastor 
and his assistants. Asked whether this financial condition of his church would not 
constrain their social services, the pastor responded,  
We do not have adequate financial resource to directly spend on charity and 
community development work.  But we assist our refugees by doing job and 
training searches and announcing them for our members in time. We also do one-
off financial supports for those refugees who decide to repatriate to Ethiopia. 
Some members of the church who are well off have volunteered to bring in some 
refugees and provide them shelter and assistance. A few others have sponsored 
the education of church members who wanted to go to college. For instance, we 
have an Ethiopian refugee who went to a Kenyan aviation school and graduated 
as a pilot. He is now working for the Ethiopian airlines.  
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4.6.2 Educational Institutions 
All of my respondents confirmed that there are no exclusive Ethiopian community 
schools in Nairobi. Ethiopian families send their kids to Kenyan public and private 
schools. One of the respondents summarized the situation as follows,  
There are no Ethiopian community schools in Nairobi. People send their kids to 
Kenyan schools. There are two parallel systems of education in Kenya. The first 
is the 8- 2- 4 system of primary ,middle school and high school system of Kenyan 
education and the British commonwealth system.  
Kenyan schools are highly regarded by Ethiopian refugees for their superior quality 
compared to their Ethiopian counterparts.  Parents were also asked whether there were 
incidents of discrimination and bullying against their children in schools. To my surprise, 
refugees did not report any such incident. As far as higher education is concerned, all but 
one of our informants stated that many refugees do not go to college in Nairobi. This is 
because most people cannot afford to pay the tuition fees of these colleges. One of my 
respondents stated,  
I know a few people who go to Nairobi University. There are many refugees who 
want to study there. But because of financial problem, most of us are out of 
school.  
Another refugee summarized the situation stating, “We all run to feed ourselves and 








4.6.3 Community Organizations 
Here, I inquired whether there are other informal or formal organizations formed by 
Ethiopian refugees as non-profit community driven initiatives. One of my respondents 
recounted that there is an Ethiopian Community Association (ECA) legally founded in 
1996.  ECA functioned as an independent and nonprofit outfit up until 2003. It was active 
in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissez-passé forms 
for those Ethiopians who want to repatriate, and managing funeral services for the 
deceased and comforting families of the deceased. However, the respondent continued,  
The Ethiopian embassy began to interfere in the management of the association. It 
wanted to assign people who are sympathetic to the regime in power in Addis and 
use the network for political cooptation purposes. Many people who were active 
in the organization resigned from participating because of this.  
Members were also asked about two ubiquitous associations in Ethiopia, “Iddirs” and 
“Iqqubs”. In Ethiopia, almost every household is a member of local burial associations 
known as the “iddir”. These organizations collect monthly contributions from members; 
they announce the death of a family member to the community; they arrange the venue 
and ceremony of the funeral procession; and comfort the family of the deceased for three 
days by bringing food and drinks to the mourning family. They also serve people who 
come to pay their condolences to the family of the deceased. A typical “Iddir” has a 
chairperson, a treasurer that manages the bank account and a secretary. Another famous 
cultural institution among Ethiopians is the “Iqqub”. “Iqqubs” refer to a group of 
individuals who pool a fixed (and usually a significant) amount of money and provide it 
to members in order to underwrite a business initiative of their own choice. Members 
take turns to access this seed capital and every member is bound to contribute monthly 
until everyone gets the opportunity. “Iqqubs” are useful in that they raise capital instantly 
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and help those who are in need of money quickly. They also serve as a collective saving 
scheme of members who set aside money for the “Iqqub”. 
Refugees underscored that there are no “Iddirs” in Nairobi. Instead, there are ad hoc 
contributions to cover and manage the funeral expenses if or when a refugee passes away. 
One of the respondents explained the situation as follows,  
I do not know if we can call them “Iddirs” properly because they are not 
formalized as in Addis Ababa. They do not have assets, offices and some division 
of labor. However there are informal associations where Ethiopians from different 
ethnic origins meet up periodically and assist each other in such unfortunate 
incidents like the death of a spouse or a family member. When people die, we 
contribute to manage the funeral service. There is also that tradition of taking food 
and drinks to comfort the family of the deceased and spend time together. 
I then asked refugees, business as well as community leaders why it is difficult to foster 
community organizations like “Iddirs” in Nairobi. One of my respondents answered as 
follows,  
You should realize that here everybody has dual challenges. On the one hand, 
people have their collective identities and associations (national or ethnic) and do 
everything to socialize and coexist. But, on the other hand, there is a lot of fear 
and suspicion among refugees themselves. Each refugee thinks that the other may 
be a government plant or an unknown quantity that could hinder or block his/her 
emigration process. So everybody is tightlipped and fearful not to divulge much 
information about their past background, their true identity and their future plans. 
It is so hard to form community associations and run such initiatives amongst 
urban refugees when trust is missing! 
4.7 Synthesis 
The bulk of this chapter analyzed how Ethiopian refugees negotiate aspects of urban 
citizenship in Nairobi.  Accordingly, I found that there is more to the term “urban 
refugee” than just political refugees.  In fact many fled to Nairobi for economic reasons. 
Some aimed to use it as a transit corridor to the West or other African countries (notably 
South Africa) while others wanted to settle in Nairobi permanently. There were also 
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political refugees who fled the country due to political persecution and still others who 
left their country of origin for personal or family related matters. Refugees had some kind 
of a social safety net upon arrival where they were welcomed by family members, 
spouses, and friends but in some cases complete strangers who happened to be 
Ethiopians.  
I found that refugees are active economic agents both in the formal and informal sectors 
of Nairobi’s economy. The bulk of the respondents were employed both as skilled and 
unskilled workers. Most worked as restaurant managers, barbers, hairdressers, cooks, 
waiters, “makangas” or “matatu” conductors. Others managed to open up small 
businesses like beauty salons, barber shops, audio and video stores, boutiques, and 
cafeterias. They are registered by the city council and pay annual fees to renew their 
business permits.  Still others have managed to break into the formal economy running 
high end businesses, cosmetic stores, construction companies, and import and export 
enterprises in Nairobi.  In so doing, these refugee-cum-businessmen have created a lot of 
employment opportunities for other Ethiopian refugees and local Kenyans too.  
It is this full blown participation of Ethiopian refugees in the Kenyan economy that 
complicates their status of residence in Nairobi.  It is hard to define them only as 
“refugees” even though most of them fled their country of origin for a number of reasons. 
It is also hard to refer to them as “immigrants” for the overwhelming majority of them 
await resettlement in a third and preferably western country. Here again, I have identified 
people that the Kenyan state recognizes as “refugees” but have arrived in the city to 
permanently settle and make a living.  One is tempted to refer to this group of people as 
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“illegal immigrants” but they are comfortable to carry a refugee ID and live in Nairobi 
indefinitely.  Perhaps, one can qualify them as de facto immigrants.  
Obviously, one cannot refer to refugees as full-fledged Kenyan citizens. But here again, 
we have second generation Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi who speak perfect Swahili, 
study in Kenyan schools and consider themselves more as Kenyans than Ethiopians. 
Should the Kenyan state grant citizenship to this cohort of people? Would not this 
automatically complicate the status of their parents who wield their refugee alien 
certificates but have lived there for years? Qualifying citizenship for Kenyans themselves 
could perhaps be part of the discussion when we attempt to qualify the experience of 
urban refugees. Save for carrying Kenyan IDs, participating in local and national 
elections or carrying Kenyan travel documents (such as passports); Ethiopian refugees 
seem to more or less enjoy similar social and economic rights like Kenyans.  
This is not to argue that Ethiopian refugees are fully integrated into Kenyan society. That 
is not the case. In fact, the study found out that Ethiopians retained their collective 
identity by establishing (or replicating) their own unique economic, religious and cultural 
institutions and practices. There are two Ethiopian Orthodox churches and around seven 
Ethiopian evangelical churches.  They have charity and care giving associations like 
“Maedot”.  These institutions are not only engaged in spiritual ministries and services but 
also provide the social and cultural milieu for refugees. They offer help for the poor, the 
sick and the elderly. They provide trainings in language and business skills to help 
refugees integrate. They comfort refugees when a family member passes away. They 
support refugees who choose to go back to Ethiopia by defraying travel costs. Refugees 
also have fraternity and sorority associations known as “Mahibers.”  
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They also founded the Ethiopian Community Association (ECA) legally in 1996 which 
was active in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissez-
passé forms for Ethiopians who wanted to repatriate, and managing funeral services for 
the deceased. This elucidates how refugees have been initiating, developing and 
institutionalizing organizations of faith and mutual support while facing immense 
challenges. Refugees are constantly involved in creating social practices and structures on 
the move from their country of origin and en route to a third country of final settlement.  
Their temporal and spatial suspension in Nairobi did not deter them from such “creative” 
transition.  It is also essential to note that different cohorts of refugees come and go via 
Nairobi but the institutions that they founded outlast their “stay” in Nairobi. The 
institutions expand, become more formal and sophisticated through the passage of time. 
 
In addition to their inkling to retain and reinforce their collective identity as Ethiopians, 
refugees also face a number of challenges from their host society that force them to 
cluster together.   Most of them do not speak Swahili (which is the national language) or 
good English that most Kenyans fluently speak. And in many instances, they are 
harassed, asked for money or arbitrarily detained by Kenyan police officers. This stands 
out as the major problem and a major cultural shock to Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi. 
Corruption is a big problem in Kenya. It runs through the government bureaucracy 
ranging from private police officers and their commanders to the clerks, department 
heads, commissioners and ministers of the Kenyan state. This holds true also for the city 
council of Nairobi where the bureaucrats are accused of using their office prerogatives to 
ask for bribes and kickbacks.  
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Given these unique set of conditions, the second research question looms even larger. 
Can the ‘Right to the City’ approach adequately explain the everyday struggle of 
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in Nairobi? To answer this question, we 
need to recap the basic premises of Lefebvre’s argument for the “Right to the City”.  
Purcell’s three point summary comes in handy.  First, Lefebvre established his notion of 
urban citizenship on inhabitance. This is a radical departure from the two traditional ways 
in which citizenship is define i.e. ius soli (being born in the territory) or ius sanguinis 
(descent from citizen parents). Second, Lefebvre posited that everyone should have the 
right “full and complete usage of the city”. All inhabitants of the city should be able to 
“live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space” (Purcell, 
2002:106). Last but not least, “right to the city” implies the right to directly participate in 
the democratic management of the urban space. Needless to mention that Lefebvre’s 
approach to democratic management is a critique of liberal and representative democracy. 
For him, representation (via electoral practices) alienates the urban citizen.  The antidote 
is what Lefebvre dubs the right to difference. This entails the right to claim rights, to 
struggle and conflict with the powers that be while managing one’s own city.  
I have earlier indicated that all but three of our respondents came straight to Nairobi. 
Camp refugees also left and settled in Nairobi without duress.  Even though the UNHCR 
and the government of Kenya insist that refugees should primarily be kept in camps, 
there is no strict rule or law that confined refugees to these premises. Movement into and 
residence inside the city of Nairobi has not therefore been sanctioned against refugees. In 
fact, beginning from the year 2006 the Kenyan government took the step of registering all 
urban refugees in Nairobi and issuing them an alien certificate card which confirmed 
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their legal residence in the city.  To use Lefebvre’s qualifier, inhabitance was always 
granted and has never been denied to urban refugees in Nairobi. Seen from this vantage 
point, urban refugees will pass the first test for urban citizenship unequivocally. 
Ethiopian refugees do “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban 
space” (Purcell, 2002:106). 
If anything, this chapter went further and explored how urban refugees occupy urban 
space in Nairobi. Here again, Lefebvre’s three fold taxonomy of urban spaces serves us a 
great deal.  In his other book The Production of Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three 
main ways of understanding space i.e. “perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Elden 
and Brenner elaborated on this schema of Lefebvre stating that it unites “physical, mental 
and social space”.  Perceived spaces, that Lefebvre also calls ‘territorial practices’ and 
‘territorial representations’ include : “the physical, material spaces of state territory, from 
the borders, fences, walls and barriers erected to mark its external limits”(Brenner and 
Elden, 2009:365). Conceived spaces , whom he also calls ‘representations of territory’ 
refer to, “a range of imagined senses of the body of a nation translated into political 
practice, including maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory cartography, 
and otherwise diagrammatically”(Brenner and Eden, 2009:365). Thirdly, lived spaces 
refer to the individual and social experience of living through the physical and mental 
world of spaces. For Purcell, lived space represents “the complex amalgamation of 





In Nairobi, refugees regularly construct urban spaces in all the three ways Lefebvre 
outlined. They occupy recognizable and crudely delineated territorial representations i.e. 
physical and geographic areas where they physically dwell clustered. They produce 
goods and services. They trade with fellow Kenyans and other African refugees. They 
occupy apartment buildings, churches, mosques, bars and restaurants disproportionately 
in Nairobi’s municipal wards like Eastleigh North, Eastleigh South and Killimani.  These 
perceived urban spaces translate into representations of territory or conceived spaces that 
refugees create through their routine interactions with territory, the fringes of the Kenyan 
state and the host community. For instance, Kenyan officials usually refer to Eastleigh as 
“their” neighborhood marking and addressing it as the neighborhood of outsiders (i.e. 
refugees). Speaking of Eastleigh, informants come with words like “crowding”, “illegal 
human trafficking”, “Somali and Ethiopian businesses”, “Islamic Fundamentalism”, 
“bomb attacks” , “security threats” etc. These “conceptions” speak volumes about how 
the physical abode of urban refugees is interpreted by the Kenyan state and the public at 
large. Eastleigh is implied as that wild neighborhood whose governmentality is suspect 
due to its overwhelming refugee population.    
 
Also, this chapter went to great length to document and analyze what Lefebvre termed as 
the social space of inhabitants i.e. “the everyday life of the city dweller (Purcell, 
2003:577).”  Here I described their economic activities and business ventures. I outlined 
their basic expenditure patterns. I looked at the religious and community organizations 
that they have created during their stay in Nairobi. In short, I depicted how refugees 
muster their social networks and economic resources to negotiate rights and resources in 
Nairobi. Three words will summarize the nature of these urban social spaces: 
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“resilience”, “innovation” and “cooperation”. Refugees come through difficult conditions 
only to unpack and innovate new livelihood strategies of survival. They also offer a 
tremendous amount of economic, social, cultural and spiritual support to each other. This 
definitely helps cushion the pain of adjusting to the grim reality of being a refugee.  To 
paraphrase Lefebvre, Ethiopian urban refugees stand out as active inhabitants who are 
constantly engaged in the creation and restructuration of perceived, conceived and social 
spaces in Nairobi. 
 
But such practices will not lead us to automatically conclude that urban refugees are 
urban citizens. This is because Lefebvre brings in a second and more important qualifier 
to what he means by “right to the city”. In addition to the appropriation and creation of 
urban spaces, Lefebvre stressed “the democratic management of the city through the 
direct participation of society (Mathivet, 2010:25)”.  In fact, Lefebvre recommends a 
“contemporary formula for social citizenship, expressing a ‘social project’ which requires 
a new political contract between the state and citizens”. In short, state- refugee relations 
and the latter’s ability to participate in the management of the city should be examined 
thoroughly.  Here, I have found that the relationship between refugees and the Kenyan 
state is not that rosy at all! None other than the problem of police corruption and 
harassment substantiates this assertion.  Refugees and their business leaders spoke 
bitterly about the problem of corruption and police harassment repeatedly.  
 
Refugees stand out as targets of police harassment and corruption because of their 
vulnerable position as the “other” i.e. aliens or foreigners. According to one of my 
respondents, “There is an undercurrent among Kenyan police officers that refugees come 
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to Kenya either because they are rich or to make money off of Kenyans!” Hence Kenyan 
police officers are not reluctant to harass and discriminate against refugees.  But refugees 
insisted that they face the specter of discrimination and exploitation not from ordinary 
Kenyans but rather from the foot soldiers of the Kenyan state! The State through its 
punitive organs (or shall we say “law enforcement officials”?) appears to be the single 
most institution that draws the contours of a refugee-citizen divide in Nairobi. The 
political, therefore, takes the centre stage in defining the rights and capabilities of a 
refugee vis-a vis its limitations and vulnerabilities.  The following chapter therefore 
dwells on the relationships between the Kenyan state and urban refugees reflecting 
mainly on the policies and practices that delineate the scope and content of political rights 









  CHAPTER V 
            THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: THE STATE AND URBAN REFUGEES 
       Overview 
 
In previous chapters, I traced the genesis of the term “citizen” from liberal renditions that 
describe an individual (i.e. a free subject) who claims a bundle of civic, political, social 
and economic rights from a respective state. In turn, the citizen is expected to pay taxes, 
elect his or her political representatives, and stand in defense of that state in case of 
aggression. Critics of liberalism such as civic republicans argued to expand the notion of 
a citizen. For the latter, a citizen should be more than a tax payer or a voter and should 
actively participate in the public and cultural affairs of his or her nation devoutly. It is 
that sense of emotional and cultural allegiance to the “nation” that counts more to them 
than mere birth or residence in a country. Still others challenge the entire premise of 
locating citizenship on membership in the nation-state arguing that we are “citizens of the 
world” before we become citizens of nation-state. For these who espouse cosmopolitan 
citizenship, our allegiance to universal human rights and dignity should never be 
compromised even when our respective nation-states trample on the rights of “other” 
states or communities.  
 
Qualifying “citizenship” therefore hinges on the notion of nation-state i.e. the power of 
the state to determine and sanction the rights of its citizens vis-a-vis “aliens” (guest 
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workers, immigrants, illegal immigrants, refugees, stateless persons, etc). This brings the 
politics of rights to the forefront of the discussion. The analysis from extensive interviews 
with Ethiopian urban refugees did point in that direction too.  Refugees kept reiterating 
that they face the specter of discrimination and exploitation in Nairobi not from ordinary 
Kenyans but rather from the officials of the Kenyan state. The Kenyan Police appears to 
be the single most institution that draws the contours of a refugee-citizen divide in 
Nairobi.   
 
The following chapter therefore pays a discriminate emphasis to the relationship between 
the Kenyan state and urban refugees. It aims to explore the policies and practices that 
delineate the scope and content of political rights for urban refugees in Kenya.  The 
chapter posits two important questions. First, what are the bundles of political rights that 
urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy (or are supposed to enjoy) and how do these differ from 
the rights of citizens? Second, how do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi relate to the Kenyan 
state, and its law enforcement agencies? Accordingly, the first section provides a 
thorough summary of the international, national and local right regimes that urban 
refugees in Kenya operate under. The second section delves into how urban refugees 
explain their relations with the auxiliaries of the Kenyan state. 
5.1 Global, Continental and National Regimes of Refugee Rights   
5.1.1 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
An ideal point to start reviewing the international legal framework on urban refuges 
would be the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted and 
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly. This document enshrined basic, 
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universal and inalienable rights to all human beings, including refugees. These inter alia 
include: a) the right to life, liberty, and security of person (Article 3); b) the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 6); c) the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State (Article 13); and d) the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others. (Article 17) 
The declaration is also unequivocal about human dignity and the importance of protecting 
it by law. Article 7 of the UDHR stipulates this vital notion by stating that “All are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” 
Article 9 qualifies this provision stating that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.” More importantly, the UDHR enshrined that every human 
being has “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
(Article 14) Clearly, the UDHR is the first international policy instrument which 
recognized the right of refugees and recalibrated it as a human rights issue.  In short, 
refugees, simply by virtue of being human beings, have fundamental rights to life and 
security, to adequate legal protection, to move around freely, create and own wealth. 
Finally, even the right to be a refugee is qualified for the first time as a basic human right. 
(UN Gen Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 1948)  
The only provision of the Universal Human Rights Declaration that delineates and 
confines the rights of the individual within the nation-state is Article 21. Stipulating a 
bundle of political rights for a citizen-person of a given country, Article 21 boldly states 
that:  
1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.2) Everyone has the right to 
equal access to public service in his country.3) The will of the people shall be 
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the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
Seen from this vantage point, refugees can enjoy all but political rights of participation, 
election and access to public services in their host city or country.  
 
5.1.2 The United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951) and the Revised Protocol 
(1967) 
Three years later (1951), the United Nations adopted its Convention on Refugees where it 
also decided to establish the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).  
Article 1 of the 1951 convention defined a refugee as a person, who fled his or her 
country “owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and “is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”  
Sub Article 4C of the first article qualifies that a ‘refugee’ may lose his or her title is if 
“He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which 
he remained owing to fear of persecution.” Hence, the Convention recognizes the 
possibility of refugees settling in permanently and becoming citizens of the country they 
fled into.  
 
Even more, Article 7(1) states that host countries “shall accord to refugees the same 
treatment as is accorded to aliens generally”. For instance, contracting states should have 
favorable policies for refugees with regards to “the acquisition of movable and 
immovable property”. (Article 13) Industrial, artistic, literary and scientific works of a 
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refugee “shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual residence.” (Article 
14) A refugee can also have gainful employment in the host country, if “1) he has 
completed three years’ residence in the country, 2) he has a spouse possessing the 
nationality of the country of residence, or 3) he has one or more children possessing the 
nationality of the country of residence.” (Article 17(2)) And refugees have broader rights 
to access public education and housing in favorable terms and by the standards that other 
aliens in the host country or city are treated. (Articles 21 and 22) A few amendments 
were inserted into the 1951 Convention when the UN General Assembly adopted a 
Protocol on 31 January 1967. 
 
The 1967 Refugee Protocol starts by lifting the time and geographic limits mentioned in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. This Protocol is more explicit and forthcoming when it 
comes to the legal protection of refugees and the duties and responsibilities of the host 
state for refugees. Article 16 sub-article 1 discusses that a “refugee shall have free access 
to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States”. Sub article 2 further 
stipulates that “A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual 
residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts.” 
We have to mention two more important obligations of any signatory state here. Article 
26 commits host states to afford refugees the freedom of movement. It states that host 
states should “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of 
residence and to move freely within its territory.”  Article 27 also mandates the 
contracting states to “issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not 




We can conclude by stating that the Refugee Convention (1951) and the 1967 Protocol on 
the Status of Refugees cover three main subjects. First they detailed the basic refugee 
definition, and specified the circumstances under which one cedes a refugee status. 
Secondly, they outlined the legal, economic, social and cultural rights of refugees 
alongside their duties and obligations. Particularly the 1967 Protocol stressed the right of 
refugees to be protected against forcible return, or refoulement, to a territory where their 
lives or freedom would be threatened. Thirdly, both the Convention and the Protocol 
discussed the contracting state’s obligations to cooperate with the newly formed United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Kenya is a signatory to UDHR, the 
Convention and Protocol on the status of refugees.  
 
5.1.3   The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on Refugees 
 
Two years later, African Heads of States met in Addis Ababa on 10 September 1969 and 
endorsed the OAU Convention on African Refugees, which is the first legal and policy 
instrument of the continent. The OAU convention endorsed the UN Convention and 
Protocol but included new concerns and provisions which were not discussed before. For 
instance, the Preamble (Clause3) states that the refugee problem has become “a source of 
friction among many Member States.” Hence, Article 3 stated that “the granting of 
asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an 
unfriendly act by any Member State”. Written in the context of the Cold War and African 
civil wars, it speaks about the difficulty to “make a distinction between a refugee who 
seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of 
fomenting subversion from outside.” (Preamble (C4))  
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The OAU declaration brought in very helpful ideas to the international upkeep of 
refugees in general. For instance, it enshrined the principle of non-refoulement. Article 
2(3) stated that a  “person fleeing his country shall not be subjected to such measures as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion.” Second, Article 2(4) introduced the idea 
that an OAU Member State can “appeal directly to other Member States and through the 
OAU” to assist in granting asylum to refugees if it finds it overwhelming or difficult. It 
also encourages other Member States to respond to such calls “in the spirit of African 
Solidarity and international cooperation” and “lighten the burden of the Member State 
granting Asylum”. 
 
Despite these constructive additions, the security concern of member states about 
subversion from neighboring countries is evident in the wording of the declaration. 
Accordingly, Article 3(1) states that any African refugee “shall also abstain from any 
subversive activities against any Member State of the OAU.” The penultimate sub article 
stresses that  
 
Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective 
territories from attacking any State Member of the OAU, by any activity likely to 
cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through 
the press, or by radio. 
 
The African continent, it seems, was the first to realize that refugee outflow due to forced 
displacement could be used as an ideal opportunity to mobilize political dissent and 
combat operations against the incumbent of a neighboring state. Unfortunately, this 
became the case in the 1970s and 80s where guerilla fighters and insurgents began to 
exploit refugee camps as recruiting and resource mobilizing grounds for civil wars raging 
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inland. The escalation of such wars, in turn, resulted the further outpouring of refugees to 
the neighboring countries unleashing a vicious cycle of conflicts and refugee-cum- 
combatants.  This was more so in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In most of these cases, the global 
superpowers (USA and USSR) were each supporting rival factions and staging brutal 
proxy wars.  
 
 
Last but not least; the OAU convention legalized the ‘encampment’ approach to refugees 
stating that, “For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle 
refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of 
origin.”(Article2(6)) Otherwise, ‘encampment” has never been enshrined as a legal 
prerogative of contracting states in the UN Convention of refugees (1951) and the 1967 
Protocol. To sum up, all of these international legal instruments play a pivotal role in 
articulating the rights and duties of refugees, contracting states, the UNHCR and the 
African Union. They have also inspired the development of national policies and laws on 








5.1.4 The Refugee Act of Kenya (2006) 
The Refugee Act of Kenya became the law of the land in December 30
th
, 2006. The Act 
begins by defining what a refugee is, the category of people who are not eligible for the 
status of a “refugee”, and the conditions under which a person cedes his or her refugee 
status.  The Act drew a lot both from the UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol while qualifying categories and concepts. To its credit, the Act outlines its 
provisions in plain English with few esoteric legal terms. It also formally instituted the 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) to be “responsible for all administrative matters 
concerning refugees in Kenya, and shall, in that capacity, co-ordinate activities and 
programs relating to refugees.” (Article6 (2)) It also enshrined the prerogatives of the 
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs who is going to head the DRA. Inter alia, the 
Commissioner is delegated to: a) “formulate policy on refugee matters in accordance with 
international Standards”, b) “register all refugees”, c) “issue refugee identification cards 
and travel documents to refugees”, and d) “manage refugee camps and other related 
facilities”. DRA is also designated to liaise with UNHCR.  
 
The Act also declared the formation of a Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) and the 
Refugee Appeal Board (RAB). RAC’s mandate is to assist the Commissioner for 
Refugees in matters concerning the recognition of persons as refugees as defined in the 
Act. The RAC comprises of 12 members, a third of whom must be women. All twelve 
members are drawn from government ministries and departments. All but two of the 
bureaus represented are from the national security corps of the cabinet. They include 
representatives from the Police, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Interior, 
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Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of course the 
Department of Refugee Affairs. Besides the provision for the incorporation of one 
representative from the host community and civil society, refugees are not represented at 
all. This means, refugees are “left only with DRA (whose competence is broader) and the 
courts of law as the legal forums through which to represent their issues and concerns.” 
(Munene, 2010:19) The Refugee Appeal Board comprises a chairperson with a 
background in law, plus six other members. Refugees can appeal to this board if they are 
not satisfied with the decision of the Department of Refugee Affairs. (Refugee Act, 
Section 10 (1))  
 
Articles 16 and 17 constitute the core of this Act for they posit refugee encampment as 
the center piece policy of the Kenyan government when it comes to refugees. There is no 
mention of urban refugees in the legislation. In fact, Article 16(2A) speaks of establishing 
“transit centers for the purposes of temporarily accommodating persons who have applied 
for recognition as refugees”. Since immigration processes are undertaken in Nairobi, 
lawmakers seem intent to establish “transit centers” (a euphemism for camps) in urban 
areas too. Section 16 (4) also provides that “…every refugee and member of his family in 
Kenya shall, in respect of wage-earning employment, be subject to the same restrictions 
as are imposed on persons who are not citizens of Kenya”. This implies that the refugees 
have the right to acquire work permits. However, Munene (2010:17) argues that “not 
many refugees will be able to secure work permits” for two reasons. First, “The 
government will consider the skills that a migrant has to offer before a work permit is 
given” (Munene, 2010:17). In most cases, refugees do not have formal credentials of 
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training and skills. Secondly, “The work permit has to be paid for”. Most refugees may 
not have the money to access the permit (Munene, 2010:17).  
 
More troubling provisions of the Refugee Act are articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that 
the Commissioner can “withdraw the refugee status of any person where there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding that person as a danger to national security or to any 
community of that country”. Furthermore, Article 21 states that the Ministry of 
Immigration can “order the expulsion from Kenya of any refugee or member of his 
family if the Minister considers the expulsion to be necessary on the grounds of national 
security or public order.” These provisions provide extraordinary (and extrajudicial!) 
prerogatives to the office of the DRA. It is also not clear what a “reasonable ground” 
constitutes to withdraw a refugee status or expel refugees as national security threats. 
Ironic enough, the law does not also specify where expelled refugees can go afterwards.  
To sum up, the Refugee Act is a policy blue print that privileges national security 
concerns and encampment. It reads more as a monitoring and punitive device and is 
rather very skeptical about refugees in general. It also rides roughshod over the reality of 
urban refugees in Nairobi and how they have become a part of the economic and social 








5.1.5 The New Kenyan Constitution (2010) 
After years of wrangling and controversy, the Republic of Kenya has ratified a new 
Constitution of Kenya following the referendum on 4
th
 August 2010.  The Kenyan 
Parliament has now taken the responsibility of forming various legal and policy task 
forces to streamline national Acts, Bills and Proclamations passed in previous years 
according to the new Constitution of Kenya. In fact, I learned from our interview with an 
official of Refugee Coalition Kenya (RCK) that the Parliament has actually delegated 
RCK to create the task force that would review the 2006 Refugee Act and streamline it in 
the spirit of the new Constitution. The fact that the national Parliament has actually 
entrusted a local NGO to head this initiative is very commendable.  
I have also looked into the Chapters, Articles, Sub-Articles and Clauses of the 
Constitution to see if there are relevant chapters that touch upon or deal with the issue of 
refugees in Kenya. Only the chapter that deals with citizenship matters (chapter 3) seems 
to be tangentially related to our focus. The new Constitution defines citizenship in the 
two traditional ways i.e. by descent from Kenyan parents (ius sanguinis) and by place of 
birth (ius soli). Article 14(1) stipulates that “A person is a citizen by birth if on the day of 
the person’s birth, whether or not the person is born in Kenya, either the mother or father 
of the person is a citizen.” Article 14(4) continues that “A child found in Kenya who is, 
or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not 
known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth”.  
 
In addition, the Constitution warranted the possibility of citizenship by naturalization too. 
Article 15(2) states that “A person who has been lawfully resident in Kenya for a 
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continuous period of at least seven years, and who satisfies the conditions prescribed by 
an Act of Parliament, may apply to be registered as a citizen”. The two factors (outlined 
in broad strokes) that would lead to Kenyan citizenship through naturalization therefore 
are a) 7 years of inhabitance, and b) satisfying conditions prescribed by a subsequent Act 
of Parliament. Both of these provisions would definitely make urban refugees who have 
lived in Nairobi for more than seven years very optimistic about securing Kenyan 
citizenship. But still, turning this possibility into reality solely depends on a future 
legislation “establishing conditions on which citizenship may be granted to individuals 
who are citizens of other countries.” (Article 15(4))  
 
The Constitution vests all political rights and freedoms on Kenyan citizens only (Article 
38). These include the rights to (a) form, or participate in forming, a political party; (b) 
participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; or (c) campaign 
for a political party or cause. Every citizen, the Constitution states, has the right to vote 
and be voted into public office.  That these rights are exclusive to Kenyan citizens is 
discussed under Article 78(1) which states that “A person is not eligible for election or 
appointment to a State office unless the person is a citizen of Kenya”. Even more, the 
Constitution states that “A State officer or a member of the Defense Forces shall not hold 
dual citizenship.” (Article 78(2)) To conclude, the new Constitution is not that different 
from other Constitutions, International Protocols and Conventions which carve out 
political rights as the exceptional domain of citizens. But it is progressive in that it left 
the door ajar for urban refugees when it comes to naturalization and claiming full Kenyan 
citizenship at a later stage. The ratification of a Kenyan Naturalization Act would 
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ultimately determine the opportunities or perils of such a course. Nevertheless, the writer 
believes it is a commendable step in the right direction.  
 
5.2 The Politics of Refugee Rights in Nairobi  
5.2.1 Legal Recognition for Urban Refugees 
Despite the flurry of international and national conventions, protocols and acts with 
regards to refugee rights, both the Kenyan government and the UNHCR were not keen to 
formally recognize and address refugees who live in urban areas before 2006.  This was 
reflected in the interviews both with officials and refugees. This benign neglect of urban 
refugees gave the leeway for brazen harassment directed especially at those who did not 
have a refugee mandate in Nairobi. One of my informants summarized the history of 
state-refugee relations in Nairobi as follows,  
We can speak of three different time frames when Ethiopian refugees began to 
arrive in Kenya. The first phase of Ethiopian refugees came in the early 1970s 
following the collapse of the Imperial regime in Ethiopia. Their number was quite 
small and most of them were political refugees. But the second and major phase 
of refugee influx to Nairobi happened in 1991 when thousands of demobilized 
soldiers, supporters and high officials of the military regime in Ethiopia fled to 
Kenya. University students and journalists who were very critical of the rebel 
fighters also began to flee to Kenya in the following years.  Following the 2005 
post –election crisis in Ethiopia, another wave of political refugees happened. But 
1991 represents a major benchmark where Nairobi began hosting thousands of 
Ethiopian refugees whose number now stands next to Somali refugees.  
Beginning from 1991 up until 2003, the Kenyan Police was very hostile to urban 
refugees. They used to arbitrarily arrest refugees, ask for money, and threaten to 
detain if refugees do not cave into their demand. Things have improved since the 
Kibaki administration came to office in 2002. But in 2005, a prominent Kenyan 
politician Mrs. Martha Karuwa who was then Kenyan Minister of Justice came 
with a drastic draft bill that aimed at summary expulsion of refugees. Most 
refugees were shocked and began to flee to South Africa and Uganda.  The 
Ugandan government explicitly stated its readiness to host refugees and the 
UNHCR threatened to move its regional office to Kampala. The Kenyan 
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government made a complete turn around and decreed all urban refugees to 
register and get their alien certificates. In just a day, more than 4000 Ethiopian 
and Eritrean refugees got their alien certificates from the Kenyan authorities.  
 
One of the refugee informants described the situation in 2005 as follows, “I got the alien 
certificate in 2006. Before that Martha Karuwa ordered us to leave the country. But it 
brought an international outcry from UN agencies here and the government changed its 
mind”.  It has now been more than 6 years since the Kenyan government begun to issue a 
legal certificate of residence to urban refugees that it calls “Alien Certificate”.  The 
policy reversal by the Kenyan government and its gesture to legalize and formalize the 
residence of urban refugees is highly regarded by Ethiopian refugees. One of my 
respondents who arrived in Nairobi in the middle of the 2005 crisis recounts the policy 
change as follows,  
Ethiopian refugees used to have a lot of problems with Kenyan police officers 
who used to detain and harass us for money. The situation has improved since 
2006 when the majority of urban refugees were issued alien certificates by the 
Kenyan government. This was good news for me because in 2005 I applied for a 
refugee status mandate at the UNHCR but was rejected by the UN. Fortunately, 
the Kenyan government granted me the alien certificate which has given me the 
legal status to reside in the city and engage in business legally. 
The alien certificate has a number of useful functions which I summarized as follows. 
First, the alien certificate grants an urban refugee the legal right to reside in the city of 
Nairobi. It serves as an identification card and helps a great deal in protecting refugees 
from random harassment by rogue police officers. Now, the police have less excuse and 
leverage to harass refugees who carry their certificates around. The alien certificate is 
also vital if one wants to secure business permits from the city council. It is required by 
banks if a refugee wants to open a bank account. Kenyan schools and colleges require the 
138 
 
alien certificate in order to process admission for applications of urban refugees. And 
more importantly, refugees are granted Kenyan exit visas to settle in western countries 
only if they have mature alien certificates. Refugees are not allowed to leave Kenya if 
their alien certificates are forged or have expired. Hence, refugees underscore how vital 
the alien certificate is. One of the respondents stated, “The alien certificate protects you 
from police harassment. You can open up your own bank account and manage your 
finances without fear of dispossession. It serves as your ID card anywhere else”. One of 
the female respondents engaged in cross border clothing trade also mentioned, “The alien 
certificate is very crucial. Without it you cannot cross the border for trade purposes.” 
Before 2005, it was only the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
that was solely involved in refugee registration. It also had the mandate to undertake what 
is known as Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process.  Refugees are summoned to be 
registered. They are asked to submit relevant documents and records that attest about 
their identity and the reasons why they fled the country. They sit in for personal 
interviews where UNHCR officials try to determine whether the applicant has faced real 
and eminent threat of political persecution in their country of origin.  
The RSD process takes a long period of time mainly because the UNHCR Kenya office 
processes the applications of hundreds and thousands of camp refugees in Daddab and 
Kakuma in addition to the urban refugees located in Nairobi. Also, the UNHCR office 
caters for refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Northern 
Uganda.  More than 15 of the refugee informants had to wait for more than two years to 
pass through the RSD process and finally secure what is popularly known as the “refugee 
mandate” from the UNHCR.  In fact, most refugees who have not yet received final 
139 
 
results about their UNHCR applications bitterly complain about the slothfulness of the 
process. One of the respondents stated,  
To secure “mandate” from the UNHCR takes a very long time. After years of 
waiting, your application can actually be rejected. There is an interview and 
screening process which is quite long. Usually, journalists, political refugees and 
those active in human rights organizations in Ethiopia get their mandates rapidly.  
Even then, the actual process of securing third country settlement and processing 
the entry visa takes a long period of time. I know of people who have waited for 
more than 10 years for this process to be completed. The rule says that you should 
not be waiting for more than 2 years but they are actually processing applications 
of the year 1999 right now.  
These sentiments of refugees are supported by UNHCR’s own assessment of the process. 
The Global Report of the UNHCR (2011:91) admits about how slow third country 
settlement from Kenya has been as follows,  
Almost 8,700 cases were submitted to resettlement countries in 2011: over 80 per 
cent to the United States followed by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia. 
However, only about one third of them (2,725) were able to depart, mostly to the 
United States, Canada, Sweden and Australia. Delays in departures to receiving 
countries were due primarily to exhaustive background security checks and 
clearances. A total of 111 persons repatriated voluntarily, mostly to Somalia and 
South Sudan.  
 
Given the incredible backlog of the UNHCR system, refugees find the alien certificate to 
be much more helpful. In most cases, refugees managed to secure both the alien 
certificates and the UNHCR mandate. For instance, one of our refugee informants 
reported,  
The UNHCR has already approved my application for a refugee status and has 
given me the document that we here refer to us “mandate”. The UNHCR is also 
processing my relocation process into a third country. I am actually waiting for 
the relocation process to be finalized but I also have the alien certificate which is 
very useful because it is your ID card. 
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But in some cases, refugees whose UNHCR applications were refused have managed to 
stay in Kenya wielding their alien certificate only. One of the female respondents 
explained her situation as follows,  
I received the Kenyan alien certificate in 2006 when I was actually waiting for the 
final result of my application for a UNHCR mandate. Unfortunately, the UNHCR 
rejected my application but I still use my alien certificate to stay in Nairobi. Most 
of us who arrived here before 2006 managed to secure alien certificate even 
though we did not get the UN mandate as a refugee. 
 Over the last three years, however, the Kenyan government and the UNHCR have 
collaborated to close this legal loophole, which will adversely impact some urban 
refugees. A UN official in Nairobi described the new process of securing legal residence 
in Nairobi as follows, 
We streamlined the refugee status determination process with Kenya’s 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA). Upon arrival, refugees should now get 
registered with the DRA to get a provisional ID locally known as the 
“Shiromoyo”. That identification card serves only for a year and in the mean time 
the refugee has to apply at the UNHCR to get a refugee mandate. UNHCR calls 
for interviews almost every six month. Once it is granted, then the Kenyan 
government offers you the alien certificate. Usually it takes a minimum of two 
years for the UNHCR to process your relocation in a third country.   
Two of my informants who are also community leaders in the refugee community 
confirmed the same about the new system of registration that the Kenyan government and 
the UNHCR have introduced.  
In the past, anybody can directly go and apply for a refugee mandate from the 
UNHCR. Now the process has changed. You have to first get your provisional ID 
from the Kenyan government before heading out to the UNHCR. After rigorous 
interviews, the UNHCR officials either grant or reject your applications for 
refugee mandate. If accepted, the UNHCR also offers a list of countries who have 
agreed to take refugees as hosts (most of these countries have quotas). The 
refugees then choose a country. The UNHCR then works with the immigration 
department of the respective host country and begins to process entry visa for the 
applicant. This process usually takes between 2 to 8 years (depending on the case) 
for refugees to finally be issued immigrant visa into western countries. After 
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securing the mandate, though, the refugee should appear at the Kenyan Ministry 
of immigration to get his alien certificate. The certificate is crucial because it is 
the sole document that warrants exit visa from Kenya when refugees leave the 
country. 
It is important to underscore here that in the past, the UNHCR was unwilling to process 
mandate and relocation to urban refugees insisting that they should go back to refugee 
camps! One of the informants described the situation as follows,  
Earlier, the UNHCR insisted on accepting and processing the application of camp 
refugees only.  Urban refugees used to play a tricky game with the UN system. 
They had contacts in the camps who telephone them about upcoming visits of 
UNHCR officials and interviewers days ahead of these planned visits. Most of the 
urban refugees used to go to Kakuma (which is almost a two days journey from 
Nairobi) to get counted, interviewed, and follow up on the status of their 
relocation applications. Then, they sneak back to Nairobi on the next immediate 
bus. 
Right now, Nairobi hosts urban refugees some of whom have both the alien certificate 
and the UNHCR mandate. There are others who managed to secure the alien certificates 
pre-2009 even though the UNHCR rejected their refugee mandate applications. And post-
2009, we have refugees who are waiting for UNHCR decisions for mandate and do not 
have an alien certificate either. The latter only have their provisional IDs. One of the 
respondents belongs to this group. Asked whether he has the certificate, he responded, “I 
don’t have Kenyan ID because I have been waiting for the UNHCR decision for a 
refugee status to apply for the alien certificate.” There, of course, were some outliers 
when it comes to why they do not have alien certificates in Nairobi. Another respondents 
added, “I managed to secure the Kenyan passport illegally and it was helpful for me to 
travel at least to other African countries.  Frankly, I do not need it!” Note how the state 
which happens to predate on the weakest and most vulnerable sections of its population 
(refugees) is itself very weak, informal and transactional. The so called “aliens” can buy 
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their way into Kenyan citizenship (at least nominally) securing passports and travel 
documents from corrupt officials. 
Two of the business leaders that I interviewed also reported that they are now Kenyan 
citizens and carry Kenyan passports. Both stated that they applied to the Ministry of 
Immigration Affairs in Kenya for naturalization and managed to secure Kenyan 
citizenship. Asked about the criteria the Kenyan authorities considered to grant these 
people the citizenships status, both respondents outlined the following factors. The 
reasons include: their long years of stay and work in Nairobi, the fact that they had legal 
business/work permits, they paid taxes in time, and they were known to Kenyan 
authorities as peaceful and law abiding business people in Kenya.  One of my 
respondents who owns her own high end beauty salon in downtown Nairobi narrated the 
process as follows,  
For so many years, I used the UNHCR travel document to fly to Europe, other 
parts of Africa and the Gulf region for business. But it was so hard to secure visa 
from embassies because of my refugee status.  So in 2005, I applied for Kenyan 
passport at the Ministry of Immigration. The Kenyan officials requested a letter 
from the Ethiopian embassy declaring that I have rescinded my Ethiopian 
citizenship. But the Ethiopian Ambassador was unwilling to give me such a letter 
and I had to plead him via the Togolese ambassador to get the letter. Finally he 
relented. The authorities looked at the fact that I have lived there for 17 years as a 
legal permanent resident and reviewed my business profile. I understand they also 
did security checks. They finally agreed to issue me a Kenyan passport.   
Another respondent, a manager of a high end Ethiopian restaurant in Nairobi also 
explained about the naturalization process as follows. 
Until very recently refugees used to go the UNHCR to register and get a 
residential permit. In my case, I had to go to the Kenyan Ministry of Immigration 
to get a Class M residential status which also allowed me to open up and run my 
restaurant business. But in 2007, I went to the Kenyan Ministry of Immigration to 
apply for Kenyan citizenship. The senior officials knew me, checked my profile 
143 
 
and agreed to grant me citizenship. But they first demanded that I revoke my 
Ethiopian citizenship which I did. Now I am Kenyan citizen. 
It is, however, important to state that I only stumbled on three cases where refugees 
stated that they have Kenyan citizenship and travel documents. Otherwise, the 
overwhelming majority of Ethiopian refugees still carry their alien certificates.   
Often, refugees stress the importance of having the alien certificate in Nairobi for security 
purposes. This is especially true in the context of the Horn of Africa where Somali based 
Islamic extremist groups have launched bomb attacks in Nairobi.  Given these attacks, 
massive police raids and arbitrary arrests are commonplace in the neighborhoods of 
Eastleigh where the majority of Somali and Ethiopian refugees reside. The Kenyan 
security officials suspect that Eastleigh is the hideout spot for the jihadists to plan and 
execute attacks in the city. The problem is innocent Somali and Ethiopian refugees get 
caught in the cross fires. In the post 911 order of the “War on Terrorism”, urban refugees 
are now subject to more police scrutiny than ever.  In a condition like this, not having 
legal alien certificate means landing in prison.  One of the refugees from Eastleigh North 
described the situation as follows: 
Just two weeks ago, we had bomb attacks in the city that the jihadist group in 
Somalia known as Al Shabab claimed responsibility for. Following that attack, 
the Kenyan police conducted random raids to find Al Shabab operatives in 
Eastleigh. Houses were ransacked and properties were confiscated or in some 
cases simply stolen by the Police. Hundreds of Ethiopian and Somali urban 
refugees were also arrested. Later, however, only those refugees who have their 
alien certificates were released and those who did not are still detained for further 
investigation. 
I also inquired whether Ethiopian refugees with alien certificates face other legal 
prohibitions during their stay in Nairobi. All but two of my respondents replied that they 
face no restrictions or prohibitions owing to their refugee status. One of the respondents 
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stated, “This is a land of freedom to me. There is no limitation on where I live, where I 
work or move in Nairobi.” Another respondent added, “No, there is no restriction 
regarding our rights here.” Two respondents stated otherwise.  One of them replied 
saying, “I was told by one of the Kenyan immigration officials that we should stay in a 40 
kilometers radius around Nairobi.  But nobody checks and I have not faced any problem 
even when I travel to cities like Mombasa which is hundreds of kilometers away from 
Nairobi.”  The other respondent added, “The Kenyan officials do not allow you to go out 
of the city. You are actually expected to apply for an additional travel document to make 
such travels. However, the officers do not strictly implement these laws. You can go 
anywhere you like.” 
5.2.2 Policing, Prejudice and “Terrorism”: Refugees and the Kenyan State 
I started off asking refugees how they characterize their relationship with police officers. 
All respondents described their relation with the Kenyan police as something which is not 
affirmative at all. One of the refugees defined it as follows, “The relationship between the 
police and the refugees is like cat and mouse. The police always ask for money when 
they meet any refugee. We prefer to hide whenever we see the Kenyan police and we do 
everything to avoid contacts with them.” Another respondent joked about it as follows, 
“We play hide and seek with the police! Let alone us, refugees, even Kenyan citizens do 
not like to face the police in whatever circumstance they are in”. In fact, one of my 
informants said, “The police have their own calendar when it comes to refugee 
harassment. The last week before the end of the month is when they run short of money. 
And so, we joke Kenyan policemen promise their wives that they are going to go out and 
get the money from a refugee to buy groceries!” 
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The following comments from an Ethiopian community leader summarize the sentiments 
of urban refugees when it comes to abuses of power by the Kenyan law enforcement 
officials. He stated,  
The government agency infamously known for harassing refugees is the Kenyan 
Police. They arrest refugees arbitrarily. They release you only if you give them 
bribe. Up until 2006 they used to take money and valuable items such as the rings 
and necklaces of refugees. This is especially the case at the end of every month 
where the officers have little money left in their pockets and struggle to make 
ends meet or during holidays when they want to buy presents for their family.  
It is a very tragic thing to witness that the so called ‘law enforcement officers’ are 
the most illegal people who violate the human rights of refugees! To their credit, 
though, the Kenyan police do not torture or physically assault refugees. But there 
were incidents where female urban refugees were sexually assaulted and raped by 
police officers. Refugee protection is a big problem both in camps and cities. 
When a famous Oromo
20
 political activist by the name Jateni was killed in 
Kakuma camp; the UNHCR did not investigate or name the perpetrators.   
It is not only the detentions and corruption that refugees detest about the Kenyan police. 
The humiliation and “degradation ceremony” that some rogue police officers commit 
upon refugees is tragic. Here is an anecdote from one of the respondents,  
I know of a girl who was working without permit as a waitress. The police came 
in and threatened to arrest her if she does not give them money. When she gave 
them the 1500 Kenyan Shillings, they complained it was not enough. They tied 
her up and roamed the streets with her in a very embarrassing way until her 
friends manage to collect more money and bargain her release. Imagine how 
painful this is for a woman who is dragged around like a sex slave, shackled 
before thousands of people. I am telling you, the police have no respect for human 
dignity! 
A priest of one of the Ethiopian Orthodox churches also disclosed how rampant police 
corruption is and how sophisticated it got over the years. In some instance, police officers 
contact Ethiopian refugees to spy on other refugees and know who has money. He 
described the problem of police harassment in Nairobi as follows. 
                                                     
20
 The Oromo are largest ethnic group in Ethiopia some of whose elite have been fighting 
for liberation and secession from Ethiopia under a veteran political organization known 
as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Mr. Jateni was an activist of the OLF. 
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Police officers have been harassing refugees in this city for so many years. They 
may arrest you arbitrarily and insist on getting money to release you. It does not 
really matter even if you show them your Ethiopian passport. They view 
Ethiopian refugees as their extra source of income. I remember officers saying, 
“Why do you wait for your salary when there are Abyssinian refugees?” Actually, 
they used to wait outside our church compound to arrest people.  
They also used to spy on Ethiopian refugees who have completed their emigration 
process to fly to the West. I remember an incident when they spotted an 
individual whom they heard is flying out of Nairobi that evening and arrested 
him. They know the refugee will pay anything to be released and catch his long 
awaited flight. So they asked to be paid 80000 Kenyan Shillings (approximately 
950 US Dollars!). The individual did not have that amount of money. So people 
had to actually bargain over the amount of the bribe for the police men and got 
him released in time.  
The pastor of one of the Evangelical churches also reflected on the problem of police 
harassment underlining how pervasive and systematic it has this far been. He stated,  
Corruption is so rampant in this country and so is police harassment.  The police 
just want to extort money from these people who are strangers and very insecure 
about their condition in Nairobi. In fact, they used to do this brazenly and in broad 
day light before 2005. I remember an incident where friend of mine went to a 
local money transfer bureau, the Western Union, to collect some money sent to 
him from abroad. The Police ambushed right outside the office and arrested my 
friend knowing he received some money. It was shameful because he had to 
negotiate the amount he gave them as bribe. When his relatives called from the 
US to check if he received the money, he jokingly answered, “Yes, they (the 
police) did receive the money!” 
There were a number of instances where I was called to police stations to 
negotiate the release of a detainee. Most officers cooperate the moment they know 
that you are a pastor. But I was also arrested by the police when I was a student at 
the Pan African Christian University (2001). The Vice Chancellor sent a worker 
from campus to get me released from prison. It became a newspaper headline 
where the Chancellor gave an extended interview on the Daily Nation about 
refugee harassment in Kenya.  
Refugees were asked whether police harassment is related to xenophobia and 
discrimination. While 17 out of 30 informants responded that police reaction to refugees 
is primarily driven by xenophobia and discrimination; the remaining thirteen (13) 
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respondents replied that it has more to do with corruption than xenophobia. Here are 
some of the reactions to this particular question. One of the informants stated,  
Police harassment and corruption is not something primarily driven by 
xenophobia. I think the police are paid very poorly and they think refugees have a 
lot of money. It is also easy for them to racially profile Ethiopians and Somalis 
who have a lighter skin complexion with tall and skinny figures than other 
Kenyans. Hence they usually set out to get money misusing their official position. 
But police harassment does not go into excesses like assault or beating. They 
usually let you go free once they get money. 
One cannot but appreciate the “fair” judgment of some refugees when they argued that 
police behavior is not out of racism but because their pay is low and they exploit 
undocumented refugees for financial gain. But the fact is the Kenyan police racially 
profile refugees. They identify Ethiopian and Somali refugees with lighter skin 
complexion and other physical features as the fat cats who can be fleeced easily. They 
conduct extrajudicial detentions and arrests. They also release detainees without any legal 
due process. And in some cases, some police officers concocted trumped up charges 
against refugees that refused to give money. Here is an account from one of the refugees, 
I remember of an incident when a refugee refused to give money to corrupt police 
officers. They put heroine in his pocket, photographed them as exhibits, and filed 
false charges against him as a drug trafficker. You cannot appeal to the higher 
officials because they are steeped in corruption to their eyeballs too! If you insist 
talking to the top level commanders, then you may have to pay a much bigger 
amount of money by way of a bribe. So, refugees “resolve” the matter at the 
station level giving a small amount of money to the foot soldiers of the Kenyan 
Police Force. 
All of these deliberate, extrajudicial and corrupt acts by the Kenyan police make us 
wonder whether we can absolve such institutional practice from xenophobia and racism.  
Two leaders of prominent Kenyan non-governmental organizations that work on refugee 
matters agree that we should not. One of them commented,  
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It is obvious that the police harass especially Ethiopian and Somali refugees. I do 
not think refugees from the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Uganda and Congo) are 
subject to the same kind of police maltreatment as Ethiopians and Somalis. It 
could be because of the latter’s language (most speak Swahili) and cultural 
affinity to Kenyans and even the similarity of their physical features with native 
Kenyans. 
Another representative of an international NGO working on refugee affairs added, “I 
think Ethiopian and Somali refugees are more subject to police harassment due to their 
looks and physical features. People guess that they are not locals and think that they have 
a lot of money.”  
Yet, some refugees fault their fellow refugees for not standing up to their rights and not 
resisting this illegal practice of extorting money from refugees.  One of the community 
leaders commented about this stating,  
Many Ethiopian refugees do not prefer to stand up for their rights or take the case 
to court. This, I think, is for two reasons. There is the language barrier and the 
feeling of insecurity and vulnerability as a refugee.  So people pay whatever 
amount they are cajoled to pay (sometimes they negotiate the amount) and leave 
detention centers. Technically, a refugee can summon the UNHCR to his or her 
aid to provide him or her legal assistance and protection. But people do not want 
to suffer in jails while all of this is bound to happen. In addition, it is quite 
difficult to get the ears of the UN officials who are not even willing to talk to a 
refugee unless they issue you an appointment. The bureaucratic red tape at the UN 
is very frustrating. So nobody takes the UNHCR seriously when it comes to legal 
aid and protection in Nairobi.  
Another respondent also remarked that urban refugees are partly responsible for 
worsening the situation by agreeing to pay bribes to police officers. He added,  
Part of the reason why police harassment became common is the fear and 
insecurity of Ethiopian refugees themselves. They do not hold their ground and 
ask to see a legal advisor when such unjust acts happen. They immediately resort 
to give bribes and get released from detention centers as soon as possible. This 
makes corrupt police officers more arrogant and rogue. 
I tried to contact and interview police officers at ward station, division and metropolitan 
levels. But in all instances the officers declined the interview asking the researcher to get 
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an official permission from higher offices. Trailing the chain of police command, I ended 
at the Kenyan National Police Commission seeking support from the Head of the Public 
Relations Department.  The officer was not willing to be interviewed. Neither did he 
cooperate to write me a letter of introduction to the lower echelons of police command 
which made it virtually impossible to interview officers.  
However, all the civilian government officials the researcher interviewed denied the 
proposition that police corruption is partly fuelled by racial profiling and xenophobic 
attitude towards refugees.  One of the ward level officials summarized the government’s 
line of defense as follows,  
We understand that refugees are harassed by police officers. But we should 
remember that the harassment is by a few rogue officers and not by the entire 
police force. Plus these officers harass refugees as single individuals and not as a 
group. We should also remember that some officers also harass Kenyan citizens. 
We should therefore differentiate between individuals and institutions. So the 
argument that Kenyan Police has xenophobic attitude is completely unfounded. 
Let us also remember that big police reforms are underway in Kenya right now. In 
fact the new Inspector General of the Police force is about to be appointed by 
Parliament. We expect new and constructive changes will take place following 
these appointments. 
Another official reacted to the complaints and accusations of many urban refugees very 
cautiously. He phrased his argument as follows,  
I cannot say the police force is entirely corrupt and xenophobic. But I cannot also 
say that all police officers are good and doing their job responsibly. However, you 
should remember the national security risk we are facing in Nairobi which is 
partly linked to urban refugees in Kenya! Last Sunday, we had a blast in Eastleigh 
outside a church compound. Police had to close in on a perimeter where they first 
detained potential suspects and had to conduct the investigation to find potential 
leads and suspects behind this attack. If you do not have a legal identification 
card, and you are not a Kenyan, then the police would think of you as a suspect. 
Refugees would definitely complain about these arrests, detentions and 
investigations as something unfair. But this is what the police should do in order 
to find evidence, leads and perpetrators who do these senseless bombing attacks.    
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Other officials insist that the problem of police harassment is on the decline since the 
ratification of the Kenyan Refugee Law in 2006. They mention a series of trainings and 
awareness creation programs conducted among police officers to reform the 
establishment. They also indicate the issuance of the alien certificate as one major 
protection for refugees since the latter can use it to prove their legal residence in Kenya.   
To the officials’ credit, most refugees also agree that the problem of police harassment 
has actually declined in recent years.  One of the refugees stated, “A few years back, the 
relationship between refugees and police was very bad. I think the situation is improving 
since President Mwai Kibaki came to power”. Another reason that Ethiopian refugees 
mention as a positive development is the joint Ethio-Kenyan military operations to weed 
out jihadists in Somalia. These measures, refugees argue, have changed the mood of the 
Kenyan police towards Ethiopian refugees. Here is how one of the refugee informants 
described this phenomenon, 
I keep hearing that the police used to be really rough to refugees six or seven 
years back. Now, however, the police do not detain as many refugees unless they 
find you doing something politically sensitive. I remember some of the officers 
asking me a token for coffee or tea. Later they befriend you! I remember a 
policeman who stopped to tell me that I should not walk in one particular avenue 
because it is not safe. So yes, there is an improvement.  
Part of this can be explained by the fact that the Ethiopian and Kenyan 
government both sent troops to Somalia in the fight against Al Shabab. This spirit 
of solidarity is reflected among men in uniform here in Nairobi.  For example, the 
police raided the entire Eastleigh conducting door to door checks and 
investigations following bomb attacks in downtown Nairobi. They let most of the 
Ethiopian refugees free, while most Somalis stayed for more investigation.  
But refugees reiterate that the decline in police harassment does not mean that there are 
no incidents of police harassment and arbitrary detention anymore. There still are. In fact, 
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the 2011 Global Report of UNHCR states that refugee harassment and detention has 
actually increased in Kenya from previous years. The report (2011:90) states,  
The number of arrests and detentions of asylum-seekers and refugees rose in the 
wake of the heightened state of security alert in Kenya. Most arrests were for the 
lack of civil documentation (such as the asylum-seeker pass or refugee identity 
card), illegal presence, or alleged involvement in terrorist activities.  
In such instances, refugees usually contribute money to bribe police officers and get the 
person released. Neither do the refugees prefer to litigate the case or take the police to the 
courts.  They think it is a long, arduous and fruitless venture since high ranking officials 
are also corrupt. In the word of one of our informants, “Nobody wants to hustle with the 
big vultures!!” 
 
5.2.3 Civil Society and the Legal Protection of Refugees 
Given the rampancy of police harassment and corruption in Nairobi, the study explored 
whether refugees have some form of legal assistance and protection from civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in Nairobi. Most refugees mentioned a few organizations that they 
are familiar with. I later had the opportunity to discuss this with the leadership of some of 
these CSOs. The three oft-mentioned NGOs are the Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK), 
Refuge Point, and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). One of the informants 
described the situation as follows, “There are only a few NGOs like RCK and Refuge 
Point who assist when refugee get into trouble with the police. However, most refugees 
have no information about these organizations”. Another respondent outlined the type of 
assistance these organizations provide stating, 
I do not know of many NGOs that provide assistance to refugees save for Refuge 
Point, RCK and HIAS.  I know Refuge Point provides health services for refugees 
and that it also assists in third country relocation process in collaboration with the 
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UNHCR and the International Organization of Migration (IOM). I know that 
RCK provides legal assistance. And HIAS is another agency under which some 
refugees managed to finalize third country relocation. I think the UNHCR seconds 
the refugee status determination process to these organizations too. They therefore 
participate in resettling urban refugees to other countries most of which are found 
in the West. 
The three other CSOs that were tangentially mentioned in our discussions with refugees 
are the German Technical Cooperation Agency, popularly known as GTZ, a Kenyan 
outfit known as “Kituo Cha Sheria” and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). One 
of my respondents indicated the role of GTZ by saying, “There are not many NGOs and 
local CSOs who vouch for the rights of urban refugees here in Nairobi. I know that GTZ 
provides a few scholarships for refugees with proper documents to go to colleges and 
institutes”. “Kituo Cha Sharia” (KCS) is a Kenyan Non Governmental Organization 
(NGO) whose name translates into English as the “Centre for Legal Empowerment”.  Just 
two years ago, KCS launched its Urban Refugee Intervention Project (URIP) which is 
based in Eastleigh through support by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).  The main objective of the 
program is to “offer legal advice to a number of vulnerable immigrants on all legal issues, 
legal representation, and assist refugees in obtaining work permits, birth and death 
certificates, identity cards etc.
21
”   
One would expect international organizations like the UNHCR and IOM to be more 
involved in the provision of legal as well as economic services to urban refugees in 
Nairobi. Sadly, these organizations are not at the forefront providing assistance. Only a 
handful of organizations (not more than ten) are currently involved in providing services 
to urban refugees whose population size is estimated to be in tens of thousands. One of 





my respondents lamented the lack of international assistance for urban refugees by 
saying, “The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was supposed to 
cater for the rights and interests of refugees. But they seldom provide such protection 
even in their own camps let alone cities”. UNHCR’s own document discusses why it has 
been reluctant to address the plight and issues of urban refugees in Nairobi until 2005. 
The study (UNHCR, PDES, 2011:9) reports,  
As a result of its tacit agreement with the encampment policy, UNHCR knew 
relatively little about the situation of refugees in Nairobi and was not well placed 
to devise protection and solutions strategies for them. UNHCR did not enjoy a 
constructive relationship with the urban refugee community, a situation that was 
both revealed and reinforced in 2000-2001, when a highly publicized resettlement 
scandal erupted, involving, amongst others, the corruption of UNHCR staff in the 
Kenyan capital.  
This situation began to change in the wake of the resettlement scandal, when a 
strengthened UNHCR team launched the Nairobi Initiative, a concerted attempt to 
examine, understand and respond to the needs of refugees living in the Kenyan 
capital. As a first step in the reorientation of its approach, UNHCR identified 
those NGOs, community-based organizations and self-help groups that were 
working with refugees in the city and completed an informal (and yet highly 
informative) study of the refugee population. This was followed up with an inter-
agency urban refugee workshop, convened in association with the Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya, and three participatory assessments with the urban refugee 
community.  
It was only in 2006 that the UNHCR first embarked on a number of urban refugee 
initiatives in Nairobi. It begun to underwrite initiatives by local NGOs such as the 
Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK) which include: 
1)The publication of an information booklet for refugees and asylum seekers, 2) 
cooperation with the City Council Clinic on refugee access to healthcare, 3) 
strengthened advocacy on the issue of free primary education for refugee 
children; 4) the establishment of a micro-grant program for refugees, and 5) the 
provision of refugee rights training to the police.”(UNHCR, PDES, 2011:9)  
It is this belated response of the UNHCR and its current work via a few local NGOs that 
makes it invisible to urban refugees. 
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Once again, I inquired refugees for feedback about the role of the UNHCR in protecting 
and promoting the rights of refugees in Nairobi. Most of my informants were very 
skeptical about the role of the UNHCR. One of our informants summarized this sentiment 
of urban refugees as follows,  
The UNHCR should have played a major role in spearheading initiatives to 
legally protect urban refugees and advocate for our rights everywhere. But the 
UNHCR has a closed door policy to complaints and appeals from urban refugees. 
They only talk to you about your refugee status determination process or about 
the relocation in a third country. The security guards do not even welcome visitors 
if they happen to be refugees who are not slotted in for interviews. They do not 
even treat us with dignity. So I do not see how they would be able to come and 
protect us from police harassment when we need it. In short, our condition is very 
precarious and vulnerable because no international organization or government 
agency is taking the responsibility to stop police harassment in Nairobi. 
Two senior officials of Refuge Point (formerly known as Mapendo) and Refugee 
Coalition of Kenya (RCK) agreed to be interviewed. They provided useful information 
on the type of project activities their respective organizations carry out to relieve the 
plight of urban refugees in Nairobi. I have taken two excerpts from each of these 
interviews which provide very good summary of relief and development ventures that 
NGOs carry out among urban refugees in Nairobi. The first excerpt is taken from a senior 
official of Refuge Point Kenya. The second excerpt is taken from our interview with 










Senior Official of Refuge Point ( Mapendo) Kenya 
Refuge Point was formerly known as Mapendo which in Swahili meant “Great Love”. 
We changed our name for funding purposes. It started off in the 1980s because of the 
unmet needs of refugees in East Africa. HIV AIDS positive refugees from South Sudan 
were denied admission to the US and this prompted people to found an advocacy 
organization for refugee rights.  
Health 
Once we became operational, we started supplying Anti Retro Viral (ARV) drugs for 
HIV positive refugees in Nairobi followed by food assistance. We still work with HIV 
patients and have also established a medical clinic that provides service to refugees free 
of charge. We have a separate health clinic in “Kayole” affiliated with the Catholic 
hospital. We also have contacts with St Mary Mission hospital here in Nairobi.  
In addition to providing curative health services in these clinics and hospitals, we have 
community health workers who are also urban refugees. The UNHCR has actually 
seconded its urban health service component to us. We also conducted the malaria 
vaccination programs in Eastleigh because the Kenyan health workers have language 
problems and refugees were also suspicious of these campaigns. 
Urban Protection Unit 
This is our newest unit that aims to provide assistance to the livelihood of refugees. Here 
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we 1) provide assistance to approximately 1000 households in the city of Nairobi, 2) we 
also conduct home visits and provide rental assistance for vulnerable refugee families 
who couldn’t afford to pay their home rents, 3) we also second officers who assist in the 
UNHCR to screen and process third country resettlement programs. Our workers are also 
posted with UNHCR not just in Nairobi but also Cairo, Northern Ethiopia, Daddab, 
Kakuma, Mozambique, Malawi and Pretoria.   
Child Protection Unit 
This unit conducts a regular assessment of vulnerable children. This could for instance be 
the case of children in abusive situations and finding ways of accelerating their relocation 
in a third country. The unit provides counseling services and minor psycho-therapic 
diagnosis of children in difficult circumstances.  
Research Unit This far we have conducted studies on gender based violence among 
refugees. We have just started a project on new arrivals looking at the routes, the 
strategies of cross border movement, and the forms of assistance refugees muster in order 












Senior Official of Refugee Coalition Kenya (RCK) 
Origin 
RCK was founded in 1998 by Kenyan legal professionals who worked in different NGOs 
dealing with human rights issues. The protection of refugees became an important issue 
at that time. There were incidents where even the UNHCR was not respecting the rights 
of refugees. So RCK started out as an advocacy forum. 
Since then RCK has taken the lead to advocate the plight of refugees and expand the 
bundle of rights that refugees should be having in the Kenyan context. We were behind 
the Refugee Act which was passed in 2005. We are now charged with responsibility by 
the Kenyan Parliament to review that Act and stream line according to the new 
Constitution of Kenya. 
We have offices in “Dadaab” and “Kakuma” (the two refugee camps in Kenya) and we 
are headquartered in Nairobi. The RCK head office serves the urban case load of refugees 
who are found in ‘Tika”, “Kitangela”, “Ruiro” and Nairobi Central.  We have three major 
programs. 
1. Legal and Psycho Social Care 
1.1 Legal Care 
This unit provides legal aid services and clinics to refugees. We hear issues of refugees, 
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consult them and try to provide solutions. 
We also counsel refugees before they go to their interviews and assessment for refugee 
status determination by the UNHCR. And if applications for RSD are rejected, we appeal 
on behalf of refugees and represent their case. In case they have court cases, we provide 
pre-trial counseling for our clients. We also serve as legal attorneys for them representing 
them in confidence. If refugees want to enter legal agreements or business contracts with 
Kenyan counterparts, we brief them about the Business Code of the country and brief 
them on how they should go about such ventures. 
1.2 Psycho Social Support 
Many refugees suffer from trauma and many women from sexual abuses when they reach 
the camps. RCK does conduct primary psychoanalytical diagnosis and refer serious cases 
to hospitals in the Nairobi. 
2. Advocacy/ Capacity Enhancement  
2.1 Advocacy 
As we mentioned earlier, RCK raised awareness to come up with a Refugee Act (2006) 
for the country and works with other stakeholders, including UNHCR and IOM, to 
support the passing of the Act. 
In 2010, the New Constitution passed and the Refugee Act is being reviewed as the 
Refugee Bill 2011. After the endorsement of the new Constitution, a Constitutional 
Implementation Committee was founded in 2010 that officially requested RCK to take 
the task of streamlining and revising the 2006 Act according to the New Constitution. We 
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took the assignment and created a pool of stakeholders that work on refugee matters to 
meet regularly over retreats and panels and improve the 2006 Act. The network is known 
as Urban Refugees Professional Network (URPN)  
But we also do other kind of advocacy campaigns. This year the Ministry of Education 
(MOE) insisted that students sitting for A-Level and O-level national exams present birth 
certificates in addition to school IDs. This puts thousands of refugee students out of the 
equation for two reasons. Most refugees are born in rural areas where birth certificates 
are not readily issued! Second, even if they have one; refugees will not be able to carry 
them in their flight from their home country. Hence we lobbied about these issues and 
made the MOE change its instructions regarding the administration of national exams. 
2.2 Capacity Enhancement  
RCK has been active in training Kenyan Law Enforcement agents about the Geneva 
Conventions, refugee rights, and international practices on refugee protection. We have 
collaborated with the Kenyan Association of Magistrates; the Kenyan Court Users 
Association and the Police to provide these trainings. We have done this because the 
level of police harassment is embarrassing for Kenya. While the financial motivation is 
mainly behind these harassments; we believe ignorance about refugees and their rights 
also plays a role. We have trained station heads, district level police officers, and officers 
at the City Police Command and the national level. These trainings have also helped us 
create a network of police officers who have served us as watchmen when violations and 
infringements happen against refugees. They blow the whistle and we contact the district 
level officers; explain what happened and ask to contact refugees. This usually happens 
when refugees are summarily detained by officials (the usual excuse being roundups and 
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security check against terrorist elements) and are later asked to pay money in order to get 
released. This year we have also trained prison wardens. 
3. Information and Research  
We conduct studies on refugees’ welfare both in camps and the cities. We publish, 
disseminate and blog about these findings. So we are contributing to knowledge 
production and dissemination too. 
 
The project activities and program concentration of these local and international NGOs to 
provide some form of a social safety net for urban refugees is laudable. Particularly, their 
emphasis on providing health services to children and women is very vital. They also 
focused on providing legal assistance for refugees in their dealing with Kenyan law 
enforcement agencies like the police and the magistrates. But the contribution of these 
organizations is like a drop in the ocean given the staggering size of urban refugee 
populations in Nairobi and their continuous inflow to the city. Second, the limited 
capacity of these organizations in terms of finance and human resources means they can 
only reach out to hundreds or thousands of refugees on a yearly basis. They also are very 
few in number. An informant from a Kenyan Human Rights organization known as “Haki 
Jamii” explains these constraints as follows,  
To be honest, I think the idea of refugees as rights’ holders is pretty much a new 
thing here in Kenya. Partly because, refugees themselves feel that they cannot ask 
for more and enjoy their basic human rights like Kenyan nationals. So the issue is 
less visible and less vocal.  
Yes, there are the international conventions on refugees that Kenya is a signatory 
to. But despite these beautiful conventions, national governments do what they 
want to do and the UNHCR makes inconsequential noises. The only organization 
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that I hear is doing some serious work is RCK which provides legal aid for 
refugees. But even that kind of legal aid does not aim at broadening the legal 
framework of the country or negotiating broader rights for refugees. Instead, it is 
providing refugees legal help within the existing legal framework. 
I think the notion of rights to refugees can come forth only in one condition. That 
is if the refugees organize themselves into collective political action groups. 
Unless the motivation and the drive come from the refugee communities 
themselves, I do not think local or international NGOs can do very much. 
The official’s remarks about the need to have refugee driven initiatives encouraged me to 
ask whether there are Ethiopian grassroots organizations that work on human rights and 
development issues in Nairobi. All of my respondents responded that there are no such 
organizations. I then asked refugees why such collective initiatives have been non-
existent in Nairobi. One of my respondents replied as follows,  
I do not know of any community association or youth group that works to protect 
and promote the rights of Ethiopian refugees here. You may wonder why. But you 
should realize that here everybody has double challenges. On the one hand, we 
have our collective identities and associations (national or ethnic) as refugees. On 
the other hand, there is a lot of fear and suspicion among refugees themselves. 
Each refugee thinks that the other may be a government agent or an unknown 
quantity that could hinder or block his or her emigration process. So everybody is 
tightlipped and fearful not to divulge much information about their past 
background, their true identity and their future plans. Therefore, it is so hard to 
form collective associations and initiatives amongst urban refugees. 
Refugees also mentioned how hard building such grassroots community associations 
could be because people seem to privilege their ethnic origin and base their social and 
political affinities on it even when they are in another country. So there are small 
informal associations of various Ethiopian ethnic groups in Nairobi. The “Oromos”, the 
“Tigrayans”, the “Amharas” and the “Guraghes”
22
, for instance meet and greet in their 
informal circles of mutual assistance. A good example for that is the case of ethnic 
refugee churches. In Nairobi, for instance, there is an Ethiopian Coptic church which 
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used to provide services for both Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Church goers. A recent 
scuffle however forced the Eritreans to establish their own Eritrean church. Among the 
evangelicals, there are Oromo ethnic churches where sermons and prayers are exclusively 
conducted in Oromo language, thus excluding non-Oromo Ethiopians. This has made it 
difficult to imagine a pan-Ethiopian community association which brings them all for the 
common good of urban refugees. This is partly because the Ethiopian government 
undermined such independent initiatives. Here is a testimony from one of the community 
leaders,     
In 1996, we founded the Ethiopian community association in Kenya. This 
association functioned until 2003 as an independent and nonprofit outfit. It was 
active in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissez-
passé forms for those Ethiopians who want to repatriate, and managing funeral 
services for the deceased and comforting families of the deceased. However the 
Ethiopian embassy began to interfere in the management of the association. It 
wanted to assign people who are sympathetic to the regime in power in Addis and 
use the network for political cooptation purposes. So many people who were 
active in the organization resigned from participating.  
Regardless of these challenges to found grassroots organizations for advocacy and legal 
protection, Ethiopian refugees stressed the importance of establishing them. They also 
underscored the need to have some form of political representation i.e. an elected body 
that can be mandated to communicate with the Kenyan government. One of the 
respondents stated, “We would lead a better life in Nairobi if we have a chance to create 
our own association and elect our own representatives. We will have a united voice 
against harassment and corruption. We can also secure help and assistance from relief 
and development organizations if we organize ourselves.” Another informant added, “I 
think we can move freely without fear of the Kenyan police if we have a formal 
representative that speaks to Kenyan officials.”  But here again, some refugees discussed 
163 
 
how mobilizing refugees for collective political representation could be challenging task. 
One of the refugees discussed these potential challenges as follows,  
I think it is hard for us to get any kind of formal political representation for many 
reasons. First and foremost, most people use Kenya as a transit corridor and not as 
the last destination. Our life is pretty much suspended. Secondly, the majority of 
Ethiopian refugees who come here are uneducated and find it difficult to even 
speak English let alone discuss political matters with Kenyan officials. Thirdly, 
many refugees fear for their life here in Kenya because the Ethiopian government 
could send agents to target them. There are instances when this happened to 
Oromo dissidents in Nairobi who were undercover. But they were identified by 
the government spies and murdered. So, the idea of being more active and visible 
in Kenyan politics would call for a number of problems both from the Kenyan and 
Ethiopian side. 
To conclude, the ubiquity of police harassment and corruption in Nairobi, and the 
constant fear and insecurity of urban refugees with regards to Kenyan law enforcement 
officials speaks volumes about the level exploitation and abuse they encounter on an 
everyday basis. Even more, there are few local organizations that provide some form of 
legal aid and protection services to these refugees. The limited capacity of these 
organizations coupled with the neglect of international organizations like the UNHCR to 
seriously address the problem of urban refugees means refugees continue to be “victims” 
of rogue officials. As far as their relation to the Kenyan state is concerned, we can 









 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: URBAN REFUGEES AND “RIGHT TO THE 
CITY” 
     Overview 
This chapter is an analysis of how urban refugees are “governed” in Kenya. It begins by 
revising the major findings of the study both in chapter 4 and 5. It then utilizes the 
arguments of the “right to the city” approach to consider whether the “urban citizenship” 
literature speaks to the experience of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi. These 
discussions lead to the final section of the chapter which underscores the need to have a 
critical look at  power and governance at the “nation-state” level in Africa since it is 
directly, if not more influentially, involved in the urban governance of refugees. Section 
6.4 is therefore a critique of the emphasis that “the right to the city” literature proffers 
only at the “urban” level. In lieu, the section up scales and engages with alternative 
perspectives about the highly extractive and authoritarian nature of the nation-state in 
Africa. In short, this chapter aims to abstract from the empirical narratives and reflect on 
the heuristic value of the “right to the city” approach to explain the condition of urban 





6.1 Henry Lefebvre: On the Politics of Rights   
This study took off by fleshing out the three conceptual dimensions of Henry Lefebvre’s 
“Right to the City” approach.  It is a theoretical scheme which grappled with the idea of 
re-configuring citizenship in three major ways i.e. scale, essence, and scope. Let us 
consider his take on the scale of citizenship. By speaking of the “City”, Lefebvre weds 
the idea of citizenship to the urban scale in contrast to the nation-state. He posited the 
City as that prominent agora where people enjoy rights and benefits. The City is that 
space where people constantly engage with and contest against the powers of capital in 
their struggle for further rights and amenities. It is the space where people practice the art 
of collective self –government that Lefebvre calls autogestion. This view is unique in its 
own right for since Westphalia the Social Sciences (particularly Political Science) 
consider the nation-state to be the ultimate (and in some cases the only) scale on which 
the struggle for meaningful citizenship is waged and articulated.  
Secondly, and most importantly, Lefebvre viewed the notion of citizenship as a liberal 
social contract between the political establishment and voters inadequate. Liberal 
democracy hollows out the participation of citizens in the politics of their City. In 
essence, representation alienates ordinary citizens from the process and outcomes of 
politics. Substantively, therefore, Lefebvre defined urban citizenship as a “new” social 
project which confers rights like: “right to information, to expression, to culture, to 
identity in difference (and equality), and to self management.” (Gilbert and Phillips 
.2003:319)  Fernandez (2007:207) did an excellent job in summarizing Lefebvre’s 
departure from that liberal contractual narrative citizenship stating, 
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If Rousseau distinguished between politics and the social pact, considering 
politics to be a mere circumstantial effect of the ‘general will’ underlying the 
social pact, Lefebvre proposed a contemporary formula for social citizenship, 
expressing a ‘social project’ which requires a new political contract between the 
state and citizens in order to reduce the gap between state and government, and 
between the institutional power and the power of civil society. 
 
Lefebvre’s project of urban citizenship does not stop at re-scaling its focus and re-
defining its essence. It gets more fascinating in that it widens the scope of citizenship 
beyond the confines of national borders and passports. While it seems to have localized 
the scale of citizenship, it leaps forward and universalizes the scope of citizenship. It 
anchors the criterion of inclusion to urban citizenship not by place of birth or ancestral 
descent but by inhabitance (the sheer presence of an individual) in that particular urban 
scale. In the words of Purcell, Lefebvre vouches for “full and complete usage of the city” 
by granting equal political and economic rights to all inhabitants. This means, “guest 
workers”, “illegal” immigrants, “immigrants” or “refugees” will have equal say and 
access to “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space” the 
same way people born or brought up in that space have.(Purcell, 2002:106)   
In chapter 4, I discussed how Ethiopian refugees fared in terms of inhabiting and altering 
Nairobi’s economic and social space. I delved into great detail to depict how refugees are 
engaged in both the formal and informal sectors of Nairobi’s economy. Some toil as 
restaurant managers, barbers, hairdressers, cooks, waiters, “makangas” or “matatu” 
conductors. Others thrived as small business owners like beauty salons, barber shops, 
audio and video stores, boutiques, and cafeterias. Still others have managed to break into 
the formal economy running high end businesses and construction companies. It is this 
active participation of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi economy that brings a pressing 
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question to mind. Would this be reason enough to conclude that Ethiopian urban refugees 
are indeed “urban citizens” of Nairobi? This question prompted us to further probe into 
the politics of rights and the relationships between the Kenyan state and Ethiopian urban 
refugees in chapter 5.  
Here, it is important to justify why such focus on the politics of rights is imperative 
before indulging with a summary of my empirical findings and reflections. This is 
important because the state, in all circumstances, stands out as the single most powerful 
institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of urban citizenship are 
inescapable. The state also becomes a primary target whose constitution would be altered 
if one picks a Lefebvrian project to reconfigure citizenship at the urban scale, through 
participatory democracy and social citizenship. It is the elephant in the room.  Even more, 
we cannot speak of the state in generic terms attributing it to be “liberal” and 
“democratic” in all contexts.  This is more so for postcolonial states of Africa which in 
most cases are run by authoritarian regimes of strong men and patron-clientelism. What 
does the “right to the city” then mean if African states do not represent legitimate social 
contracts between “citizens” and the political establishment?  
There is a flurry of works (Simone A, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007, 2006; Chachage and 
Kanyinga, 2003, Nyaoro, 2010) that point to the dismal record of African states when it 
comes to respecting and protecting the rights of refugees and immigrants.  For instance, 
Nyamnjoh discussed the case of South African and Botswanan cities stating that 
“disaffected nationals, in conjunction with the state, direct their resentment against 
immigrants and ethnic minorities.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:74) But this should not deter us to 
dig further and explore “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and exclusion” that 
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determine “accessibility to citizenship in real terms.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:79) It is in this 
spirit that I analyzed refugee-state relations in Kenya and how that speaks back to 
Lefebvre’s politics of rights.  
 
6.2 Governing “Strangers”: Speak Inclusion and Practice Exclusion  
The problem of refugees, stateless persons, and internally displaced people (IDPs) 
emerged as an outstanding issue in the aftermath of the Second World War. The United 
Nations took the lead in developing a gamut of conventions, and protocols on human 
rights and refugees, which members states became a signatory to. The post War era of 
reconstruction dovetailed with the emergence of numerous independent states in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Most of these countries also incorporated the fundamentals of 
these conventions into their respective constitutions.  
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on Refugees 
(1951) stand out in this regard which also influenced the new Constitution of the Kenyan 
Republic (2010) and its Refugee Act (2006). Close to home, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) which has now evolved into the African Union (AU) ratified its first 
Convention on Refugees in 1969 whose legal provisions and underlying tenets have also 
informed the policies of Kenya. The format of these conventions is very similar for they 
address three major concerns. They outline a portfolio of rights for refugees; they declare 
and constitute institutions to oversee implementation; and they address procedural 




Despite trivial differences in procedure, however, we notice two overriding and 
contradictory undercurrents beneath this global architecture of rights for refugees.  On the 
one hand, the post colonial state has consented to the protection and upkeep of 
international refugees. This it did through the formal recognition and accenting to 
international and continental conventions. In the case of Kenya, the State has gone further 
to officially articulate and ratify a national Act of Refugees which duplicates most of the 
UN conventions and beckons towards greater inclusion of refugees in the domestic 
political space. Hence there is de jure recognition about the problem of refugees and 
readiness to host and protect refugees as a host state.   
The trend for recognition and inclusion began from endorsing the UDHR (1948) that 
canonized the right to life, liberty and security of person, and also outlined the civil, 
political, social and cultural rights of all human beings. For the first time in human 
history, UDHR enshrined the right to be a refugee as human right. All human beings have 
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” (Article 14) 
The 1951 Convention (that Kenya is a signatory) also outlined the right of refugees to be 
rightful owners of industrial, artistic, literary and scientific works. It stated that refugees 
can have gainful employment at least after three years of residence. It recognized that 
they can become citizens of their host state through naturalization, affinal (marriage) or 
consanguinal ties (if they have children with a spouse from the host country).  
The conventions assign the state to be the responsible agent to provide legal protection 
and security for refugees. The UDHR, for instance, upholds the principle of “equality 
before the Law” and protection by the law “without prejudice or discrimination.” States 
should also ensure that no refugee shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention by 
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law enforcement officials. The 1951 Convention on refugees reiterates and extends these 
fundamental liberties to refugees. For instance, the Convention stressed that a refugee 
“shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.” The 
Conventions and Protocols also enshrined the freedom of movement. In fact, the 1951 
convention urges all states to “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to 
choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory.”  
To its credit, the OAU Convention pioneered in making the principle of non-refoulement 
as a policy cornerstone.  It unequivocally stated that no refugee shall be rejected at border 
entry or face expulsion back to the country of origin that he or she fled away from. It also 
introduced the concept of “refugee transfer” to another African state if it finds the refugee 
inflow overwhelming to address or cater for. It is the first blueprint which stressed the 
need to have regional cooperation to tackle refugee crisis.  It is truly comforting to realize 
that mankind has come a long way to enshrine, declare and protect the basic and 
inalienable rights of refugees throughout the world. It is also encouraging to note that 
most African states are signatories to the UDHR, the 1951 UN Convention, and the OAU 
declaration on refugees. Post World War II, we can safely argue that there is a concerted 
effort on the part of states to recognize the problem of refugees, provide them with 
adequate legal protection and enhance their welfare.  The Refugee Act of Kenya accedes 
to this trend of inclusion and recognition for it endorses the aforementioned conventions 
and protocols as legally binding documents.   
But there is another policy undercurrent which runs through the fabric of these global, 
regional and national policy instruments which to a certain extent contradicts the previous 
gesture of host states towards the recognition and upkeep of refugee rights. It is this 
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undercurrent that I refer to as the securitization and exclusion of the refugee 
phenomenon.  From the outset, the international architecture of nation-states sanctions 
people to enjoy political rights of participation, election and access to public services 
only in their country of origin. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) 
declares political rights to be the exclusive domain of citizen-persons only.  Refugees 
would have to suspend their political rights until they re-establish their former citizenship 
or change it.  To their chagrin, host states do not find refugees turning apolitical once 
they cross a borderline. To the contrary, they usually become politicized. That is the 
reason why the OAU convention stated about the difficulty of making “a distinction 
between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country 
for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion from outside.” One can read subversion as 
the shorthand for political activism here.  
 
In fact, Article 3(1) of the OAU convention urges that any African refugee “shall abstain 
from any subversive activities against any Member State of the OAU.” African states, it 
seems, were the first to realize that refugee outflow could be used as an ideal opportunity 
to mobilize political dissent and combat operations against the incumbent of a 
neighboring state.  This happened in the 1970s and 80s where guerilla fighters and 
insurgents began to exploit refugee camps as recruiting and resource mobilizing grounds 
for civil wars raging inland. Policy wise, therefore, states begun to redefine refugees as 
national security threats leading to what we call the securitization of the refugee problem. 
This undercurrent translated itself into national laws and regulations whose primary 




Here again, the OAU Convention on refugees was the first to legalize “encampment” as 
the most ideal approach to handle refugees.  It is ideal not from the perspective of 
providing health or educational services to refugees. Rather, the need to secure the 
borders and the hinterland from “refugee subversion” made encampment the unrivalled 
modus operandi. Interestingly, encampment has never been enshrined as a viable option 
for refugee protection in both the UN Convention of refugees (1951) and the 1967 
Protocol. Kenya’s Refugee Act (2006) accedes to the same notion of securitizing the 
refugee problem. Encampment is its centermost stratagem of refugee management 
(Articles 16 and 17).  Even the national Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) is populated 
by representatives from the Police, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Local Government, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, the Refugee Act 
(2006) does not mention anything about urban refugees. Given the remarkable population 
size of urban refugees and their significant participation in Nairobi’s economy; their 
omission from the law of the land is staggering. It seems Kenya’s policy for urban 
refugees is one of benign neglect. 
Apparently, the securitization of the refugee phenomenon has brought far reaching 
negative consequences than encampment and benign neglect. None attests to this fact 
than the Refugee Act (2006) which confers extraordinary (and extrajudicial!) powers to 
the office of the Department of Refugee Affairs to revoke the refugee status of 
individuals or expel them out of Kenya, if there is “reasonable ground” to do so.  The Act 
does not however make clear what constitutes a “reasonable ground” to rescind a refugee 
status or expel refugees. Ironic enough, the law does not also specify where expelled 
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refugees can go afterwards.  These draconian provisions erode the basic rights and 
freedoms of refugees, particularly their right to legal protection and due process. They 
also force refugees to live under the shadow of fear and insecurity since they could be 
expelled by the stroke of pen from the Department of Refugee Affairs. In short, the 
Refugee Act is a policy blue print that attests to the securitization of the refugee 
phenomena which privileges encampment and control. It reads more as a monitoring and 
punitive device that invokes fear on the part of refugees.  
 Here it is important to note that public opinion is also shifting to view refugees more as 
security problems. A Kenyan researcher described this sentiment as follows, 
Unfortunately, the face of refugees in Kenya is the Somalis who are being viewed 
as security threats in Kenya. Even Kenyan Somalis get pulled out first because 
they look Somali. Second they are asked for money to secure Kenyan ID, 
something which they should be able to get freely. The Kenyan government also 
tightened the process stating that you now need a birth certificate and parental IDs 
to get Kenyan IDs. But imagine how many people have IDs in the rural Eastern 
provinces of Kenya with birth certificates and parental IDs? It simply does not 
work!!  
I think there is also rising anti-refuge sentiment in Kenya. I was in Nakuru town 
(180 Kilometers outside Nairobi) when I saw a mob of angry street boys chanting 
and saying “They killed one of us” after the Eastleigh church bombing happened. 
Coincidentally, they found two Somalis on their way that they beat up and 
mugged in broad day light! This is new to Kenya and very disturbing too. 
The Kenyan state therefore is in a double bind. It straddles two opposing viewpoints and 
policy commitments. On the one hand it speaks about the recognition and upkeep of 
refugee rights and welfare. On the other hand, it considers refugees as national security 
threats meant to be excluded and confined in refugee camps. This is an unsavory art of 




6.3 A Faustian Bargain: Incarcerate or Predate 
The situation gets even bleaker when we consider the findings from the interviews. 
Asked about their relations with state officials, refugees view the officials not as 
guarantors or protectors of their rights but the very violators. First of all the benign 
neglect of urban refugees by the Kenyan Government and the UNHCR until 2006 should 
be viewed as depriving  the support and amenities urban refugees deserved. Willful and 
deliberate exclusion of urban refugees from the existing safety net of protection and 
provision is itself a violation of human rights. It is violation by omission. But even for 
those who are found in the refugee camps, one can hardly argue that their rights are 
protected and amenities are adequately provided by the state or international agencies. In 
fact, their living conditions are terrible. One of the community leaders among the 
Ethiopian refugees described encampment as follows,  
The camps do offer housing (usually tents), and they ration foods (grain and 
water). But the camps are like concentration camps. The climate is so hostile and 
the places are usually infested with tropical diseases and plagues. The quality of 
shelter and food refugees receive is horrible. And security wise, Ethiopian 
refugees fear for their lives because the government infiltrates spies and assassins 
to attack its political foes. Actually, people know that the person who used to 
organize intelligence and counter offensive missions inside Kenya is now 
officially appointed as a political attaché by the Ethiopian government inside the 
Kenyan embassy. 
In fact, many refugees argued that they prefer to live in urban areas without any support 
from the Kenyan government or the UNHCR rather than stay in the camps. Refugees are 
confident that in urban areas they are able to find jobs or establish their own small 
businesses to cater for their needs. They are also better placed to contact their relatives 
abroad and seek some financial assistance in urban areas. One of the respondents 
described it as follows, “There is plenty of advantage that urban refugees have. They rent 
better houses; and they have access to educational and health institutions as long as they 
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afford to cover their own expenses.” The Kenyan state and the UNHCR insist on 
concentrating people in these camps but have failed to provide the basic nutrition, 
housing, health and educational that refugees need.  
Had camps been more attractive care and protection units than cities, then refugees would 
have flocked to them.   But the camps neither provide the services nor the protection 
refugees need. As indicated above, the Ethiopian government infiltrates these camps to 
spy on, intimidate and in some cases even assassinate political refugees that fled into the 
camps.  While the conventions speak of subversion on the part of refugees against the 
host state, the Kenyan case is a complete reversal where refugees are targets of 
infiltration by agents of the very state that chased them out! To sum up, the analysis 
clearly shows that the Kenyan state shows little or no enthusiasm to address the 
conditions of urban refugees. Neither does it commit resources and personnel to cater for 
the thousands of refugees which are found in the camps.  It is a watchman state bent on 
confining and monitoring strangers than recognizing their rights and including them into 
the social and economic fabric of the Kenyan public.  
Obviously, that visceral urge of the states to confine, monitor and control refugees has a 
lot to do with the securitization of the refugee problem. But it is crucial to recognize that 
the meaning of securitizing the refugee problem has evolved through time in Africa. 
During the 1970s and 80s, African states viewed refugee camps as breeding grounds for 
armed rebel movements. In the case of Ethiopia, for instance, the military junta that ruled 
Ethiopia until 1991 lost the civil war to two rebel groups namely the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Both the 
TPLF and EPLF used neighboring Sudan and its refugee camps (which were 
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overpopulated with Ethiopian refugees) as recruiting and fund raising grounds to 
continue the armed struggle against the military regime.  The Cold War context also 
means the global superpowers were also involved in aiding their preferred armed group 
to stage an assault on states that lean towards the East or the West.  But the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought peace dividends in Africa where 
protracted civil wars came to an end in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Liberia. And 
new security challenges began to emerge from the dying embers of the Cold War.  
 
Post 9/11, the refugee issue is being re-securitized. States re-rationalized the need to 
encamp refugees and couched it in the language of “war against terror” and fighting 
“international terrorism” in the Horn of Africa. This is not to down play the security 
threats of Kenya from Islamic extremist elements. The Kenyan state does face real, and 
imminent national security threats from jihadist armed groups. Nairobi was one of the 
cities which became the first victim of Al Qaeda bomb attacks following the 1998 
bombing of the US Embassy building. Since then Al Shabab, a Somali Islamic Jihadist 
group and an affiliate of Al Qaeda, declared war on Ethiopia and Kenya calling them 
satellites of the “evil” West.  Eastleigh, the biggest hub of urban refugees in Nairobi, has 
now become the theatre where groups like Al Shabab wage their “mini-jihads” against 
powerful actors like the Kenyan state. 
 
Let us consider attacks made only in the second half of the year 2012. In July 2012, at 
least 15 people were killed inside a church in a Kenyan northeastern town Garrissa when 
Al Shabab militants threw hand grenades in the middle of a Sunday church service.   
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In August, 2012, a suicide bomb attack by a Somali man in Eastleigh killed one person 
and injured 6 more Kenyans. The attack coincided with Secretary Hillary R Clinton’s 
visit to Nairobi. And on November 20, 2012 a bomb thrown into a “Matatu” exploded to 
kill ten (10) innocent civilians and injure around 20 people in the refugee populated 
Eastleigh. Actually, riots erupted for three days in Eastleigh when Kenyan youth started 
mob lynching, destroying and ransacking the houses and businesses of Somali refugees 
in Eastleigh. It took more than three days for the riots to end. The recurrence of these 
bomb attacks in crowded concentration points and public transport vehicles has definitely 
increased xenophobia in Eastleigh. Two days after the incident, the Daily Nation, the 
most popular daily newspaper in Kenya reported,  
Ten (10) women had been raped as a result of Monday’s skirmishes, which was 
concentrated in Eastleigh Section I. At least nine people were injured and 
property worth millions of shillings destroyed when angry mobs went on the 
rampage in the wake of the matatu explosion. Business premises closed for most 
of yesterday as police battled rioting youth who were targeting residents from the 
Somali community. 
Another bomb attack rocked Eastleigh on December 7, 2012 “killing two people and 
wounding at least eight” while I was writing this
23
. Unfortunately, both the Kenyan state 
and Kenyan nationals pour their wrath on innocent refugees who have nothing to do with 
such concerted bomb attacks. Incidences of rape, vandalism, looting and mob lynching 
on refugees in Nairobi are a stark proof about the rise of xenophobia. It is also a 
testament on how Kenyan state governs. If it cannot confine them, then it predates on 
them. Munene (2010:4) described the rise of xenophobic attacks in Nairobi as follows,  
Xenophobia is on the increase. Refugees are considered a threat to the socio-
economic stability of developing host countries because they compete with local 





communities over resources, markets and jobs. This might lead to tension and 
conflict over resources between refugees and hosts, a situation often exacerbated 
by xenophobia.   
However, it is wrong to assume that police harassment in Nairobi comes only as a 
response to only the bomb attacks and subversive activities of extremist elements based 
in Somalia.  
 
The findings from interviewing a range of informants clearly show that police corruption 
and harassment of refugees is a long standing problem which has more to do with the 
structural problems of the Kenyan police itself. The interviews came up with evidence 
that the Kenyan police racially profile refugees. They identify Ethiopian and Somali 
refugees with lighter skin complexion and other physical features and threaten them for 
money. When refugees refuse to do so, they risk arbitrary arrest. They conduct 
extrajudicial detentions until the friends and relatives of the refugee bring the ransom 
money. Refugees do everything they can to avoid these officers and do so at particular 
days of the month. The last week of each month and the eve of weekends are days when 
the Kenyan police go out in full force to extort money from these vulnerable refugees.  
The police also release detainees without any legal due process if the latter concur to pay 
bribes.  
 
The study also brought cases when some police officers concocted trumped up charges 
like drug trafficking against refugees that refused to give money. Some of the officers 
have no qualms for they even wait outside church yards and auditoriums to harass 
refugees for money. They even spy on refugees who are about to leave the country 
detaining them for a staggering amount of money. They understand the refugees will do 
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anything to catch their long awaited emigration flights from Nairobi. Given all these, 
refugees live in fear and security. They do not divulge such information like their plans 
for departure and emigration.  
 
In fact, the rise of political Islam in the Horn of Africa and terror attacks in Nairobi now 
gives ammunition for the Police to arbitrarily arrest and threaten refugee charging them 
as suspects for terrorism. Being a refugee can almost pass for being de facto “terrorist”. 
The securitization of the refugee problem has therefore shaped two major strategies of the 
Kenyan state when it comes to governing refugees. It encamps and monitors those in 
camps. And when it comes to urban refugees, state officials either prey on them (via 
corruption and exploitation) or threaten to incarcerate them. In fact, incarceration is 
routinized so much so that refugees immediately start to collect contributions to get a 
fellow refugee released once detained. 
 
6.4 Re-thinking the “Nation-State”: Critique of “Right to the City” 
The “right to the city” literature considers the re-scaling of citizenship at urban levels as a 
truism. This, the protagonists argue, is the case owing to globalization where the nation-
state is relinquishing some of its powers to supra-national entities( like the European 
Union), sub-national entities(devolution of power to regions and localities), and also to 
the global corporate class (retrenchment of the public sector owing to processes like 
privatization. (Purcell, 2003; 2002) In fact, it has now become trendy to emphasize the 
role of “global cities” and develop a hierarchy of them. The plethora of literature around 
Global and World Cities (GaWC) testifies to this trend (Sassen, 1991, 1995, 2006; 
Friedman, 1986, 1995; Taylor, P.J., G. Catalano and D.R.F. Walker, 2002a, 2002b). 
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Sassen(2006:230), for instance, writes about the “denationalization of state agendas” in 
today’s hyper-connected global era arguing,  
There had been a considerable institutionalizing, especially since the 1990s, of the 
“rights” of non-national firms, the deregulation of cross-border transactions, and 
the proliferation of privatized systems of law internal to specialized fields,  most 
notably the reinvented lex mercatoria and new lex digitalis. These are systems of 
private rules to govern specialized domains. Except for the most powerful, states 
today also find their work constrained by the growing influence and power of 
several supranational organizations, particularly IMF and the WTO. If securing 
these rights, options and powers entailed an even partial relinquishing of 
components of state authority as constructed over the last century and more, this 
signals a necessary engagement by national states in the process of globalization, 
even as this same process also enables the formalization of non-state normative 
orders where the state once had excusive authority.  
 
For Sassen and others, this process of “denationalization” is destabilizing the notion of 
citizenship at different levels resulting in the “debordering and relocalizing” of 
citizenship primarily in urban centers. Sassen (2006:314) continues,  
The national as container of social process and power is cracked, opening up 
possibilities for a geography politics that links sub-national spaces. Cities are 
foremost in this geography.  
 
Obviously, these arguments dovetail with the premises of the “right to the city” literature 
and the new era of “urban citizenship” it speaks about.  However, a recurrent theme 
which surfaced during the analysis and write up of this thesis is the predominant role of 
the nation-state in crafting, legislating, and enforcing laws when it comes to urban 
refugees. Considering the case of urban refugees in Nairobi, therefore, much of the hype 
about globalization and the decline in the power of the nation-state appears to be, at least 




In the Kenyan context, the Department of Refugee Affairs (which is under the Office of 
the Prime Minister) is the only agency which has jurisdiction over matters of refugee 
registration, and camp management. It is the only agency which liaises with the UNHCR 
and has a say in the resettlement of refugees in a third (usually Western) country.  When 
it comes to security, it is the national police force of Kenya and the intelligence bureau 
that have regular contacts with urban refugees. The only other government agency 
interacting with refugee affairs is the City Council of Nairobi that issues business permits 
to refugees, collects annual fees and conducts a regular check up of their business 
premises.  
 
These facts show the need for a more comprehensive and deeper analysis about the 
structure and functions of the Kenyan state, itself a post-colonial creation. It was not 
within the remit of my research questions to deal with this issue. I am however convinced 
that a deeper dive to look at the creation and the workings of the Kenyan state is 
absolutely essential if we need to better explain state-citizen and state-refugee relations in 
Kenya. This is for two practical reasons.  
 
First, the historical processes that led to the creation of states in Africa are unique and 
somewhat different from the history of state formation in Europe and North America. For 
instance, Lefebvre is critical about the liberal democratic states in the West which in his 
opinion alienate and dis-empower urbanites from self government and collective decision 
making i.e. autogestion. Ironic enough, much of the debate among African scholars is 
how to turn the page on authoritarian rule in many African states and ensure legitimate 
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democratic social contracts between the people and their governments.  In fact, the 
demand for urban citizenship (if it only implies right to the local city-state) may sound a 
far cry seen from that vantage point. We will come back to some of these debates on the 
nature of the African state shortly. But secondly, the state is the single most powerful 
institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of urban citizenship are 
inescapable. It becomes a primary target whose structure would need to alter if one picks 
the Lefebvrian project to ensure formal urban citizenship for immigrants, refugees, guest 
workers etc.  
The Kenyan state offers us a number of contradictions in its treatment of refugees. It has 
placed encampment as the center most strategy of governing strangers. But at the same 
time, it has allowed thousands of refugees to reside in cities like Nairobi. It has issued 
legal alien certificates for these refugees that enabled them to open up businesses, enroll 
in colleges and schools, or get health treatment in public hospitals and clinics. Yet again, 
it has become more hawkish due to repeated bomb attacks by Islamist extremist groups 
most of whom allegedly use Eastleigh as a hideout and a launching pad for such 
operations. But at the same time, the state apparatus is too weak and corrupt that refugees 
can illegally “buy” legal travel documents such as Kenyan passports.  
This is happening when the upcoming Kenyan parliament (elections will be held in 
March 2013) is given the mandate to ratify national Act of Naturalization for Kenya. 
Ironically, “accessing” Kenyan citizenship has become possible for the powerful “others” 
even when the national rules and regulations are not yet in place to manage it! Also, state 
officials harp on the need to include, empower and integrate urban refugees. But in 
reality, public officials ranging from sanitation officers of the city council to officers of 
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the Kenyan police force use their discretionary powers to harass urban refugees, ask for 
bribes, arrest the latter arbitrarily, and release them without any legal due process.  These 
are not isolated incidents but structured processes which do force us to question the 
structure and functions of the post-colonial state in Kenya.  
We would also be wrong to assume that the Kenyan state is an exception when it comes 
to rampant corruption, exploitation and blatant violation of human rights including 
refugee rights. As we indicated in previous chapters, a number of authors (Simone A, 
2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007, 2006; Nyaoro, 2010) pointed out the dismal record of African 
states when it comes to respecting and protecting the rights of refugee.  The following 
arguments would therefore be starting points to re-engage the task of understanding and 
explaining the authoritarian and adversely extractive nature of African states.  
 
The modernization Thesis  
Going back to the classics of Marx and Weber and to the writings of Barrington Moore 
(1966) and Samuel Huntington (1991), there is a conventional assumption that a liberal 
democratic state is most likely to emerge in industrialized modern economies. According 
to Osaghae(1999:17), the modernization thesis alludes to “poverty, illiteracy, economic 
underdevelopment, low levels of industrialization, urbanization, and national cohesion” 
as explanatory factors for the pervasiveness of authoritarian regimes in the Third World. 
Modernization theory had its own share of criticisms beginning from the early 60s but its 
fundamental problem is that the supposed “empirical relationship and positive correlation 
between economic development and political development” does not always hold true 
(Abbott, 2009:179). Abbott, for instance, explains how the economic growth and 
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development of Malaysia was not accompanied with democratization but rather with 
increased authoritarianism. In a similar vein, Osaghae(1999:17) criticizes the 
development-democratization thesis as “tentative and unproven.”   
 
Neo-Institutionalism 
Another popular way of explaining authoritarianism in Africa is the weakness of 
watchdog institutions that should have overseen and enforced a democratic process.  In 
many instances, incumbents “handpicked partisans to serve on so-called independent 
electoral commissions and invent new electoral rules and qualifications to exclude critical 
segments of the opposition.” (Osaghae,1999:11) Complaints and appeals of the public or 
the opposition to higher courts fail on deaf ears for court judges are handpicked and 
appointed by the executive whose independence and non-partisanship gets compromised. 
A common feature in Africa, Osaghae(1999:16) argues, is “the weakness of 
representative, oversight and judicial institutions.” Perhaps, the litmus test of 
authoritarianism in Africa is “the failure to grant equality of access to state-controlled 
resources to the various groups” (Osaghae, 1999:16).  Incumbent regimes in Africa use 
the state resource for their party efforts. Often, it is difficult to see the dividing line 
between the state and the party organizations.  
 
Neo-institutionalism is a very descriptive way of explaining what is going on in the 
continent instead of explaining it. Institutions do not become strong or weak in their own. 
Rational and strategic political actors with vested interests tinker and manipulate them. 
Institutionalism fails to bring in this dynamics and expose the underlying factors behind 
the excesses of the executive. It does not, for instance, explain how the rural peasantry, 
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the urban middle class, the incumbent elite, and the army are vying for influence and 
benefits each time elections are held.  
 
Neo Patrimonialism 
Another explanation of authoritarianism in Africa is that the incumbents “maintain 
authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law.” (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1994:458) Patrimony is “the award by public officials of personal favors, 
both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, 
contracts, and projects).” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:458) In such a scenario, 
elections become, “violent factional struggles over patronage rather than by divisions of 
political ideology.” Svasand and Randall (2001:21) concur stating, “the foundations of 
political accountability in Africa are both collective and extra-institutional: they rest on 
the particularistic links between Big Men, or patrons, and their constituent communities.” 
According to Bratton and Van De Walle, “the prospects for democracy are better in 
transitions from regime types other than neo-patrimonial ones. This is so because greater 
progress has been made in other regimes in routinizing participation.” (Bratton and Van 
De Walle 1994:487) The problem with the argument for neo-patrimonialism (Bayart, 
1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, S Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, 1999) is that it 
inclines to explain patronage and corruption in Africa in culture deterministic ways. 
Simplified, the protagonists state that African officials exploit the people and embezzle 
public funds for private gains and ostentatious spending because they are traditionally 




This argument has come under fire from many African scholars. Thandika Mkandawire’s 
piercing criticism of neo-patrimonialism and its cultural deterministic underpinnings 
stands out in this regard. According to Mkandawire(2002:183-4),  
 
In some essentialist (and often poorly veiled racist) accounts, it is suggested that 
there is something fundamentally wrong with African culture - and that senseless 
violence is an undisavowable excrescence of that culture. Such accounts attempt 
to search some distant past for culturally encoded genes for the perpetration of 
atrocious acts and plunder to explain the recurrence of such deeds today. Some 
authors even resort to what borders on instant historical anthropology: having 
identified cases of plunder in Liberia's troubled past, Stephen Ellis (1998: 169) 
concludes: 'There is an obvious echo of this historical tradition in the practice of 
present-day warlords.' Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999: 2) concur 
with Ellis when they conclude that the 'seemingly "barbaric" violence' is 'an 
instrumentally plausible re-traditionalisation of society'. That is how 'Africa 
works', and all the conflicts 'are part of everyday calculus of power in 
contemporary Africa' (ibid.: 82). Much of this writing takes historical continuity 
and cultural relativism to absurd extremes, to say the least, and in its journalistic 
rendition attains racist proportions. 
 
But there is an older and still problematic explanation about neo-patrimonialism too. 
(Bates, 1981; Jackson and Roseburg, 1983; Callaghy, 1984; Kasfir, 1984; Young and 
Turner, 1985; Ergas, 1987; Chabal, 1988; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988) This school 
speaks of “rent-seeking” by the African elite as a rational but adverse capital 
accumulation stratagem. Olukoshi (2005:183) draws a very useful line between these two 
patterns of explaining neo-patrimonialism in cultural and economic terms. He states,  
For some of the contributors to the development of this perspective, rent-seeking 
is integral to the very nature of African culture and/or society, while for others the 
political/policy elite are the self-conscious producers of niches of opportunity 
which they exploit. Some of the rent-seeking niches are also held to arise from the 
nature of African economies, which have been structured within a state-
interventionist model of development that allocates an important role to the 
exercise of policy discretion, facilitates oligopolistic practices, and discourages 




But one thing is clear. Whether one takes the “culturalist” or the “economic” route of 
explaining neo-patrimonialism in Africa, both approaches portray a very cynical image 
about the prospects of economic transformation and democratization in Africa. Olukoshi 
(2005:183) spells this out eloquently stating,  
There is widespread agreement among them that Africa’s economic development 
and political transition from authoritarian rule have been stymied and obstructed. 
The intellectual roots of Afro-pessimism can be traced to this perspective insofar 
as it represents a frame which, in treating rent-seeking behaviours, neo-
patrimonialist practices and post-colony syndromes as ubiquitous and all-
pervasive, almost sees no way out of the “dead end” to African development. 
 
This tone of explaining the nation-state in Africa as a “cultural other” leaves a bitter taste 
in the mouth of many who charge the protagonists of neo-patrimonialism as Afro-
pessimists. 
 
The Disjuncture Thesis 
For many (Gibbon et al 1992; Chole and Jibrin 1995; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995), 
the crisis of states in Africa resulted due to cavalier attempts to transplant the liberal 
democratic model of the west riding roughshod over the cultural, economic and political 
particularities of the continent. This was the case with the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) where poor nations were summarily ‘advised’ to 
democratize by powerful external actors. So, liberal democracy is imported in the same 
“de-rooted manner the African state evolved in colonial Africa.” (Osaghae, 1999:20)  
This created a historic disjuncture between the political elites and the state on the one 




According to Osaghae (1999:20) the elite has also failed to take into account the multi-
ethnic character of their countries and craft “their own forms of ‘multi-ethnic democracy' 
(Horowitz 1994; Lijphart 1977) or what post-modernists call 'difference democracy' 
(Dryzek 1996).” Claude Ake (1993:244) stood out in this calling for “a consocietal 
arrangement-the use of ethnic groups, nationalities and communities as the constituencies 
of representation” This, for Ake, “would be a highly decentralized system of government 
with equal emphasis on individual and communal rights”.  
 
A good example in support of the disjuncture thesis would be the “culture” of 
manipulating elections.  Many African scholars argue that rigging elections and 
manipulating results started from the colonial times. Colonial masters introduced local 
and regional elections making sure the ‘elected’ are agents of colonial domination. For 
Adejoumbi (2000:63), “colonialism by its very nature and character is antithetical to the 
logic and philosophy of elections and democracy, having been constructed on a base of 
authoritarianism and domination.”  After independence, the African state begun to serve 
“as the focus of capital accumulation and the fulcrum of social control” making it nearly 
impossible to allow genuine democratic elections from within. (Adejoumbi, 2000:63) 
Even worse, the Cold war “de-emphasized the object of real elections and genuine 
democracy” where both the East and West allied with tyrants for strategic reasons. Up 
until the early 90s, therefore, Africans were “denied democracy by a confluence of 






Putting the Kenyan State to the Test  
I do not pretend that these explanations about the root causes of authoritarianism in 
Africa sufficiently explain everything about the Kenyan state. Neither am I arguing that 
this is an exhaustive list of explanations mainly because the history of state formation 
varies between African states themselves. The way the Ethiopian state emerged is for 
instance remarkably different from the Kenyan state materialized. Also, none of these 
explanations go far when considered each at a time. An eclectic framework is in order. 
National politics in Kenya is featured by intense and sometimes violent competition 
between the elite of the various ethnic groups (Kagwanja et al, 2008; CSIS, 2011; 
Anderson, David M, 2002). There is resentment on the part of the non- Kikuyu elite that 
the latter have controlled the resources and power of the Kenyan state disproportionately 
since independence.  
 
The 2007 post election violence in Kenya brought these schisms to the forefront when 
supporters of Mwai Kibaki (an ethnic Kikuyu) violently clashed with supporters of Raila 
Odinga (an ethnic Luo). The Center for Strategic and International Studies report (2011) 
aptly summarized the conditions which led to the outbreak of violence that shook the core 
of the country. The study argues, 
 
The violence of January 2008 laid bare the principal fault lines of Kenyan Politics. 
These fault lines break mainly along ethnic lines and are the product of the 
convergence of three factors: first, the number and relative size of Kenya’s 
principal ethnic groups, particularly the fact that Kenya’s politics are driven by 
shifting coalition amongst the largest groups; second, a highly uneven 
geographical pattern of economic development which has divided the country into 
rich and poor areas, and which has meant that several ethnic groups, particularly 
the Kikuyu, are relatively rich while others are relatively poor; and this the fact 
that since independence, Kenya’s political leaders have invariably sought to 




The CSIS (2011:1) reported that “more than 1500 were killed and nearly a third of a 
million were displaced” by the crisis.  The United Nations intervened and former 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Koffi Annan, brokered a power sharing deal 
where Mr. Kibaki retained the Presidential post and Mr. Odinga became the Prime 
Minister. Each faction fought hard to appoint its supporters to key ministerial portfolios 
like foreign affairs, defense and finance.  The coalition government has survived so far 
but elections are due to be held in March 2013. The future of Kenya is hanging in the 
balance and talking to ordinary Kenyans in the streets of Nairobi, one easily feels 
simmering tension building up to the election date. 
 
Given this background, neo-patrimonialism and institutionalism could help partly explain 
the workings of the Kenyan state. Kenyan parties are coalitions of de facto ethnically 
organized parties. They represent coalitions of elite who peddle their ethnic identity as 
the single most political capital to wield power. There obviously are incentives and 
rewards in doing so. (Kagwanja, M, 2009) But also, the state infrastructure has very weak 
institutions such as the Kenyan Electoral Commission. The 2007 post election violence 
saw massive vote frauds and rigging especially in the rural parts of the country. Both 
President Kibaki’s party and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
declared themselves as winners. Eventually, violence broke out in the Rift Valley region 
of Kenya where people “burned and looted factories, shops and homes, and chased those 
perceived to be supporters of Kibaki (mostly, but not exclusively, members of his Kikuyu 
tribe) away.” (HRW, 2008:4)  The independence of the judiciary was compromised and 




Even more, the fact that the international community intervened to stop the violence; that 
it forced the contestants to settle for shared government; and charged six prominent 
political leaders for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
Hague; speaks volumes about how weak and deferent the Kenyan state is to outside 
influence. Political legitimacy, it seems, does not come from popular sovereignty (the 
Kenyan people themselves) but rather from powerful foreign countries in the West that 
call the shots. One definitely needs a huge dose of history about the colonial origins and 
the neo-colonial relations of the Kenyan state with the West to partly explain its 
authoritarian and predatory proclivities. All said, I cannot stress more about the need 
conduct serious and comprehensive studies to look into the historical roots of the Kenyan 
state and its political economy.  As painstaking and costly as they would be, only such 
research ventures could provide us better explanations about state-citizen and, by 
extension, state-refugee relations in Kenya.  
 
Seeing like a State, Seeing like a City 
A caveat is important here. This is not to argue that citizenship is not entirely contested at 
an urban level at all. Rather, it is to argue that urban refugees employ their individual and 
collective agency as well as resources to chip away from the confining, monitoring and 
fixing acts of the state both at urban and national levels. Hence, struggles for “right to the 
city” do not happen exclusively or detached from parallel struggles for “right to the 
nation-state”. These processes are happening altogether at once. They are intertwined 
both in essence (what urban refugees demand) and in scale (whether they demand it at 
national or urban levels). Our task should therefore be to explore the inter-linkages 
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between these registers of political action. It is in that spirit that I call for a re-focus also 
on the politics of the nation-state. 
Warren Magnusson (2011) has done an excellent job in underscoring the need to look at 
politics both from the optic of the “nation-state” and “the city”. He stresses that “seeing 
like a state” (2011:3) has always been the preoccupation of political scientists with such 
conventional assumptions like: 
1) The world is divided into states, each of which has its own territory and 
claims sovereignty in relation to it. 2) Within each state, there is a hierarchy of 
authority, so that there is always a final authority with respects to issues in 
dispute. 3) Within each state, everything and everyone is ultimately subject to 
the state’s authority: in that sense, the state is sovereign.  
 
This approach, Magnusson argues, ignored the importance of studying power relations 
outside the prism of the sovereign and “see like a city”. “Seeing like a city” (2011:4) he 
adds recognizes  
(1) The world is characterized not only by its division into sovereign states, but 
also by the presence within it of a multiplicity of political authorities in different 
registers, ones that are there for different purposes and heed the call of different 
drummers. (2)Many of these authorities claim that they are not political – only 
cultural, economic, religious, communal, or whatever – and such a move often 
enhances their autonomy, not least in relation to authorities that claim 
sovereignty. (3) Only some of the political authorities are arranged in a neat 
hierarchy: most are not. (4)The space of the state is only one of many. Other 
histories are enacted in spaces that are qualitatively different, and cannot be 
assimilated to the space of the state. In fact, what we call social movements are 
ones that generate new spaces of action and new histories, in relation to which 
new identities, interests, and forms of authority are established.  The result is a 
pattern of interaction that defies easy modeling. 
 
Magnusson (2011:120) privileges “seeing like a city” which he argues “is to accept a 
certain disorderliness, unpredictability, and multiplicity as inevitable and to pose the 
problem of politics in relation to that complexity”. However, he recognizes that we 
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already live in a world of states and a world of cities, pointing out the need to consider 
them both in terms of their complexity and inter-linkages. My findings about the role of 
the Kenyan nation-state and its direct involvement in the urban life of refugees confirm 
this. We need to see both like a “city” and a “state” shedding light on their complexity, 





    POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A number of policy recommendations came out of the interviews and discussions with 
refugees, representatives of civil society organizations working on the issue of refugees, 
and government officials. I clustered these recommendations into thematic areas. This 
chapter is therefore divided into two major categories of policy recommendations. The 
first dwells on recommendations put forth by refugees themselves while the second 
category refers to recommendations made by government officials and leaders of the 
various civil society organizations.  
7.1 Refugee Recommendations  
Promoting Economic Rights and Opportunities  
The majority of refugee informants underscored the need to further enhance economic 
opportunities for urban refugees. These recommendations revolved around two major 
themes i.e. jobs and business permits. Seven of my informants stated that there is 
bureaucratic red tape when it comes to issuing business permits for urban refugees in 
Nairobi. Accordingly, they argued that the process of getting business permits in Nairobi 
should be made simpler.  One of the informants summarized this argument as follows,  
We are grateful that the Kenyan government has made it possible for us to have 
legal alien certificates and opening the leeway for refugees to open up small 
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businesses. But having the alien certificate should not be seen as an end it itself.  
I recommend that the Kenyan government extend its support by letting us to be 
active in doing business.  
Another informant explained why having business and work permits is essential for the 
urban refugee community. He stated, “I think the remittances we get from relatives 
abroad create some dependency in our minds. I suggest different organizations plan to 
assist refugees to be self reliant and independent by giving them job opportunities.”    
I probed more to find out whether refugees aspire to be employed by the government 
itself or only private sector jobs. One of my respondents indicated, “There are many 
educated doctors, engineers, and professionals who if given the chance by the Kenyan 
government can work here. Remember, this benefits not only the refugees but the Kenyan 
government too.”  Others mentioned that there was precedence in the 1970s where the 
Kenyan government employed hundreds of Ugandan professionals who fled Idi Amin’s 
brutal persecution in Uganda.  One of the officials of “Hakki Jammi” recounted this 
saying, “The first wave of refugees to Kenya is from Uganda in the late 70s.  I used to 
have Ugandan professors here in the University of Nairobi and there were Ugandan 
teachers in primary and secondary schools in Kenya”. He stated that these refugees filled 
a very important and critical gap in Kenya when it was lagging behind in terms of its 
skilled manpower development.  
Promoting Legal Recognition and Inclusion  
Another set of recommendations were made around political rights, in general, and the 
need for more legal recognition and protection of urban refugees, in particular. A number 
of urban refugees stated that the refugee alien certificate has been very helpful for their 
stay in Nairobi. But they lamented about the long period of time the UNHCR takes to 
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issue “mandate refugee certificates” (MRCs). Others emphasized the need to cut red tape 
in the UN system when it comes to third country settlement programs. One of the 
informants expressed the need for reform as follows, “The UNHCR should improve its 
handling of refugees and particularly the third country relocation process. It is not fair for 
people to be stranded for more than a decade and wait till they get relocated in another 
country”. In general, the UNHCR is viewed as an opaque organization which does not 
respond to the plights and challenges of urban refugees in Nairobi.  
 
But the most recurrent and major recommendation that urban refugees made was about 
the need to combat police harassment and corruption. This theme dominated most of my 
discussions with refugees. Here is how one of the refugees described the urgent need for 
police reform, “I want the police to respect our human rights. I want the exploitation and 
arbitrary arrests by the police to end. Someone has to force the police to respect the law 
of their land!” Some refugees mentioned that this should start by educating the police 
force not to violate the rights of refugees. Others indicated the need to punish corrupt 
police officers and deter other officers from following course. In light of the recent police 
raids to Eastleigh to clamp down on Al Shabab operatives, Ethiopian refugees insist that 
the police should be able to differentiate between them and Somali refugees (the 
argument being Ethiopians have nothing to do with the bomb attacks in Nairobi).  One of 
my informants summed up this argument as follows, “We are Ethiopian refugees and not 
Somali terrorists! Why should be we be harassed, raided and interrogated by the police 
for things our community has nothing to do with?” 
197 
 
Even more, eleven informants recommended that the Kenyan government grant 
citizenship to those who want to live in the country. One of the refugees stated, “Some of 
us have lived here for more than ten years. Our children go to school here and we have 
our businesses. It would be very helpful if the Kenyan government grants citizenship.”  In 
fact, most of these refugees expressed their optimism that the new Kenyan constitution 
will offer them the gateway for naturalization. Another respondent added,  
The new constitution has a provision that the naturalization process will be 
undertaken following an Act of the Kenyan Parliament. We think this is a very 
good idea! Many people who first set out to migrate into another country have 
changed their mind and settled to live here for the long haul.  
Another refugee spoke about the public debate about naturalization which was 
undertaken before the ratification of the new constitution. The constitution, he argued, 
has made naturalization a realistic option for urban refugees. He continued,  
There was a lot of debate among the Kenyan elite about the future of refugees. 
There were some who insisted that refugees are living here, working and 
contributing to the economy of Kenya and argued that Kenya should provide 
citizenship to the refugees. There were others who viewed us as security threats to 
the country; and people who compete for the jobs of Kenyan nationals. Some 
Kenyans hold this view strongly because they already think white settlers and 
Indians have unfairly benefited and thrived in Kenya. So they view the influx of 
refugees negatively. But the new constitution has already stipulated that: 1) a 
foreigner who married a Kenyan national can be naturalized as a Kenyan if she or 
he lived in the country; 2) there is a provision that someone who worked as a legal 
and permanent resident of Kenya can be naturalized as a Kenyan after 7 years of 
stay here. These are very encouraging developments for many Ethiopian refugees 
who now lived here for more than 7 years and think of settling here permanently!  
 
Awareness Creation and Integration  
Respondents also commented that Ethiopian refugees should first know about the pros 
and cons of life in countries like Kenya before they leave their country. Awareness 
creation, they argue, is very important so that many who are lured by the news of good 
198 
 
life in Kenya and West do not come to Kenya unprepared. One of my respondents 
stressed this point stating,  
 Being a refugee is very difficult. I came here hoping that my life would be better, 
but I ended up in worse living conditions. So I advise friends in Ethiopia to know 
about the challenges and opportunities of refugee life before they cross the border.  
Others recommended that urban refugees in Nairobi should be forthcoming and active to 
integrate to the Kenyan society. Integration, they argued, cannot be realized only by state 
laws and regulations. According to one of my informants, “Ethiopian refugees should be 
more open-minded to integrate themselves with the Kenyan people. This creates a lot of 
opportunities for both the refugee community and Kenyans”. Part of this integration, 
refugees uphold, comes from finding job opportunities and being productive member of 
society.   
 I think most refugees are dependent on cash transfers from relatives who live in 
countries like American and Canada. This hurts the confidence and enthusiasm of 
refugees to find jobs here and thrive on their own. There are some who have been 
receiving help for 10 years. Imagine how that affects your self esteem?! Most people 
get addicted with alcohol and drugs because they are jobless and idle. In my opinion, 
integration should foster creating work opportunities for urban refugees. 
 
7.2 Recommendations by Policy Actors 
Go Beyond Encampment  
Opinion about Kenya’s refugee policy swings between two extremes. There are many 
who argue that Kenya has the record and reputation of being the most welcoming country 
for refugees in East Africa. There are others who blame Kenya for benefiting from the 
instability of neighboring countries in two ways: 1) by hosting a myriad of international 
and UN organizations who are involved in humanitarian assistance in the Horn, and 2) 
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through income remittances from abroad to the refugees themselves. Most of the 
respondents graded Kenya highly when it comes to receiving refugees but they express 
their doubts about its center most strategy of refugee administration i.e. encampment. 
One of the respondents stated,  
The Kenyan government has been welcoming refugees for more than 5 decades 
now. The government also had peaceful relations with the Ethiopian government 
and people.  But they insist on confining refuges to camps! They were always 
concerned to round up and confine refugees in remote camps which were so arid 
and inhospitable. Actually, I think Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania have a much 
more relaxed policy towards refugees. In these countries refugees are not forced 
to stay in camps. Most live in urban areas, trade, send their children to education 
and at the same time process their relocation in Western countries.  
The respondents recognize that the current refugee law sticks to the encampment 
approach and totally neglects the phenomenon of urban refugees. This, they argue, should 
be reversed. Some are not very enthusiastic about the implementation of naturalization as 
per the new constitution. They have doubts whether there is the political will to enforce 
the provision. One of the officials of Refuge Point explained his reason as follows,  
In the current Refugee Law of Kenya encampment is put in a preferred position. 
Things have not changed much. I know there are new interesting provisions in the 
new constitution of Kenya but I very much doubt if this promise will soon be 
realized. Let alone refugees from Ethiopian and the Sudan, even Somali Kenyans 
had to now carry a second identification card proving that they are Kenyans. 
Hence there is still a lot of suspicion against refugees in Kenya. Let me give you 
an example, I am European and my wife is a Kenyan. But nobody considers our 
daughter as Kenyan, people call her a “Musungu” (a white person) even though 
this is where she is born and brought up! 
Even though these actors are clear eyed about the challenges of shifting from the old 
encampment policy of the government, they underline that more efforts should be 
expended to expand the bundle of rights and services for urban refugees in Nairobi. In 
short, they all agree on the need to go beyond encampment.  
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More Freedoms and Empowerment 
Respondents insist that a new policy approach to urban refugees should bequeath more 
freedoms, aspire to empower them economically and bring them to the fold of the 
Kenyan society. A senior Kenyan researcher on refugee matters in Kenya pointed,  
Urban citizenship is the answer. Kenya will benefit more if we relax our 
regulations on refugees and give them more freedom to work. It benefits the city 
for the following three reasons. First of all, refugees bring a lot of skills with 
them. Especially urban refugees are people who are educated in their country. 
They have some professional training that they can turn into business when they 
come here. Secondly, we create more jobs for Kenyans and create revenue. 
Thirdly, refugees could use their global connections to bring in capital (by way of 
remittances or seed capital) into the country. 
Another official from Danish Refugee Council in Kenya argued along the same lines 
stating, “We have to encourage and support the full integration of urban refugees. 
Especially the young people have the potential to integrate faster because they speak the 
language, go to school here and have Kenyan friends”. Accordingly, he listed the 
following specific policy recommendations which summed up the comments of the other 
respondents concisely. He stated,  
1) The provision of security and protection for urban refugees should be the first 
priority. This means police harassment and corruption should stop. 2) The creation of 
a formal safety net for basic services provision is highly indispensable. 3) Awareness 
creation and public sympathy for refugees is important. 4) We should also be working 
towards the socioeconomic integration of urban refugees.  
As far as providing security and protection for refugees is concerned, our respondents 
stated that there still are many refugees that do not have the alien certificate. Providing 
these IDs will help a long way. They also added that The Kenyan government should 
seriously undertake Police reform to ward off such practices like corruption, harassment, 
and arbitrary arrests. When it comes to the provision of a social safety net for urban 
refugees, my respondents indicated three major ways of doing so.  First, they underscored 
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that linking refugees to the government institutions and providing efficient public 
services would go a long way. For instance, easing the bureaucratic red tape for refugees 
who seek trade licenses can be a good start. Secondly, the government can encourage 
banks to finance small business initiatives of urban refugees. Thirdly, the Kenyan 
government can help train and improve refugee skills for the Kenyan labor market. Last 
but not least, both the government and civil society organizations can work aggressively 
to create public awareness about the Refugee Act, their rights and responsibilities in 
Kenya. Such action could help stem down the fear, insecurity and also xenophobia that 
some Kenyans may have towards refugees. This is extremely important in light of the 
tension and intermittent mob violence that erupts after bomb attacks by extremist 
elements. 
End Turf Wars and Corruption 
Respondents within the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR 
indicated that there is duplication of efforts by the department of refugee affairs (DRA) 
and the UNHCR. This lack of a clear division of labor between DRA and the UNHCR 
has led to a turf war between these two agencies. The DRA insists that it should 
undertake the entire process of refugee registration and third country settlement. The 
DRA officials spoke out that the UNHCR should only confine itself to camp management 
and the IOM to travel arrangement. This obviously does not tally up with the 
international conventions and customary practice.  
In addition, the relocation process of refugees is facing a lot of difficulty because the 
DRA insisted that refugees should secure exit visa when they leave the country. 
According to an IOM official,  
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This is a bureaucratic red tape since refugees have their alien certificates, the 
refugee mandate status documents, and legal travel documents with entry visas 
when they go the airports. Some officials inside the DRA and the department of 
Immigration, however, intimidate refugees and ask for money in order to issue 
them exit visas.  
The problem of corruption and refugee harassment, common within the police force, 
seems to be affecting the DRA too. Unfortunately refugees will pay anything to use their 
long waited chance of moving to the West and not miss their final chance.  They are 
vulnerable and eager. The issue has now become a bone of contention between the 
Kenyan authorities, on the one hand, and the international agencies, on the other.  The 
turf war should come to an end and government corruption abated from the ranks of the 
DRA, if refugees are to lead a more secure and promising life in Nairobi. 
Engage the City Council and Ward Management 
Urban refugees constitute a significant portion of Nairobi’s population. But the city 
council never engaged them in policy dialogue as stakeholders in any of its ventures. This 
is because the government plans are mainly designed to address Kenyan citizens via the 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) which claims to be the sole government agency to 
oversee refugee matters in Kenya. However, the city council should be involved since 
urban refugees contribute to the local economy and also are consumers of public goods 
and services such as roads, schools, transport services, housing and other utilities.  In 
fact, three of the ward managers which govern the refugee populated areas of Eastleigh 
and Kilimani discussed major problems part of which are attributed to the constant influx 
of refugees to these neighborhoods. One of the managers of Eastleigh North ward 
summarized these problems as follows,   
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We have a constant inflow of refugees into Eastleigh and our apartments are crowded. 
Hence we have big problem of solid waste management in the ward. Language and 
communication barrier is another problem we have with refugees. Most refugees do 
not speak very good English or Swahili. We also have security problems. Most of 
these refugees used to be combatants and some still have political acrimonies and 
clan rivalries (this is especially the case with Somalis). Occasionally, scuffles and 
fights break out between them. I remember two incidents where the ward 
management and district police were involved to stop the fights and resolve the 
disputes.  
Given these pressing issues, one would assume that the city government will be working 
with representatives of urban refugees to address problems of housing, sanitation and 
hygiene, and public safety. But all government representatives confirmed that no such 
channel exists between the city government and the refugee community. A senior official 
at Nairobi’s Social Development Bureau confirmed about this stating,  
About 4 months ago, representatives of Oromo refugees from Ethiopia came to 
register as a group. Their objective was to raise relief and development aid for 
their community here in Nairobi and implement urban based community 
development projects. Once their association got registered by our bureau; the 
DRA issued a letter that they cannot be registered and that every correspondence 
with an individual or a group of refugees in Nairobi should be directed to it. 
Apparently, their certificate was suspended by higher authorities. 
Clearly city and ward level managers are sidelined from refugee administration. This is 
despite the fact that they provide most of the services on the ground and interact with the 
refugee populace on a day to day basis. It is therefore very important that the city 
council and its leaders at the various tiers of local administration open lines of 
communication with urban refugees and liaise to manage these wards safely and 
effectively. They have not been able to do this so far. 
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      CHAPTER VIII    
                                 CONCLUSION   
     
It is important to recap the three major research questions of the study in order to provide 
a summary of the findings and reflections from the fieldwork.  First, I set out to 
understand how Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the 
city of Nairobi. Secondly, I aimed to evaluate whether the conceptual tools of Lefebvre’s 
‘right to the city’ approach and his call for urban citizenship help us explain the social, 
political and economic processes that refugees yield in Nairobi. Finally, I set out to find 
out practical policy recommendations that both refugees and the researcher deem are 
useful entry points to better the living conditions of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi.  
 
These research questions could be redefined in ways which emphasize the theoretical 
inferences, and reflections the study aimed to make from the outset.  Seen from such 
vantage point, the first research question could be rephrased as follows, “Do urban 
refugees have the right to participate centrally in the production of urban space?” The 
second research question can also be reformulated as follows, “How far can the urban 
citizenship literature on western cities (aiming at the inclusion and participation of 
immigrants and strangers) explain the situation of urban refugees in non-western cities? 
Last but not least, our emphasis on policy issues can also be rearranged as follows, “What 
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kinds of policy recommendations could be made to improve the provisions as well as the 
implementation of these policies?” A caveat is important here. The central research 
objective of the study remains the same whether one takes the empirical route of 
interpreting and analyzing field data or prefers the theoretical route of superimposing 
Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ model to identify patterns or anomalies. In a nutshell, this 
study set out to explore, qualify, and explain how refugees negotiate aspects of urban 
citizenship in Nairobi.  
As far as methodology is concerned, I employed a case study design interviewing 
refugees, community and business leaders, representatives of civil society organizations 
that support urban refugees, and finally government officials. Nairobi was selected 
because Kenya has been the only stable country in East Africa hosting refugees from 
neighboring countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Northern Uganda and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Official figures suggest there are “around 46,000 
refugees in Nairobi, however unofficial estimates are nearer 100,000 (UNHCR 2010).” 
The same report indicated that Ethiopians comprise the second largest nationality of 
urban refugees in Nairobi following Somalis. 
A qualitative case study, I argued, provides a suitable platform of engaging our research 
questions because its epistemological assumptions are based on “interpretivism”.  
Interpretivism posits that “reality and meaning are constructed from the actions and 
reactions of society’s constituent members, the individuals” (Bryman, 2004:17). 
Qualitative research asserts that the researcher and the social world impact each other.  
Value free research is impossible to conduct for facts and values are not distinct but 
intertwined. But most importantly, qualitative research rebels against the excesses of 
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positivism which attempt to impose principles and regularities while studying human 
behavior.  The biggest advantage of conducting this case study was therefore to study 
human behavior in a real life context capturing the refugees’ own perspectives and 
interpretation of social processes but also yielding them to a coherent theoretical lens i.e. 
the “right to the city” approach.   
Accordingly, I conducted a total of thirty (30) semi-structured interviews with Ethiopian 
urban refugees in three municipal wards of Nairobi. In addition I undertook a total of 
twenty (20) key informant interviews with three different groups of people. First, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with a total of seven (7) Kenyan government officials in 
the city council, and municipal wards. This was followed by interviews with 
representatives of both local (Kenyan) and international NGOs working on the issue of 
urban refugees in Nairobi.  I conducted a total of 7 key informant interviews with 
members of the civil society sector. Finally, I conducted six (6) key informant interviews 
with Ethiopian community leaders who are active in religious, or community 
associations. The Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK) was very instrumental in helping 
me build rapport with the refugee community in Nairobi and facilitating the selection 
process of informants. All of the urban refugees that I approached were willing to be 
interviewed anonymously.  I also used their recommendation to identify and shortlist a 
group of Ethiopian refugee-cum- businessmen and community leaders for the key 
informant interviews. Again, RCK’s officials were very instrumental to introduce me to 
the NGO community working on refugee matters and arranging interviews.  
The only setback I encountered was the refusal of station, division and metropolitan 
police officers who refused to be interviewed. Getting the police perspective would have 
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been very useful, but civilian government officials partially compensated for the lack of 
that perspective by explaining the government’s stand on refugee matters, in general, and 
police-refugee relations, in particular. It is also important to state here that the anonymity 
of all refugee informants has been kept. I have taken extra care to transcribe the data 
carefully, anonymize and protect it. To the best of my ability, I was also cautious to 
phrase questions in broad strokes and thematic fashion avoiding personal and pointed 
questions which may invoke harm and pain to the respondents.  
Table 7 provides a summary of the major findings of the study in relation to the three 
overarching research questions posited above. The depiction is followed by three 
consecutive sections which provide a detailed summary of the findings. Section 8.1 
explains how refugees negotiate certain aspects of urban citizenship in Nairobi. Section 
8.2, dwells on the lessons learned regarding the applicability of the right to the city in 
Africa and conversely what Africa brings to the right to the city analysis. Section 8.3 
summarizes the major policy recommendations made both by refugees and policy actors 
in order to better protect and enhance refugee rights and wellbeing in Nairobi. Last but 
not least, section 8.4 provides a tight summary of what emerged as the overarching theme 
of the study i.e. the theme of being a “stranded stranger”. It ends with a brief discussion 
of potential areas of research and inquiry regarding the urban citizenship literature and its 






Table 7 Summary of Major Research Questions and Findings  
Research Questions  Findings  
1. How do Ethiopian urban refugees 
negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the 
city of Nairobi? 
 
1. Inhabitance 
Despite official policy to encamp refugees, 
movement into and residence inside the city of 
Nairobi has not been sanctioned against 
refugees. To use Lefebvre’s qualifier, 
inhabitance is the first step through which 
urban refugees negotiate citizenship in Nairobi.  
2. Production of Urban Spaces 
In Nairobi, Ethiopian refugees actively 
construct “perceived”, “conceived” and 
“social” spaces.  
2.1 They occupy recognizable and crudely 
delineated territorial representations such as 
apartment buildings, churches, mosques, bars 
and restaurants in certain neighborhoods. 
2.2 These perceived urban spaces translate into 
conceived spaces created through routine 
interactions with territory, the fringes of the 
Kenyan state and the host community.  
 
2.3 Refugees also construct what Lefebvre 
termed social spaces on a day to day basis in 
Nairobi. They work both in the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy. They also 
established their own religious and cultural 
institutions.  
 
2. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ 
approach to explain the everyday struggle of 
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and 
resources in the city of Nairobi? 
 
3.Participatory and Democratic 
Management 
3.1 Urban refugees fail to meet the third criteria 
of Lefebvre’s urban citizenship criterion i.e. 
political rights to participate in the governance 
of the city. 
3.2 Policy wise, the Kenyan state speaks about 
the recognition and upkeep of refugee rights 
while considering them as national security 




3.3 The relationship between state officials and 
urban refugees is one of discrimination and 
exploitation. Racial profiling, harassment, 
corruption, and arbitrary arrests are 
commonplace. 
3.4 The right to the city literature is inadequate 
for it takes the liberal democratic state for 
granted as opposed to authoritarianism and 
neo-patrimony prevalent in Africa. 
3.5 Its emphasis on globalization and the 
reduction in the powers of the nation-state fails 
to explain the condition in Kenya. Here, it is 
national agencies like the police, the 
intelligence and Department of Refugee Affairs 
who are exclusively involved in managing 
refugee affairs.  
3.6 Struggles for “right to the city” do not 
happen exclusively or detached from parallel 
struggles for “right to the nation-state”. Hence 
the urban citizenship literature should re-focus 
also on the politics of the nation-state. 
 
3. What kind of urban policy measures can 
African cities take to manage displacement 
driven urbanization and use it as a positive 
force for social change? 
4.1 Enhance economic opportunities for urban 
refugees offering them both employment and 
business opportunities.  
4.2 Easing the bureaucratic red tape to secure 
“alien certificates”, and UN mandated refugee 
certificates. 
4.3 Explore possibilities to secure Kenyan 
citizenship for those who have decided to settle 
in Kenya permanently 
4.4. Go beyond encampment and promote the 
integration of refugees through economic, 
social and cultural means. 
4.5 Enable urban refugees to participate in 
urban governance and policy dialogue as 






8.1 Seeing like a City: Negotiating Urban Citizenship in Nairobi 
Ethiopian urban refugees live in relative peace with regular Kenyans. They trade, supply 
goods and services to the Kenyan market. They also buy goods and services produced 
and sold by Kenyans. They have an overwhelmingly positive attitude about the 
opportunities Nairobi has offered them. They also are grateful about the acceptance and 
tolerance of regular Kenyans to the urban refugees found in their midst. I dubbed this 
amicable social space that refugees create in interaction with regular citizens of Kenya as 
integration from below.  It is a social space featured by a teeming diversity (or complexity 
as Magnusson calls it) of actors, motives and economic strategies. 
 
Let me start from the diversity of the refugees themselves. Often, there is an assumption 
(mainly by the State) that a refugee is an individual who is forced out of his or her 
country due to fear of persecution or eminent life threats. But this political definition 
faded away in our case where most urban refugees are not political refugees at all. In fact 
many fled to Nairobi for economic reasons.  Most refugees consider Nairobi as their 
launching pad to settle in Western Europe and America. Others use it as transit point to 
travel all the way to South Africa which has now become a popular destination for illegal 
immigration and human trafficking. Still others arrived in Nairobi to look for a job and 
settle in there permanently. Of course, there were many who fled Ethiopia for reasons of 
political persecution. But there were also others who were lured by stories of fortune and 
adventure that they heard from their lovers, family members and friends to come and 
settle in Nairobi.  Right from the outset, therefore, urban refugees defy the conventional 
way of defining a refugee. They are a diverse group of actors who view their hiatus in 
Nairobi in more ways than politics. 
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Urban refugees are also diverse in terms of their economic strategies. They are actively 
involved in both the formal and informal sectors of Nairobi’s economy. Most are 
employed in the urban transport sectors, owning public minibuses (the “matatus”) or 
serving as drivers, ushers (“makangas”) or conductors (money collectors). Both women 
and men are involved in small businesses like beauty salons, barber shops, audio and 
video stores, boutiques, and cafeterias. These businesses are registered by the city council 
of Nairobi and refugees have to pay annual fees to get their business permits renewed 
every year.  I also interviewed business tycoons who landed in Nairobi as refugees but 
have risen to the top. They broke into the formal economy running high end restaurants, 
cosmetic stores, construction companies, and import and export enterprises in Nairobi.  In 
fact, I have realized that these businessmen have created a lot of job opportunities for 
Ethiopians and Kenyans too.  
It is this diversity that problematizes our use of the word “refugee.” I persisted in using 
the term “refugee” only as a signifier that we are talking about people who left their 
country of origin, and crossed an international boundary to live in the city of a 
neighboring country. Otherwise, the participation of Ethiopian refugees in the Kenyan 
economy complicates their status of residence in Nairobi.  Most of them sought economic 
opportunities in Kenya either permanently or until their final relocation in a third country. 
They did not confine themselves to refugee camps waiting for their final settlement in 
another country. This makes it hard to call them only as “refugees”. But we cannot define 
them “immigrants” either. This is because the overwhelming majority of them await 
resettlement in a third and preferably western country. For convenience purpose, they all 
carry a refugee “alien certificate” even though their real intent may not even be to 
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relocate.  For instance, I have identified people that the Kenyan state recognizes as 
“refugees” but have arrived in the city to permanently settle and make a living.  One is 
tempted to refer to this group of people as “illegal immigrants” but they are comfortable 
to carry a refugee ID and live in Nairobi indefinitely.  Perhaps, one can qualify them as 
de facto immigrants.  
Again, it is hard to define urban refugees as full-fledged Kenyan citizens. But most of 
these refugees have stayed in Kenya for more than decades; some have married and had 
children in Kenya. Some of them have children in Kenya who may claim Kenyan 
citizenship by birth. What would this make of their parents? The second generation of 
Ethiopian refugees go to Kenyan schools, speak perfect Swahili and often struggle to 
speak Ethiopian languages. Some of this young people perceive themselves as Kenyans 
and so is their social world. This reminds us of Holsten and Appadurai’s distinction about 
substantive and formal citizenship. Looking at this particular segment of Ethiopian 
refugees; one wonders whether they do not meet the ‘substantive’ criterion for Kenyan 
citizenship.   
How do these practices speak to Lefebvre’s notion of “urban citizenship”? Lefebvre 
removes the ground of citizenship from descent (from citizen parents) or being born in 
that country; and fixes it on the notion of inhabitance. He speaks of urban citizens as 
people who have full rights to live in, work in, and play in the city and therefore have 
ownership and usership rights to the city.  Third, Lefebvre speaks of empowering all 
inhabitants with the power to be directly involved in the management of the affairs of the 
city. He was skeptical about the virtues of liberal representative democracy which 
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alienate the regular voter and empower technocrats in the actual governing of the 
metropolis.  
We should consider Lefebvre’s three fold taxonomy of urban spaces to have a better 
understanding what I dubbed integration from below. In his book The Production of 
Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three main ways of understanding space i.e. 
“perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Perceived spaces signify physical abodes. 
Conceived spaces are the impressions, biases, or in general, representations etched with 
such physical spaces. Finally, lived spaces refer to the everyday lived experience of the 
inhabitants. This they do by navigating through both the physical and mental scapes of 
the city. Urban refugees are very active in the creation of all three forms of urban space.  
In Nairobi, Eastleigh represents that geographically delineated physical and territorial 
space where refugees dwell in, play in and work in. There, they produce goods and 
services. They trade with fellow Kenyans and other African refugees. They rent 
apartment buildings; go to churches and mosques, or visit bars and restaurants. These 
perceived spaces translate into conceived spaces that refugees create through their routine 
interactions with territory, the fringes of the Kenyan state and the host community. For 
instance, Kenyan officials usually refer to Eastleigh as “their” neighborhood marking 
and addressing it as the neighborhood of outsiders (i.e. refugees). Speaking of Eastleigh, 
informants come with words like “crowding”, “illegal human trafficking”, “Somali and 
Ethiopian businesses”, “bomb attacks” , “security threats” etc. For the purpose of this 
study, it does not really matter whether these stocks of conceptions about Eastleigh and 
its inhabitants are valid or not. In lieu, we need to realize that even powerful actors like 
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the state viewed Eastleigh, a remarkable urban territory, as the abode of economic and 
social interaction primarily driven by the active agency of urban refugees.  
 
Ethiopian urban refugees are no less productive when it comes to the creation of what 
Lefebvre calls social spaces. If anything, this study recorded an elaborate account of the 
“lived experience” of urban refugees. It documented their economic ventures. It also 
analyzed the creation, and role of various religious and community organizations by 
urban refugees. The researcher thinks three words will summarize the nature of these 
urban social spaces: “resilience”, “innovation” and “cooperation”. Refugees come 
through difficult conditions only to unpack and embark on new livelihood strategies 
through cooperation. To paraphrase Lefebvre, they are restless cosmopolitans constantly 
engaged in the creation and restructuration of perceived, conceived and social spaces in 
Nairobi.  Shall we then conclude that Ethiopian urban refugees are vintage urban citizens 
of Nairobi? Not really.  
 
8.2 Seeing like a State in Africa: A Critique of the Right to the City  
I have already mentioned that Lefebvre underscored “the democratic management of the 
city through the direct participation of society (Mathivet, 2010:25)” as another important 
criterion to define urban citizenship.  According to Fernandez (2007:207), Lefebvre 
recommends a “contemporary formula for social citizenship, expressing a ‘social project’ 
which requires a new political contract between the state and citizens”.  So my attempt to 
answer our central research question (whether refugees actively participate in the 
production of urban space) cannot be fully addressed unless we focus on the ways the 
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Kenyan state interacts with refugees. This is very important also because the idea of 
citizenship in all its theoretical renditions (liberal, civic –republican, cosmopolitan etc.) is 
fundamentally defined by the relationship of citizens to the state.  Chapter five and six 
dealt extensively with state-refugee relations in Nairobi bringing the politics of rights to 
the fore and showing the inadequacy of the urban citizenship literature in this regard. 
The analysis from extensive interviews with Ethiopian urban refugees pointed to another 
overarching social space which is of exclusion and discrimination in Nairobi. It is a social 
space created by a generation of legal and policy regimes that first set out to protect the 
rights of refugees. But they were gradually undermined by a counter argument which 
views refugees as national security threats and pushes for their confinement and 
exclusion. Urban refugees kept reiterating that they face the specter of discrimination and 
exploitation in Nairobi not from ordinary Kenyans but rather from the officials of the 
Kenyan state. The Kenyan Police stands out as the single most institution that draws the 
contours of a refugee-citizen divide in Nairobi.  Ethiopian refugees are far from complete 
integration in Nairobi, partly due to the exclusive and punitive policies of the Kenyan 
state directed mainly at monitoring, regulating and penalizing them.  
Let us consider these policies of governing urban refugees in more detail. Here I found 
out two parallel but contradictory policy directions. On the one hand, Kenya has been a 
signatory to the UN declaration of human rights, its conventions on the upkeep and 
protection of refugees; and the OAU convention on refugees.  It has also developed and 
ratified its own Refugee Law (2006). These conventions and declarations proffer basic 
and inalienable human rights to refugees; and enshrine the right to be a refugee as a 
human right. They encourage host states to grant refugees the right to work; to own and 
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manage material as well as intellectual property. And most importantly, the conventions 
reiterate the need to provide refugees with legal protection, ensuring their access to public 
courts and attesting their equality before the law.  They also recognized that refugees can 
become citizens of their host state through naturalization, affinal (marriage) or 
consanguinal ties (if they have children with a spouse from the host country). These 
official commitments of the Kenyan state are deemed to promote more recognition and 
inclusion. 
But there is another policy undercurrent which runs counter to the trend for more 
recognition and inclusion i.e. a trend of exclusion and securitizing the refugee 
phenomenon.  From the outset, the UN declaration of human rights preserves political 
rights only for citizens of a respective state. Refugees, it seems, are duty bound to be 
apolitical once they cross an international border. To their chagrin, host states do not find 
refugees turning apolitical. To the contrary, they become politicized. It was the OAU 
convention which first recognized the subversive, political potential of refugees. Its 
convention rushed to urge host states not to use refugee populations as cannon fodder for 
armed political insurrections against a neighboring regime.  Policy wise, therefore, states 
begun to redefine refugees as national security threats as early as the 1960s leading to the 
securitization of the refugee problem.  
 
This undercurrent translated itself into national laws and regulations whose primary 
intent is to monitor, regulate and impose stringent sanctions on refugees.  The Kenyan 
Refugee Law (2006) is undergirded by this same undercurrent of securitizing the refugee 
phenomenon. Encampment is its centermost stratagem of refugee management. The 
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highest policy making body, the Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) is populated by 
representatives from the police and the national security apparatus of the state. Refugees 
do not have any representative whatsoever. Even more, DRA is given extraordinary and 
extrajudicial (in light of international law) powers to revoke the refugee status of 
individuals or expel them out of Kenya, if there is “reasonable ground” to do so.  The Act 
does not make clear what constitutes a “reasonable ground” to rescind a refugee status or 
expel refugees. It does not also specify where expelled refugees can go afterwards.  These 
provisions erode the basic rights and freedoms of refugees, particularly their right to legal 
protection and due process. They also force refugees to live under the shadow of fear and 
insecurity.  
 
Interviews with urban refugees portrayed that they do not view Kenyan state officials as 
guarantors or protectors of their rights but the very violators. They also despise the 
encampment strategy of the state. Refugees resist encampment for a number of reasons. 
Most of these camps are located in arid and inhospitable areas with little or no housing 
facilities, clean water and electricity. The UNHCR offers food rations which are meager. 
The camps are overcrowded and they have safety and security problems. Women are 
exposed to sexual assault and rape. In more than one instances, spies of the Ethiopian 
government infiltrated camps to assassinate refugees who fled the country inside Kenya. 
Last but not least, there are no health and educational facilities around the camps. For all 
these practical reasons, refugees flee to cities.  
 
The situation they face in cities is no less challenging. Law enforcement officials, 
especially the police racially profile them. They threaten refugees for bribe and in some 
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instances arbitrarily arrest them for money. The police also release detainees without any 
legal due process if the latter concur to pay bribes. The relationship between the state 
officials and urban refugees is one of discrimination and exploitation.  The state either 
incarcerates urban refugees or else predates on them. Post 911, the refugee phenomena is 
re-securitized where refugees in Nairobi (especially the Somalis) are suspected of being 
Al Shabab operators (a Somali Jihadist group and an affiliate of Al Qaeda). The 
government of Kenya links refugees with bomb attacks of embassies, churches, and 
public transport vehicles in Nairobi.  This trend has harbored fear and xenophobia in the 
city at an alarming rate. It has also given a new excuse for rogue police officers to 
intimidate arrest and threaten to indict innocent urban refugees as national security 
threats.  To conclude, encampment, racial profiling, arbitrary arrests and rampant 
corruption attest that urban refugees operate under a political space which aims at 
discriminating and excluding them.  
 
How do these findings speak to the premises of the “right to the city” approach? The 
policies of the Kenyan state and its relations with urban refugees in Nairobi show that the 
“right to the city” literature is inadequate when it comes to explaining the role of the 
nation-state on the urban. The scholarship on urban citizenship posits the re-scaling of 
citizenship at urban levels as something which is fait accompli. The protagonists argue 
that the nation-state is relinquishing some of its powers to supra-national, sub-national, 
and private-corporate entities due to globalization (Purcell, 2003; 2002). None other than 
the Global and World City (GaWC) literature in urban studies trumpets the decline of the 
nation-state. Sassen (2006:314) summarized this line of thought as follows,  
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The national as container of social process and power is cracked, opening up 
possibilities for a geography politics that links sub-national spaces. Cities are 
foremost in this geography.  
 
However, this was not the case in Nairobi. In Kenya, it is the Department of Refugee 
Affairs (which is under the Office of the Prime Minister) which has the final say on 
matters of refugee registration, and camp management. The DRA also liaises with the 
UNHCR and has a say in the resettlement of refugees in a third (usually Western) 
country.  The national police force of Kenya and the intelligence bureau make regular 
contacts with urban refugees. The only other government agency interacting with refugee 
affairs is the City Council of Nairobi that issues business permits to refugees, collects 
annual fees and conducts a regular check up of their business premises.  In short, the role 
of the nation-state and its institutions is noteworthy, if not indispensable. There are two 
important reasons why the role of the nation-state and its interface with the urban should 
be explored.  
 
First, the creation of states in Africa is unique and qualitatively different from the history 
of state formation in Europe and North America. Lefebvre is critical about the liberal 
democratic states in the West which in his opinion alienate urbanites from self 
government and collective decision making i.e. autogestion. Ironic enough, much of the 
debate among African scholars is how to turn the page on authoritarian rule in many 
African states and ensure legitimate democratic social contracts between the people and 
their governments.  In fact, the demand for urban citizenship (if it only implies right to 
the local city-state) may sound a far cry seen from that vantage point. Secondly, the state 
is the single most powerful institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of 
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urban citizenship are inescapable. It becomes a primary target whose structure would 
need to alter if one picks the Lefebvrian project to ensure formal urban citizenship for 
immigrants, refugees, guest workers etc.  
 
It is this lacuna of the urban citizenship literature that prompted me to consider 
theoretical discussions about the origins and nature of the post-colonial state in Africa. 
There is a raging debate about the state in Africa with multiple explanations about its 
authoritarian and adversely extractive nature. Section 6.4 attempted to provide a cursory 
review of these debates. Some speak of it in terms of weak institutional make up. Others 
talk about the preponderance of ethnic and personal networks of power that forced the 
state to be neo-patrimonial. Still others speak of sustained but cavalier attempts to import 
and impose Western models of governance (like neo-liberalism) in Africa which ignore 
local realties and often falter.  As I indicated before, these schools of thought about the 
nature of the post colonial state in Africa do not provide us an exhaustive list of 
explanations about the root causes of authoritarianism in Africa.  Rather they point out to 
the need for a more comprehensive and deeper analysis about the structure and functions 
of the Kenyan state, itself a post-colonial creation. Two caveats are important here.  
First, this is not to argue that citizenship is not entirely contested at an urban level at all. 
Rather, it is to argue that urban refugees employ their individual and collective agency as 
well as resources to chip away from the confining, monitoring and fixing acts of the state 
both at urban and national levels. Hence, struggles for “right to the city” do not happen 
exclusively or detached from parallel struggles for “right to the nation-state”. These 
processes are happening altogether at once. They are intertwined both in essence (what 
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urban refugees demand) and in scale (whether they demand it at national or urban levels). 
Our task should therefore be to explore the inter-linkages between these registers of 
political action. It is in that spirit that I call for a re-focus also on the politics of the 
nation-state. Here, I think Warren Magnusson’s recent work and his call for 
understanding the politics of urbanism (2011)  both through the optic of the “nation-state” 
and “the city” is a useful point to start from. 
Second, the lack of integration cannot wholly be attributed to the policies of the state. 
Refugees’ own conception of otherness and their tendency to cling to folks from their 
country of origin for psychological and social purposes also explains the lack of full 
integration. This is reinforced by the unique economic, religious and cultural institutions 
and practices that refugees create. For instance, there are two Ethiopian Orthodox 
churches and around seven Ethiopian evangelical churches.  They have charity and care 
giving associations like “Maedot”.  These institutions provide assistance for the poor, the 
sick and the elderly. They provide trainings in language and business skills to help 
refugees integrate. They comfort refugees when a family member passes away. They 
support refugees who choose to go back to Ethiopia by defraying travel costs. Refugees 
also have fraternity and sorority associations known as “Mahibers.”  
There are two effects of this particular process. On the one hand, it proves that refugees 
are constantly involved in creating social practices and structures. Their temporal and 
spatial suspension in Nairobi did not deter them from such “creative” transition.  It is also 
essential to note that different cohorts of refugees come and go via Nairobi but the 
institutions that they founded outlast their “stay” in Nairobi. But on the other hand, these 
institutions are exclusively for Ethiopian refugees; reinforcing that identity of ‘otherness’; 
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preventing local Kenyans from joining in, and also serving as disincentives for Ethiopian 
refugees to break their shell and fully integrate with the Kenyan public. In a situation 
where this social and cultural divide is clearly felt and pronounced by both sides, the 
Kenyan state would not obviously entertain the bequeathal of political rights in urban 
centers. In other words, the lack of integration on the part of refugees themselves 
dampens efforts for full urban citizenship in the Lefevbrian sense. 
8.3 Policy Recommendations  
Chapter 7 has dealt with policy recommendations made both by refugees and policy 
actors in great detail. However, most of these recommendations could be clustered into 
five (5) focal areas. First, refugees and policy actors stressed the need to promote 
economic opportunities for urban refugees offering them both employment and business 
opportunities. Secondly, they stressed the importance for legal recognition and 
protection. This, many stated, could be facilitated by cutting the bureaucratic red tape that 
prevents refugees from securing “alien certificates”, and UN “mandated refugee 
certificates” in time.  
 
Even more, one third of our refugee respondents expressed their enthusiasm about the 
new Kenyan constitution which avails the opportunity for naturalization. Hence they 
called for legal and policy instruments that offer a path to Kenyan citizenship. Fourthly, 
both refugees and policy actors stressed the importance of going beyond encampment, 
recognizing and addressing the challenges and opportunities that urban refugees avail in 
Nairobi. This, they argued, could be realized not only through legislative and policy 
actions by the state but also by promoting the economic and social integration of refugees 
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into the mainstream Kenyan society. Last but not least, both urban refugees and policy 
actors in government and the civil society sector underscored the need to involve urban 
refugees in Nairobi’s governance as crucial stakeholders. 
 
8.4 Stranded Strangers  
This study is about strangers who are stranded in space, time and identity in Nairobi. It is 
about Ethiopian refugees whose stay in Nairobi produced interesting social, economic 
and political practices difficult to qualify in such conventional terms like “refugee”, 
“immigrant” or a “citizen”. The bulk of the analysis can be summed up under this 
overarching theme of being a “stranded stranger”. All said, urban refugees exist and 
interact on two different spaces. On the one hand, they are aggressively involved in 
economic activities, social and religious affairs. They muster their skills, money, time and 
social networks not only to survive but also to create revenue and employment 
opportunities; to render social support for fellow other refugees; and to negotiate access 
and rights to the Kenyan state. On the other hand, refugees operate under punitive, highly 
exploitative and discriminatory political and policy regimes which deprive them some 
basic liberties and freedoms as well as the legal protection they deserve from the host 
nation i.e. the Kenyan state. It is this virtual state of suspension; this liminal state of 
existence between a refugee and an urban citizen; I preferred to call being a “stranded 
stranger”.  
 
The reality of urban refugees is torn in such a way that they meet two of the criteria of 
Lefebvre’s concept of urban citizenship ( inhabitance and the production of urban spaces) 
but they miserably fail to meet the third criterion i.e. political rights to participate in the 
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governance of the city. Given these findings, the right to the city literature should expand 
its horizon and conduct more empirical and comparative studies in non-western cities. It 
needs to shed apriori assumptions about the impact of globalization on the power of 
nation-states. Rather it should explore how the “national” interacts with the “urban”. It 
also needs to grapple with the notion of post-colonial states in the South where 
authoritarian and neo-patrimonial regimes are more of the norm than the exception. As 
evidenced in this study, their history and dynamics is clearly different than the case of 
liberal, democratic, and Westphalian states in Europe and North America. Such ventures 
will not stifle attempts to develop meta theories about urbanism at a global scale. Instead, 
they will provide us the theoretical insights and the research techniques to understand 
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1. How long have you been living in Nairobi? What was the primary reason that 
made you leave your country of origin? 
2. Have you been living in Refugee camps before moving to Nairobi? If yes, why 
did you move to Nairobi? 
3. Did you have a host family or a relative who assisted you while arriving in 
Nairobi? If yes, what kind of support did they provide you? 
4. Do you rent your place of domicile in Nairobi? If yes, how did you contact the 
land lords? 
5. Were there any surprises or cultural shocks that you experienced when you first 
landed in Nairobi? Can you share some of your anecdotes with us? 
II. Economic Rights  
6. What is your major source of income in Nairobi? How do you cover your monthly 
expenses for food, clothing and shelter? 
7. Do you have preferences when it comes to who you buy your basic essentials 
(food, and clothing) from? If yes, please discuss? 
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8. Are you engaged in any remunerative economic activity in Nairobi? If so, can you 
tell us more about your occupation? 
9.  If you have a job, do you work alongside Kenyans at your work place? If yes, 
how do you evaluate the relationship between Kenyans and Ethiopian refugees at 
your job? 
10. Do you have a bank account in Nairobi? If yes, how easy is it for refugees to open 
a bank account in Nairobi? 
11. Do you have a business of your own in Nairobi? If yes, what do you sell? And 
when did you establish your business? 
12. Do you have particular preference about who you hire in your business (Kenyans, 
Ethiopian Refugees or both)? In any of these cases, why? 
13. Are you licensed by the city government? Can you tell us how the process works 
for refugees that would like to open businesses in Nairobi? 
14. Do you pay taxes to the city government, the national government, or both? 
15. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing, 
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities? 
16. How is your business being viewed by Kenyans or other refugees in Nairobi? 
17. Are you a member of any local saving and credit association in Nairobi? 
18. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban 






III. Political Rights  
19. Are you registered or ID’ed by the Kenyan government or the city council as a 
refugee? If yes, which agency is responsible? And, what are the procedures 
involved? 
20.  Do the Kenyan authorities specify your ‘rights’ as urban refugees? If yes, what 
are the main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi? 
21. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties and restrictions on you as urban refugees? 
If yes, what are these duties and restrictions that you have to abide by while living 
in Nairobi? 
22. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and 
urban refugees? 
23. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the 
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case? 
24. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’ 
the law enforcement officials? 
25. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling 
legal and political matters of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? 
26. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and 






IV. Social Capital 
27. Do you or other Ethiopian refugees you know of attend schools or higher 
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?  
28. Do refugees have preferences for study purposes? If yes, why? (School fees, 
curricula, proximity, sense of community etc...) Do Ethiopian refugees have their own 
community schools in Nairobi? 
29. Do Ethiopian refugees have their own religious institutions (churches or mosques) 
in Nairobi? If so, do you know how these institutions were established and managed? 
30. Do you attend such religious services? If so, can you tell us the reasons why you 
attend these services? How do these institutions impact both refugees and the host 
community? 
31. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do 
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community? 
V. Urban Refugee Policy  
 32. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of 
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi introduce to address the conditions of urban 
refugees?  





Appendix 2: Interview Questions for Community Representatives of 






1. When did Ethiopian refugees start to migrate into Kenya? Can we speak of 
different phases of refugee inflow into Kenya from Ethiopia? 
2. What are the primary reasons that instigated the outflow of people from Ethiopia 
into Kenya? 
3. Relatively speaking, are many of the Ethiopian refugees found in refugee camps 
or in the city of Nairobi? 
4. What are the pros and cons of staying in refugee camps?  
5. Do many refugees travel into Nairobi from camps? If yes, why do they move into 
Nairobi from these camps? 
6. What are the pros and cons of staying in cities like Nairobi for refugees?  
7. What kind of support system do refugees have when they settle in Nairobi? Can 
we speak of different social (family, community or organizational) support 
schemes for new people? 
8. How do people access housing services in Nairobi? And how do they cover costs 
related to housing? 
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9. Do most Ethiopians experience cultural shocks when they first land in Nairobi? 
Can you share some of your anecdotes with us? 
II. Economic Rights  
10. How do refugees support themselves financially? How do they cover their 
monthly expenses for food, clothing and shelter? 
11. Are there Ethiopian refugees engaged in any remunerative economic activity in 
Nairobi? If so, can you tell us more about these occupations and economic 
activities? 
12.  Are there businesses owned and run by Ethiopian refugees? If yes, can you tell us 
more about the nature of these businesses? 
13. Do these businesses have particular preference about who they hire as a worker 
(Kenyans, Ethiopian Refugees or both)? 
14. Do these businesses cater only for Ethiopians or both Kenyans and Ethiopians? 
15. Do Ethiopian refugees have local saving and credit association in Nairobi? 
16. Is Nairobi a business friendly city for urban refugees when it comes to the 
registration, licensing and operation? If yes, why? If not, why not? 
17. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing, 
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities? 
18. In your opinion, how do Kenyans view business owned and run by Ethiopians in 
Nairobi? 
19. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban 




III. Political Rights  
20.  Which government agencies are responsible for following up on refugee affairs 
in Nairobi? What are their respective responsibilities?  
21. Do Kenyan authorities specify the ‘rights’ of urban refugees? If yes, what are the 
main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi? 
22. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties, or prohibitions on urban refugees? If 
yes, what are these prohibitions that urban refugees need to abide by while living 
in Nairobi? 
23. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and 
urban refugees? 
24. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the 
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case? 
25. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’ 
the law enforcement officials? 
26. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling 
legal and political matters of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? 
27. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and 
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? 
28. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at 
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not?  
 
29. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production 




IV. Social Capital 
30. Do Ethiopian refugees have their own educational institutions (primary, middle or 
high schools etc...) 
31.  Do Ethiopian refugees have preferences for school purposes? If yes, why? 
(School fees, curricula, proximity, sense of community etc.)  
32.  Do Ethiopian refugees have their own religious institutions (churches or mosques) 
in Nairobi? If so, do you know how these institutions were established and 
managed? 
33. In your opinion, do these religious institutions have other social functions than 
organized worship? How do these institutions impact both refugees and the host 
community? 
34. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do 
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community? 
V. Urban Refugee Policy  
35. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of 
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi can introduce to address or improve the 
conditions of urban refugees?  











1. When did Ethiopian refugees start to migrate into Kenya? Can we speak of 
different phases of refugee inflow into Kenya from Ethiopia? 
2. What are the primary reasons that instigated the outflow of people from Ethiopia 
into Kenya? 
3. Relatively speaking, are many of the Ethiopian refugees found in refugee camps 
or in the city of Nairobi? 
4. What are the pros and cons of staying in refugee camps?  
5. Do many refugees travel into Nairobi from camps? If yes, why do they move into 
Nairobi from these camps? 
6. What are the pros and cons of staying in cities like Nairobi for refugees?  
7. What kind of support system do refugees have when they settle in Nairobi? Can 
we speak of different social (family, community or organizational) support 
schemes for new people? 
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8. How do people access housing services in Nairobi? And how do they cover costs 
related to housing? 
9. Do most Ethiopians experience cultural shocks when they first land in Nairobi? 
Can you share some of your anecdotes with us? 
II. Economic Rights  
10. How do refugees support themselves financially? How do they cover their 
monthly expenses for food, clothing and shelter? 
11. Are there Ethiopian refugees engaged in any remunerative economic activity in 
Nairobi? If so, can you tell us more about these occupations and economic 
activities? 
12.  Are there many businesses owned and run by Ethiopian refugees? If yes, can you 
tell us more about the nature of these businesses? 
13. Do these businesses have particular preference about who they hire as a worker 
(Kenyans, Ethiopian Refugees or both)? 
14. Do these businesses cater only for Ethiopians or both Kenyans and Ethiopians? 
15. Do Ethiopian refugees have local saving and credit association in Nairobi? 
16. Is Nairobi a business friendly city for urban refugees when it comes to the 
registration, licensing and operation? If yes, why? If not, why not? 
17. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing, 
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities? 




19. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban 
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not? 
 
III. Political Rights  
20.  Which government agencies are responsible for following up on refugee affairs 
in Nairobi? What are their respective responsibilities?  
21. Do Kenyan authorities specify the ‘rights’ of urban refugees? If yes, what are the 
main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi? 
22. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties, or prohibitions on the businesses of 
urban refugees? If yes, what are these prohibitions that urban refugees need to 
abide by while living in Nairobi? 
23. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and 
the businesses of urban refugees? 
24. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the 
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case? 
25. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’ 
the law enforcement officials? 
26. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling 






IV. Urban Refugee Policy  
27. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of 
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi can introduce to address or improve the 
conditions of urban refugees?  










I. Laws, Policies and Political Rights 
1. In your opinion, what are the reasons that make Ethiopian and other refugees 
come to Nairobi? 
 
2. Do you think refugees should be allowed to settle in cities like Nairobi? Or is it 
more advisable to settle them in refugee camps? Why? 
 
3. Do you think refugees should be registered or ID’ed by Kenyan officials before 
moving into Nairobi’s neighborhoods? If so, why? If not, why not?  
4. How do you evaluate Kenya’s adherence to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees 
to which it is a signatory? 
5. Are you familiar with Kenyan national laws and policy instruments on refugees? 
If so, can you outline the basic provisions, policy goals and strategies of the 
Kenyan government on refugees? 
6. Which agencies are responsible for enforcing these national laws and policies? 
And how successful has the Kenyan government been in implementing its policy? 
7. How do you assess the role of your agency in implementing the national policy on 




8. How do you evaluate the relationship between the law enforcement agencies 
(such as the Nairobi police department) and urban refugees? 
9. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the 
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?  
10. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’ 
law enforcement officials? 
11. How do you assess the role and performance of local non-governmental 
organizations working on the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the 
strength and weaknesses of these organizations? 
12. How do you view the role and performance of UNHCR and IOM working on the 
issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the strength and weaknesses of these 
organizations? 
13. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at 
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
 
II. Economic Rights 
14. Are there Ethiopian or other refugee businesses in Nairobi? If yes, how do 
Kenyans view these businesses owned and run by refugees? 
15. Do you think, Ethiopian or other refugees in Nairobi should be allowed to open 
up businesses and trade alongside Kenyan counterparts? If so, why? If not, why 
not? 
16. Are businesses owned and run by refugees registered, licensed and taxed by 
government? If so, which authority is in charge of these duties and prerogatives?   
17. In your opinion, do refugees play a key role in transforming the urban 
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not? 
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III. Social Capital 
18.  Are you aware of Ethiopian or other urban refugees attending schools or higher 
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?  
19. Are you aware of any community school founded and managed by Ethiopians or 
other urban refugees in Nairobi? If so, why do you think refugees prefer their own 
schools than the Kenyan public school system? 
20. Are you aware of religious institutions (churches or mosques) in Nairobi founded 
by Ethiopian refugees? If so, do you know how these institutions were established 
and managed? 
21. In your opinion, how do religious institutions impact both refugees and the host 
community? 
22. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do 
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community? 
23. Is there concern/fear amongst Kenyans that refugees are not ‘integrating’ to 
Kenyan ways of living and hence are creating isolated cultural enclaves in Nairobi? 
If so, can you share us anecdotes or incidents where Kenyans expressed their 
concern about the rising influx of urban refugees from neighboring countries? 
24. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and 
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? 
25. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production 






IV. Urban Refugee Policy 
26. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are right? If so why? If 
not, why not? 
27. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are effectively enforced? 
If so why? If not, why not? 
28. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of the Kenyan government be 
when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries? 
29. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of local and international 













Appendix 5: Sample Interview Questions for Representatives of Local 





1. How long have you been living in Nairobi? 
2. Have you come across Ethiopian refugees in your neighborhood? If yes, since 
when did you begin to notice these refugees? 
3. Do you remember a particular year or period of time when a large number of 
Ethiopians started to move into your neighborhood? 
4. In your opinion, what are the reasons that make Ethiopian and other refugees 
come to Nairobi? 
 
II. Laws, Policies and Political Rights 
5. Do you think refugees should be allowed to settle in cities like Nairobi? Or is it 
more advisable to settle them in refugee camps? Why? 
 
6. Do you think refugees should be registered or ID’ed by Kenyan officials before 
moving into Nairobi’s neighborhoods? If so, why? If not, why not?  
7. How do you evaluate Kenya’s adherence to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees 
to which it is a signatory? 
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8. Are you familiar about Kenyan national laws and policy instruments on refugees? 
If so, can you outline the basic provisions, policy goals and strategies of the 
Kenyan government on refugees? 
9. Which agencies are responsible for enforcing these national laws and policies? 
And how successful has the Kenyan government been in implementing its policy? 
10. How do you assess the role of your agency in with regards to urban refugees? 
What are your agencies major activities and achievements? What are its 
challenges and obstacles? 
11. How do you evaluate the relationship between the law enforcement agencies 
(such as the Nairobi police department) and urban refugees? 
12. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the 
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?  
13. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights and 
resources from the law enforcement officials? 
14. How do you assess the role and performance of government agencies working on 
the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the strength and weaknesses of 
these organizations? 
15. How do you view the role and performance of other local and international 
organizations working on the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the 
strength and weaknesses of these organizations? 
16. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at 
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
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III. Economic Rights 
17. Are there Ethiopian or other refugee businesses in Nairobi? If yes, how do 
Kenyans view these businesses owned and run by refugees? 
18. Do you think, Ethiopian or other refugees in Nairobi should be allowed to open 
up businesses and trade alongside Kenyan counterparts? If so, why? If not, why 
not? 
19. Are businesses owned and run by refugees registered, licensed and taxed by 
government? If so, which authority is in charge of these duties and prerogatives?   
20. In your opinion, do refugees play a key role in transforming the urban 
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not? 
IV. Social Capital 
21.  Are you aware of Ethiopian or other urban refugees attending schools or higher 
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?  
22. Are you aware of any community school founded and managed by Ethiopians or 
other urban refugees in Nairobi? If so, why do you think refugees prefer their own 
schools than the Kenyan public school system? 
23. Are you aware of religious institutions (churches or mosques) in Nairobi founded 
by Ethiopian refugees? If so, do you know how these institutions were established 
and managed? 
24. In your opinion, how do religious institutions impact both refugees and the host 
community? 
25. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do 
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community? 
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26. Is there concern/fear amongst Kenyans that refugees are not ‘integrating’ to 
Kenyan ways of living and hence are creating isolated cultural enclaves in Nairobi? 
If so, can you share us anecdotes or incidents where Kenyans expressed their 
concern about the rising influx of urban refugees from neighboring countries? 
27. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and 
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? 
28. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production 
of urban space? If so, how? If not, why not? 
V. Urban Refugee Policy 
29. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are right? If so why? If 
not, why not? 
30. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are effectively enforced? 
If so why? If not, why not? 
31. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of the Kenyan government be 
when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries? 
32. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of local and international 
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Lecturer with Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa 
University (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) from 2001 to 2013. I am currently on study leave 
beginning from August 2009. 
Tasks and Achievements  
I thought the following undergraduate courses: “Urban Sociology”, “Social 
Development: Theories and Perspectives” and “Social Identities: Class, Ethnicity and 
Nationalism.” I have also supervised students’ thesis and other research work in addition 
to teaching.  
Faculty Administration  
Tasks and Achievements  
I was actively involved in faculty related activities during my nine (9) years of tenure in 
at Addis Ababa University. Accordingly,  
 
 I was elected as a representative (2006-2008) of the academic staff of the College 
of Social Sciences (CSS) in the Academic Commission of the College which is 
the highest decision making organ of the College. In the Commission, I took part 
in the preparation of the Five Years Strategic Plan of the CSS; oversaw the hiring 
of new academic staff in the College; managed student affairs of admission, 
grading and graduation ceremonies. I also served as the Secretary of the 
Commission in charge of the documenting the proceedings of the Commission 
meetings.   
 
 In 2007, I was elected by the President of Addis Ababa University to chair and 
lead a faculty-wide committee responsible for founding a Pan-African Studies 
Centre, an independent and multi-disciplinary research institute, in Addis Ababa 
University. As a chairperson of this body, I coordinated and led a faculty wide 
initiative to develop a graduate program in African Studies. I also developed an 
organizational development plan (ODP) which outlined the academic, 
administrative and finance goals of this nascent centre over a five years period of 
time.  
 
 Later in 2008, I also participated in the strategic planning process of developing a 







Research and Consultancy Projects  
I have been involved in a number of research and consultancy endeavors which could 
broadly be summarized in three thematic areas: 1) Urban development and the Right to 
the City, 2) Strategic Planning and Development Management, and 3) Well-Being 
and Development Interventions.   
 
Tasks and Achievements  
In each of these academic as well commissioned studies I served in 3 different capacities. 
I was a principal researcher in some of them where I designed the research questions, 
developed fitting methodological designs, oversaw the collection of field data and 
fully participated in the write up of reports. In other instances, I co-managed such 
research projects. Last but not least, I was also involved as a field coordinator and 
research assistance for some of the studies.  A complete list of these undertakings is 
listed below under Section III.  
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Tasks and Achievements  
 I have served as the Deputy Head of the Research and Publications sub-committee 
of the Ethiopian Society of Sociologists, Social Workers and Anthropologists 
(ESSSWA)’s Executive Committee.  The subcommittee was in charge of 
soliciting research funds for ESSWA, assisting in the publication of Doctoral 
and Masters level studies as books, and organizing monthly seminars for 
discussions among Ethiopian academics and practitioners in the fields of 
sociology, social work and anthropology. I served in this capacity for two years 
(August 2007 - July 2009). 
 
 I have served as the Board Member of a national non-profit organization “Afro 
Flag Youth Vision Association” founded by young sociology graduates of the 
AAU in 2004 to promote youth participation in electoral politics, and offer a 
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Aside from scholarly research and publications, I worked as free lance writer and 
contributor of a famous Ethiopian weekly Newspaper which operated in Ethiopia from 
2007 to 2009 known as “Addis Neger”. Up until 2009, “Addis Neger” ranked top in 
terms of readership and sale in the fledgling private media of Ethiopia. From 2009 on, the 
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blogger and commentator of current political issues unfolding in Ethiopia and the Horn of 
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 Co- researcher and writer of a Three Years Strategic Planning document 
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 Principal Researcher for a policy review study commissioned by the Aklilu 
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2006- January 2007) 
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developed for the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum, an indigenous think 
thank group founded by the CRDA, Inter Africa Group and Christian Aid 
Ethiopia. (June – September 2006)   
 
 Field researcher on an evaluative research on UNDP-Ethiopia’s partnership with 
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- December 15 2004] 
 
 Adjunct Researcher in the University of Bath [UK]based, Wellbeing In 
Developing Countries [WED] Research Project which is an interdisciplinary 
research group that explored the relationships between poverty , inequality and 
the quality of life in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Peru and Thailand( Oct,2004-
December 2005). 
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[University of Bergen, Norway] by the Norwegian Parliament to study the project 
activities, associational networks and achievements of Save the Children-Norway 
in Ethiopia, March- April 2003. 
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 Researcher in a mid-term evaluation of an urban development project in Addis 
Ababa run by the Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Project 
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 A student intern in a local NGO namely Alem Children Support Organisation 
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 Derese Getachew Kassa (2007), From OAU to AU: Relevance for Civil Society 
Organizations in Africa/Ethiopia, occasional paper read at an International 
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Rally for Peace and Democratization, Oxfam UK and the Afroflag Youth Vision,  
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extension program: A sociology of state-peasant relations”, Masters of Research 
dissertation, Department of Economics and International Development, University of 
Bath, the United Kingdom. 
 
 Derese Getachew et al (August 2003), “ A Systemic Analysis of the Rwandan 
Genocide”, Paper presented for the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, International 




 Derese Getachew Kassa (June 2000), “Impact Assessment of Indigenous 
Interventions on Child Welfare”, Bachelor of Arts Thesis, Department of sociology 
and social anthropology, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.   
 
VI.CAPABILITIES  
Excellent Communication Skills 
Experience in Program Development, Management and Evaluation 
Experience in Organizing, and Managing Research and Consultancy Groups 
Excellent Networking and Collaboration skills across and within Agencies 
  
VII.TRAINING AND WORKSHOPS 
Transnational Migration and Global Development      2012 
Bergen Summer Research School PhD Conference, University of Bergen, Norway, 20-22 
June  
 
Developing Peace Research Skills in Africa      2007 
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